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In this dissertation, I claim the sentence is a form of rhetorical delivery.  Building on scholarship 
expanding delivery beyond voice and gesture––redefining it as (among other terms) medium, 
circulation, presentation, distribution, and rhetorical velocity––I work toward a rhetoric of 
syntactic delivery, one that depends upon Performance, Display, and Location.  With a chapter 
devoted to each, these three terms allow me to interrogate the work of the sentence, to think 
through the performativity of prose, to claim that the sentence moves on the page and that those 
moves constitute a rhetorical delivery that brings discourse to its readers.    
This project intervenes in two bodies of scholarship.  To work in stylistics calling 
Composition back to the sentence, I offer a sentence re-theorized in light of its rhetorical 
delivery, a sentence necessarily bound up in the social, the political, and the rhetorical by way of 
how its grammar holds ideas in relation one to another.  To current scholarship in delivery, I 
offer the sentence as a mediated and embodied technology delivering discourse.  This is a 
performative sentence, one that asks teachers and students to read and write the sentence 
differently, looking not to error or argumentation as benchmarks of good writing but instead 
toward the performative drama unfolding as the sentence moves across the page.  But, given that 
the sentence is the foundation of both a writer’s work and a writer’s education, this dissertation 
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reaches beyond Composition to anywhere the teaching of writing takes place, the methods of 
engaging the sentence I demonstrate here applicable in a variety of rhetorical and pedagogical 
settings.   
A note on method:  I rely solely on student writing for my corpus of sentences.  I do so 
because most books on the sentence look to the prose of famous writers (Presidents, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., Didion, Wolfe, Updike, and the like), and student sentences, if they do appear at 
all, serve as examples of error.  The argument is subtle but clear: students cannot write good 
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I came to this project through the 2010 film The King’s Speech, a movie about Prince Albert, the 
Duke of York, a man who stuttered and a man who would be forced to wear the crown following 
the death of his father and the subsequent abdication of the throne by his brother, Edward VIII.  
The film focuses on the relationship between the Prince (who later assumes the title King George 
VI) and his speech therapist, Lionel Logue.  In the film’s culminating scene in Buckingham 
Palace, King George delivers an historic radio address declaring war with Nazi Germany.  Logue 
stands facing the King in the broadcast booth, the two sequestered from Palace staff.  Logue is in 
black tie.  The camera lingers over the King’s speech; it is heavily marked with slashes and 
accents to guide his delivery.  As he speaks, the King pauses between phrases, gathering himself, 
while Logue, holding a copy of the speech in one hand, gestures with the other as if conducting a 
symphony.  The scene cuts regularly to the British people listening on the battlefield, at the gates 
of the Palace, in their work places, in the halls and drawing rooms and cramped quarters of their 
homes.  Churchill, Edward VIII, and the Queen listen intently, the King calling his country to 
steadfastness during the looming war.  The King delivers the speech fluently and calmly, the 
scene a demonstration of all Logue has taught him.   
After the speech, as the King puts on his coat and he and Logue pack up, Logue quips, 
“You still stuttered on the w.”  The King responds, “Had to throw in a few, so they knew it was 
me.”  Logue smiles.  They exit the broadcast booth, Logue following behind the King, the Palace 
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staff standing in the halls, applauding.  The King sits before a desk, shuffles some papers and 
pretends to read them, and a photographer snaps a picture for the daily.  Exhausted, the King 
sighs, and to Logue’s congratulations on his first wartime speech, responds: “I suspect I should 
have to do a great deal more.”  
I am interested in how The King’s Speech highlights the rhetoricity of stuttering and the 
rhetoricity of speech therapy.  Because disability evokes pity and sympathy (as in the case of 
Tiny Tim Cratchit) or distrust (as in the case of disabled villains Captain Hook, Darth Vader, and 
the One-Armed Man), the King’s stuttering calls into question his ethos.  Consequently, it calls 
into question his ability to rally and lead a country through war.   His stuttering is, then, an issue 
of rhetorical practice.  Because The King’s Speech focuses on the political and social contexts 
and exigencies of the King’s stuttering, it resists framing itself solely as a triumph narrative 
wherein the dignity of an individual lies in the ability to overcome disability.  Martha Rose 
argues such triumph narratives have far-reaching negative consequences because they frame 
disability as a matter of “personal misfortune rather than a political situation” (65).  While there 
certainly is a triumph in the film, the King’s statement that he will have to do many more of 
these wartime speeches foreshadows that his stuttering is not so easily contained and that he will 
contend with it regularly in the years to come.   
The King’s Speech is a film about rhetorical practice, about ethos, about delivery, and this 
is made apparent in the many pedagogical moments in the movie. Though they have a therapist-
patient relationship, Logue takes on the role of teacher and the King becomes his student.  Logue 
has a reputation for unorthodox methods; their first session together has the King reading 
Shakespeare aloud while classical music blares.  Some 35 minutes into the movie, more of his 
methods are revealed: Logue has the King sing, breath deeply with the Queen sitting on his 
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chest, sway forward and back while speaking, perform facial exercises to loosen the jowls and 
tongue, hold a single sound while yelling out a window 15 seconds.  It’s a teaching montage of 
sorts, Logue and the King meeting every day to practice speech.  This is not a pedagogy of 
memorization, of lecture; this is not the “banking method.”  Rather, it is a pedagogy predicated 
upon play and experimentation.  It is a pedagogy of production––the production of sounds, the 
production of bodily movement.  So too, it is a pedagogy of invitation, Logue’s methods asking 
his student to work within a linguistic and physical and rhetorical space the King had previously 
avoided and had not been welcome to engage because of the societal, cultural, and political 
forces governing disability within the public sphere.  
For some time, I had been trying to find a connection between my wife’s work as a 
speech therapist and my own work in Composition.  The King’s Speech showed me the link.  We 
both teach delivery.  When my wife works with a teenager who stutters, a child who cannot 
pronounce r, an adult who lisps, she is teaching the canon of delivery in its most traditional sense 
(as was Logue), refining the use of the voice.  She is, on the one hand, addressing issues of 
pathology––her job title is a Speech Language Pathologist––but she tells me she thinks of her job 
not as much in terms of that pathology but instead of evaluation.  She tests her students regularly, 
determining how often and in what situations they make certain sounds, working with her 
students until they reach “mastery,” pronouncing their trouble words and sounds correctly 80% 
of the time.  She understands her job as teaching a skill, her students learning that skill and 
transferring it to various contexts.   
I note how situational speech therapy is: her students only stutter in certain contexts, or 
they only mispronounce a certain sound when it appears in the middle of a word, for instance, 
but not when it appears at the beginning or end of a word.  Speech production is contextual.  The 
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goal is for her students to transfer the speaking skills they learn to other settings, other contexts, 
other sentences, other words––that is, other rhetorical situations.  Though she never uses the term 
“delivery” in her practice, I see my wife addressing issues of rhetoric.  The pathological feeds 
into the rhetorical, affecting how her clients speak, and how they speak affects how they are 
perceived by whomever they are talking with, speaking a matter of delivery and of ethos.  This is 
the link between her work in the speech therapy room and my work in the classroom.  When I 
teach students to write essays, I too am teaching delivery.  It is a delivery quite different than 
what my wife teaches in speech therapy––a delivery of writing rather than speech––but we are 
both concerned, in one way or another, with how discourse reaches an audience.  I am careful, 
though, in this connection between her work as a speech therapist and mine in the writing 
classroom; I do not want to frame the writing classroom as one of disability or deficit, using the 
metaphor of medicine to characterize the teaching of writing.1  I do, however, want to think 
through what it might mean for a writing teacher to teach delivery.  
 As I was coming to this understanding of the relationship between speech therapy and the 
teaching of writing via delivery, I was reading Quintilian, trying to think through the 
implications of his claims regarding rhetoric and the vir bonus dicendi peritus (the good man 
skilled at speaking) (12.1.1).  Quintilian’s definition of rhetoric connects a skill at speaking––that 
is, delivery––with morality and rhetorical practice.  The three are linked.  In the introduction to 
The Orator’s Education, Quintilian clarifies who his audience is:  
There is one point I must emphasize from the start: without the help of nature, 
precepts and techniques are powerless.  This work, therefore, must not be thought 
                                                
1 See Mike Rose, “The Language of Exclusion: Writing Instruction at the University,” for more 
on how medical metaphors have framed writing instruction. 
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of as written for persons without talent, any more than treatises on agriculture are 
meant for barren soils.  And there are other aids too, with which individuals have 
to be born: voice, strong lungs, good health, stamina, good looks. 
(1.prooemium.26-27).   
These are the very physical traits my wife’s speech therapy students lack.  Hardly any have a 
strong voice, strong lungs, or good health, many are weak and have no stamina, and few possess 
“good looks” by societal standards of beauty.  Quintilian concedes that some of these physical 
traits “can be further developed by methodical training”––as in the case of Demosthenes––but 
then he doubles down on his initial claim: “but sometimes they are so completely lacking as to 
destroy any advantages of talent and study” (1.prooemium.27).   
 These assertions are troubling not only for their frankness, but also for how they restrict 
rhetorical training and practice to the able-bodied.  Thinking now about The King’s Speech, 
speech therapy, the writing classroom, delivery, and Quintilian’s claims regarding the able body 
and rhetorical practice, in 2012 I published my first study of delivery, “Revealing Rather Than 
Concealing Disability: The Rhetoric of Parkinson’s Advocate Michael J. Fox.”  The article is an 
effort to push back against Quintilian’s claims concerning disability and rhetorical practice.  
Michael J. Fox was diagnosed with Parkinson’s in 1991, and he kept it secret for seven years.  
He did this by timing his public appearances to compliment his medication schedule and later 
undergoing a thalamotomy, a process that destroys part of the thalamus in the brain in an effort 
to reduce tremors.  Pressured by tabloids, Fox came out in 1998 to People: “It’s not that I had a 
deep, dark secret … It was just my thing to deal with.  But this box I had put everything into kind 
of expanded to a point where it’s difficult to lug around.  What’s inside the box isn’t inhibiting 
me.  It’s the box itself.  I think I can help people by talking” (Schneider n. pag.).   
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Soon after the exclusive article in People, Fox began advocating for Parkinson’s research 
funds.  His first act of public advocacy was an address given to the Senate Appropriations 
Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education in September 1999 seeking 
increased funding for Parkinson’s research.  That speech marks not only Fox’s first advocacy, 
but also the first time Fox appeared in public without having taken his medications.  Of the 
speech, Fox writes in his memoir, “It seemed to me that this occasion demanded that my 
testimony about the effects of the disease, and the urgency we as a community were feeling, be 
seen as well as heard” (247 qtd. in Moe “Revealing” 449, emphasis in original).  This speech, 
and those that followed, elicited a firestorm of responses, including accusations of deceit and 
pandering.  Fox’s sans-medication advocacy calls attention to delivery, to how it functions at the 
intersection of the social, the political, and the rhetorical.  As I wrote in the article, “Fox’s 
display confounds traditional, limiting, and reductive responses to disability, establishing Fox as 
a rhetorical agent and asking, even demanding, that rhetoricians and audiences both within and 
beyond disability studies reevaluate whether the disabled body necessarily obstructs rhetorical 
efficacy, rethink conventional framings of disability, and reconsider the rhetoricity of the 
disabled body” (445). 
As I look back on my article on Fox, I see that it is, first and foremost, a piece of 
rhetorical analysis.  Though it contributes to a growing body of scholarship on delivery as well 
as disability studies while also speaking to classical rhetorical theory, the essay makes no gesture 
toward the classroom, toward the student, toward the teacher.  And, as I am a teacher of writing, 
the Fox article leaves questions unasked and unanswered: it assumes a traditional model of 
delivery, that is, a speech delivered within an oral setting via the voice and gestures; what 
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relevance, if any, might delivery have for the teaching of writing?  And how might this notion of 
a written delivery change the work of the writer, of the reader, of the student, and of the teacher?   




To describe the shape of this project, allow me to work through the terms of its title, beginning 
with Delivery.  As readers will recall, classical rhetoric teaches there are five parts to rhetorical 
practice.  First, a rhetor finds his ideas.2  Second, he organizes them.  Third, he picks a style, 
formal, informal, or somewhere in between.  Fourth, he memorizes the speech, and fifth, he 
delivers it using the voice and gesture.  Quintilian, Demosthenes, Cicero, and Aristotle (though 
he, begrudgingly) believed delivery to be the most important part of rhetorical practice.  But as 
rhetorical instruction and practice shifted over the years from the stage to the page––that is, from 
the senate, the courtroom, the pulpit, and the theatre to the written word––delivery became less a 
concern for teachers and students.  After all, why teach how to gesture or use the voice when 
teaching how to write?  Delivery fell from its place of prominence within the classroom, largely 
due to defined solely by voice and gesture.  In the early 1990s, delivery made a comeback, 
rescued by rhetorical theorists searching for a way to theorize secondary orality and new media.  
These theorists redefined delivery, looking to terms like circulation, distribution, presentation, 
and medium to describe how discourse reaches its audience.  The narrative here is this: delivery 
disappeared but new media brought it back.  Ben McCorkle refutes that narrative, claiming 
                                                
2 I use the masculine pronoun here to reference––though not endorse––the gendered classroom 
classical rhetoric assumes. 
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delivery did not disappear with the advent of writing but rather how it operates evolved.  In this 
project, I build upon McCorkle’s work, thinking through what delivery would look like in 
writing. 
 This question of what a written delivery would look like leads to my second term: 
Syntactic Delivery.  I suggest that syntax is where delivery occurs in writing.  It is through 
sentence craft that the writer delivers discourse to the audience.  I make this claim not only to 
find a way for delivery to operate within writing, but also in response to the lack of attention paid 
to the sentence in Composition’s current literature and classrooms.  Part of this project aims to 
deliver the sentence––that is, to recoup it––from the pedagogical leftovers of the 1980s, to show 
that the sentence is a vital and vibrant site of pedagogical possibility.  I seek to reclaim the 
sentence prompted not by some literacy crisis, but rather because the sentence offers an avenue 
into the relationship between language and performance, between language and display, between 
language and ethos, between language and how a writer moves within the world.   I intervene in 
scholarship on both delivery and style: whereas much current work with delivery focuses on 
technologies, I remind the field that writing, too, is a technology, one that delivers discourse, and 
that sentences are the primary agent of that delivery.  
Syntactic delivery necessitates a fundamental revision of how the sentence is read, 
written, taught, and studied, and in this sense, I am suggesting a Rhetoric of Syntactic Delivery.  
I use rhetoric here not in the limited sense of persuasion or argumentation alone, but rather in the 
more full sense of a method, a way of thinking, a way of approaching a topic, a system for 
generating critical thought.  This is a rhetoric as a course of study, a curriculum even, a rhetoric 
as a way of being, a rhetoric of engaging the written word.  This project works to unseat 
entrenched ways of reading sentences, and to do so, I resist argumentation as the sole purpose of 
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writing, proposing instead a rhetoric predicated upon performance, upon display, upon the ways 
a writer locates herself within a community.   
And I am moving Toward this Rhetoric of Syntactic Delivery.  My use of Toward signals 
(1) that this rhetoric is inchoate and (2) that this rhetoric recognizes the contingencies inherent to 
all rhetorical practice.  That is, it is foolhardy to make any hard and fast claims about rhetoric for 
all rhetoric contextual, dependent upon the various exigencies governing the rhetorical situation.  
I am ever aware that rhetorical theory is difficult to pin down, ever aware too that rhetorical 
theory is always a work in process.  
 I work Toward a Rhetoric of Syntactic Delivery over the course of five chapters.  In 
Chapter One, “Delivery, Style, and the Sentence,” I explore the relationship between delivery 
and style.  The rise of delivery in the early 1990s sits amid the fall of the sentence in the 1980s 
and its supposed return in the early 2000s, suggestive of a relationship between delivery and 
style.  Looking to a handful of teachers whose writing suggests a tacit understanding of delivery 
operating within writing, I claim that syntax is a form of rhetorical delivery, albeit one yet to be 
recognized and theorized by the field.  Following the work of recent scholarship in delivery that 
has set aside voice and gesture as delivery’s defining terms, I propose three terms to describe the 
work of syntactic delivery: performance, display, and location.  In the chapters that follow, I take 
up these key terms.  I note, though, that the figures I rely on sit at the fringes of Composition.  
While I do cite significant names in Composition and Rhetoric, they play a small role.  Because 
Composition is not paying attention to the sentence, I must look to the margins of the field, to 
teachers and writers whose work I find most provocative, teachers and writers across disciplinary 
lines.  This project is necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing on Philosophy, Linguistics, and 
Literary Criticism.   
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In Chapter Two, “Reading and Writing Performativity,” I take up Performance, using the 
speech-act theory of J. L. Austin, the literary criticism and reader-response theory of Stanley 
Fish, and a touch of Chomsky’s transformational grammar to claim that the sentence performs on 
the page.  I use this performative sentence to read Virginia Tufte’s 1971 Grammar as Style and 
her 2006 Artful Sentences, two projects all but dismissed by Composition.  I claim the 
performative sentence demands teachers, students, readers, and writers move away from 
grammar instruction predicated upon error and toward a pedagogy governed by the performative 
possibilities of the delivered sentence.   
In Chapter Three, “Rhetorics of Display and Rhetorics of Education,” I claim the 
sentence enacts epideictic rhetoric (rhetoric that shows forth, rhetoric that displays).  Walter Jost, 
Jeffrey Walker, and Dale Sullivan each argue epideictic rhetoric displays the shared values of a 
community; I offer that the sentence enacts that same display through its syntax, students 
adopting what they believe to be the ways of writing the academic community values.  I use this 
epideictic sentence to read William E. Coles’s 1978 The Plural I: The Teaching of Writing, and I 
claim that the displayed sentence necessitates teachers read not to be persuaded but instead to 
observe how a student shows forth on the page.   
In Chapter Four, “Locating a Syntactic Self,” I consider how delivery shapes audience 
perceptions of a rhetor.  As Composition redefines ethos, moving away from its associations with 
character and toward its etymological roots of dwelling and inhabitation (Applegarth; Christoph; 
Halloran; Miller; Reynolds), I look to the sentence as a locative device, a means to situate the 
writer within a discourse.  Setting Graff and Birkenstein’s They Say / I Say: The Moves that 
Matter in Academic Writing against Verlyn Klinkenborg’s Several Short Sentences about 
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Writing, I claim the writer inhabits the sentence, the locative sentence asking readers and writers, 
teachers and students to revise their understanding of ethos. 
This project is a defense of the sentence, a declaration of its value for the classroom, and 
in Chapter Five, “Delivering the Sentence,” I make this apology outright.  I respond to Richard 
Miller’s question concerning what good the literate arts offer a society besieged by violence and 
conflict.  I suggest the sentence, through how its grammar demands that words be placed in 
relation to each other, offers an avenue into working toward engagement and reconciliation 
outside the classroom.    
I rely on Performance, Display, and Location for how they challenge dominant paradigms 
of engaging the sentence, but so too, I rely on these terms because each lays claim to being the 
most important part of rhetorical practice.  Consider, for example, how J. L. Austin, in seeking to 
differentiate between the performative and the constative, concludes that the two cannot be so 
easily distinguished, recognizing that the constative is performative.  The performative, for 
Austin, becomes the bedrock of language practice (How To 91; Philosophical Papers 236-37).  
Or consider that Lawrence Prelli claims rhetorics of display are the “dominant rhetoric of our 
time” (2, 9).  And consider, too, Aristotle’s reluctant assertion that ethos is the most important, 
most effective, most authoritative of the rhetorical appeals (Rhetoric 1.2.4).  These claims to 
primacy are not coincidental.  Ben McCorkle argues that delivery is the most important of the 
rhetorical arts, because without the delivery of discourse, rhetoric could not exist (xi, 172).  The 
same could be said about any of the canons of rhetorical practice, but if I entertain McCorkle’s 
argument, then the claims to primacy on the parts of performativity, epideictic rhetoric, and ethos 
are justified.  Performance, Display, and Location fall under the umbrella of delivery, and if 
delivery is the most important part of rhetorical practice––as Demosthenes famously said it was, 
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claiming it was the only faculty needed (Quintilian 11.3.6)––it follows that Performance, 




On sentences: when I refer to “the sentence,” I am speaking of the written word, of a sentence 
composed on the page.  On working with sentences: Sentences are portable.  They can be easily 
read, rewritten, revised, imitated, and questioned, easily written on the chalkboard, easily 
reproduced from one text to another.  And sentences are a starting point from which readers, 
writers, and teachers can scale up or down to consider larger or smaller units of discourse, from 
the word to the phrase to the clause to the paragraph to the page to the chapter to the entire work.  
But these characteristics of the sentence––its portability and its scalability––create problems for 
teaching it.  They easily lead to decontextualizing the sentence.  Countless sentence-appreciation 
websites and books present the sentence as a museum piece, plucked from its original context, 
arranged in a new setting.  Often the only context given is the author and title of the work from 
which the sentence was lifted.  Such a method has its merits––it allows the curator to draw 
attention to a particular part of the sentence and the particular move it makes––but this method is 
also problematic.  Through decontextualizing the sentence, sentence appreciation makes the 
sentence a-rhetorical, such that any claim made about that decontextualized sentence risks 
trivializing and essentializing that sentence.  So too, the museum-piece sentence presents itself as 
finished, the work of the writer done and now on display, the implication being that revision is 
out of the question at this point.  
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A second problem when working with sentences: which ones to consider?  Stanley Fish 
offers one approach to sentence selection in his 2011 How to Write a Sentence and How to Read 
One.  Fish confesses he is a “sentence watcher … always on the lookout for sentences that take 
your breath away, for sentences that make you say, ‘Isn’t that something?’ or ‘What a 
sentence!’” (3).  He compares these sentences to the sports highlight reel: “[Y]ou know, the five 
greatest dunks, or the ten greatest catches, or the fifteen greatest touchdown runbacks” (3).  The 
result: Fish praises a sentence like Updike’s “It was in the books while it was still in the sky,” a 
sentence describing Ted Williams’s home run in his final at-bat at Fenway Park (9-10).  He gives 
no mention to sentences like “The Sox won, 5-4” from the same Updike piece.  The problem 
with this method is that if only the homerun sentences warrant the reader’s attention, the 
mundane sentences that do little more than catch a routine fly ball in left field––those sentences 
that do the daily, ordinary, lackluster tasks of prosaic prose––those sentences warrant little, if 
any, critical attention.  Reading becomes a treasure hunt for rhetorical figures of speech and 
thought.3   
These concerns govern my method for reading sentences.  I offer here a way of working 
with sentences that keeps them in their original context as best I can. I seek to value the work of 
                                                
3 Fish’s method for sentence selection resonates with the problem linguist Adam Kendon faces in 
discerning how to define a gesture.  Kendon acknowledges that he cannot study each and every 
movement a person makes; there are just too many.  He narrows his scope by not considering 
“visible bodily expressions of thoughts or feelings that are deemed inadvertent or are regarded as 
something a person cannot ‘help’ ” (Gesture 8).  Waving your hand is considered a gesture, but 
not scratching your arm or sneezing.  So too with how Fish pulls sentences from Updike.  Surely 
he can’t analyze each and every sentence, so Fish reads just the ones that take his breath away.  
The alternative approach would be linguist David McNeill’s, who studies gestures that are 
“everyday occurrences––the spontaneous, unwitting, and regular accompaniments of speech that 
we see in our moving fingers, hands, and arms.  They are so much a part of speaking that one is 
often unaware of them” (3).  My approach to the sentence––reading not only the ones that take 
my breath away but also the sentences of ordinary writing––falls more in-line with McNeill than 
Kendon.  See Moe “Scorebooks and Commonplace Books.”  
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everyday sentences, sentences without the flare of “It was in the books while it was still in the 
sky.”  To do so, this dissertation rests solely upon student sentences because student sentences 
rarely appear in print.  Granted, student essays do occasionally appear in Composition 
scholarship and textbooks (see Harris; Salvatori and Donahue).  But if student sentences appear 
in print, they most often serve as examples of error.  Contrasted against sentence-appreciation 
books curating Didion, King, Milton, Stein, Woolf, and their ilk, the argument is subtle but clear: 
students cannot write good sentences.  I disagree.  Students can and do write good sentences, and 
teachers need to learn to read them as such.  My project here is not one of sentence-appreciation, 
and I do not present sentences as showpieces.  The decontextualized sentence––whether by a 
student or Updike––is always a problem.  I resist the sentence museum in an argument not only 
for the value of student sentences, but also as an illustration of how one might engage student 
work.  As best I can, I present these student sentences within the context of both the sentences 
and the classroom instruction surrounding them, recognizing, of course, that the sentences are 
still necessarily and unavoidably decontextualized.   
Because student sentences are the centerpiece of this project, I’ve created space between 
the chapters proper to read them.  In these Interchapters, I exemplify, test, and further the claims 
made in the main chapters.  Some Interchapters read student sentences; others read students 
reading sentences.  By giving student writing in its own space within the project, I do not intend 
to endorse or reinforce a divide between theory (in the Chapters proper) and praxis (in the 
Interchapters).  Rather, I set student sentences in their own space so as to value student work.  
The Interchapters do not attempt, nor are they meant, to solve the problems introduced in the 
previous chapter, nor are they intended to give an authoritative answer concerning the delivered, 
performed, displayed, or locative sentence.  They are not lesson plans or resources for teaching 
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style (see Carillo; Johnson Rhetoric of Pleasure; Lanham Handlist).  Neither are they hero 
narratives.  Rather, they are where I try to find ways to read student writing––their sentences 













Delivery is weakened if it refers only to the gesture, physical 
movement, and expression that many commentators have 
dismissed it as doing.  It includes this aspect of communication in 
person, but it includes much more as well. 
 
Kathleen Welch 
“Reconfiguring Writing and Delivery  






Born in Conflenti, Italy, in 1885, Antonio Porchia moved to Argentina when he was 17.  Porchia 
had no formal education, worked at a printing press for a time, and spent his life writing and 
refining some 600 aphorisms.1  After reading a selection of Porchia’s aphorisms, I asked my 
students to write in response to one of their choosing.2  The following comes from a student 
writing on this aphorism from Voices: “My poverty is not complete: it lacks me.”  
This is really funny to me, and I don’t know why.  The first time I heard it read in 
class, I legitimately laughed out loud.  It was the only aphorism that we read 
                                                
1 For more on Porchia’s life, see W. S. Merwin’s prefatory remarks to his 2003 translation of 
Porchia’s Voces.  
 
2 A sampling of Porchia’s aphorisms are collected in the ninth edition of Ways of Reading: An 
Anthology for Writers.  The student essay I discuss here responds to the second Assignment for 
Writing, which asks that students write a series of ten responses to a single aphorism 
(Bartholomae and Petrosky 480-81). 
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which made me have a perceptible reaction.  As soon as I heard it, I thought, “this 
one is going to be my favorite.”  And it was.3  
I recall the day we read Porchia’s aphorisms aloud, and I recall this student’s laugh.  It was the 
only laughter during the reading.  The student’s affective response becomes the starting point for 
her inquiry:  
Why is this line so funny to me?  I don’t think that Porchia meant to make a joke.  
However, there is something about the written delivery of the line that just makes 
it comical.  It’s almost deadpan in a way?  No, I don’t think deadpan is the right 
word.  Honestly, this line reminds me of the classic one-liner joke used by stand 
up comedians all the time.  Or, and maybe this is reading a little bit too far, a rap 
punch line.  There is currently a trend in hip-hop/rap where rappers will make 
one-liner jokes that start with a premise, and usually have a one or two word 
punch line.  An example of this would be when Nicki Minaj raps “I’m the one 
making the plays, now you know why/These b****es calling me Manning, Eli” in 
her song “Roman’s Revenge”.  The Eli Manning punch line at the end is what 
creates all of the humor in that lyric.  In my mind, adding that last “it lacks me” to 
the end of this aphorism does the same type of thing.  
The student leaps from Porchia to Minaj, connecting the poet’s aphorism to the rapper’s punch 
line.  This association across genre, across culture, across time is possible, the student says, 
because of “something about the written delivery of the line.”  
                                                
3 Convention requires a [sic] following the student’s un-capitalized “this” of “this one is going to 
be my favorite.”  Rather than insert [sic] into student prose––which muddies the text, distracts 
from what the student accomplishes as a writer, and reinforces the notion that what distinguishes 
student writing is error––consider this footnote a blanket [sic] for all quoted material in this 
dissertation.   
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Pushing against her initial reading of Porchia, the student admits, “The aphorism is less 
funny to me now.”  It is “something about the written delivery of the line” provoking this 
interpretative shift: 
As my attitude towards the nature of this line has changed, so has the way which I 
read it.  When I first read this aphorism, in my head it sounded like “My poverty 
is not complete (beat) it lacks me.”  It sounded like a joke followed by a punch 
line.  Now, it sounds like “My poverty is not complete: it lacks me!”  The sort of 
deadpan humor is gone, and instead is replaced with this positive energy.  I now 
read this line as a bona fide statement of assurance.  
The student is searching for language to describe “something about the written delivery of the 
line.”  Notice how she articulates it: “in my head it sounded like ‘My poverty is not complete 
(beat) it lacks me.’ ”  The student hears the prose in her head as it is read.  She engages the text 
aurally through reading and represents that reading on the page by inserting a beat into the 
sentence.  The parenthetical “(beat)” replaces the colon.  Both are in service of rhythm.  That 
beat creates the punch line (humor is always a matter of timing), the pause baiting readers and 
listeners for the witty conclusion, the delivery of the line shaping its interpretation, its form 
governing its meaning.  
In the student’s revised reading of Porchia, the inserted “beat” vacates the aphorism and 
the colon returns, formatting instead carrying the cues for written delivery: “My poverty is not 
complete: it lacks me!”  I am not sure how to read what I assume are varying degrees of 
emphasis in the student’s italics, bold-face font, and exclamation point, but all result in what the 
student calls “positive energy.”  In this delivery, Porchia’s aphorism becomes triumphant, or, as 
the student writes, “a statement of power.  It’s not a joke, but instead something that someone 
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said to ensure that themselves and others knew that their poverty was not all consuming.  I like 
the idea of that more than a joke anyway.”  The student notices that she is “reading the aphorism 
differently” and that she is “putting stress on different words.”  This leads her to “wonder how 
the nature of the statement would change if other words besides the ones I had chosen were 
stressed.”  She continues this line of inquiry:   
“My poverty is not complete: it lacks me.” 
Stressing not makes the aphorism feel more like a mantra.  This is something that 
I can imagine someone muttering to themselves every day to remind them that its 
not as bad as it could be. 
“My poverty is not complete: it lacks me.” 
Stressing complete makes the aphorism feel like that much more of a retort.  Like 
someone came up and accused the person of being in complete poverty, and the 
person felt the need to clarify the severity of his poverty. 
In her first reading, this aphorism was a joke, the colon creating a pause followed by a punch line.  
When “my” and “me” were emphasized, the aphorism became a “statement of power.”  Stressing 
“not” turns the aphorism into a “mantra,” and stressing “complete” makes it into a “retort.”  Four 
different deliveries, four different genres, four different readings of Porchia.  The student notes 
that her readings all “[depend] on which words the reader emphasizes.”  She concludes, “This 
statement is a lot more pliable to the reader’s own way of reading than I had originally thought,” 
such pliability a product of delivery.  
What makes this student’s reading of Porchia possible is “something about the written 
delivery of the line.”  Consider how she sees this written delivery at work.  First, she turns to the 
rhythm of the sentence, the pause following “My poverty is not complete” creating a joke.  Here, 
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written delivery is a matter of beats.  The student then manipulates the typeface, using bolded 
and italicized words to change the delivery of the aphorism: delivery as display.  Later in her 
paper, she turns to syntax, imitating Porchia and writing her own aphorisms: 
  My means define my circumstances, but they don’t define me. 
  My beauty is not my body, but my body is my beauty. 
  I am what I am, not what you tell me to be.  
The student refers to these as “some attempts at self-assuring aphorisms.”  She moves away from 
the joke and toward the mantra and retort.  There is a feeling of triumphant resistance in her 
aphorisms.  Each is balanced, its opening statement answered by what follows after the comma.  
The student smartly imitates Porchia’s mid-sentence pause (he does it via colon; she does it via 
comma and conjunction) as well as Porchia’s negation.  That “not” and its comma or colon are 
important: together, they create the pivot that makes the aphorism a joke, a statement of power, a 
mantra, a retort––they create the aphorism’s sense of defiance.  
This student’s reading of Porchia illustrates how “written delivery” depends just as much 
on what the reader brings to those sentences as the sentences themselves.  The student activates 
Porchia’s aphorisms, her manipulations of their delivery making possible her reading of that 
work.  What is most provocative here is the student’s joining of delivery and style.  In an effort 
to read the aphorism, instead of looking to the content of the sentence, or its placement within 
the larger work, or to Porchia’s biography, the student instead looks to the sentence itself.  Hers 
is a reading grounded in the work of the delivered sentence.  “Written delivery,” as she calls it, 
governs her reading of Porchia while offering a framework for her own aphorisms, the delivered 
sentence shaping both her reading and her writing practice.   
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I note that, at this point in the course, I had not yet introduced the class to rhetorical 
delivery.  The term “written delivery” is entirely the student’s own.  Her reading is made 
possible by a conflation of factors: the student’s prior schooling (I assume), her love of rap, her 
ability to hear the rhythms of written language when read.  But so too, her reading is made 
possible by this fraught relationship between style and delivery and, perhaps more so, her 
reading is made possible by the question of what a reader’s role is in activating a written text.  In 
oral settings where voice and delivery are the means of delivery, the orator delivers; in a written 
text, the writer writes, but so too, the reader reads, delivery becoming something of a shared 
responsibility.  The question then arises as to what delivery looks like in a text-based setting, 
outside of the realm of oral discourse.  The student’s reading of Porchia points to these issues, 
and her reading is provocative, too, for its insistence that gesture is not merely ornamental but 
rather carries meaning; indeed, it is how the sentence moves that enables its different 
interpretations.4  
 I take this student’s reading of Porchia’s written delivery as a starting point to inquire 
into the relationship between delivery and the written word.  I argue that delivery did not 
                                                
4  The student’s understanding of gesture as expressive of meaning and not as mere 
ornamentation reflects current Linguistics scholarship.  David McNeill, in Gesture and Thought, 
claims there have been two significant “shifts” in how Linguistics understands gesture.  The first 
occurred in the 1930s as the field moved away from a model of gesture based upon rhetorical 
performance to one where gestures “come to be studied in life, as they occur spontaneously 
during conversation and other discourse modes” (13).  The shift here is from deliberate, crafted, 
rhetorical gestures to the unintentional, those that occur without premeditated thought, the 
gestures of the everyday as opposed to the gestures of the courtroom, senate, pulpit, and stage.  
McNeill pinpoints the second shift on Adam Kendon’s 1972 “Some Relationships between Body 
Motion and Speech.”  With that article, gestures begin to be “regarded as parts of language 
itself––not as embellishments or elaborations, but as integral parts of the process of language and 
its use” (McNeill 13, emphasis McNeill’s).  For more Linguistics scholarship on gesture, see 
Kendon’s Gesture: Visible Action as Utterance as well as Hagoort and Van Berkum; Jacobs and 
Garnham; Kelly et al.; Kita; Lozano and Tversky, each of whom work through the relationship 
between gesture and meaning.   
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disappear with the advent of writing, but rather that the means by which it operates evolved.  
Building upon recent scholarship expanding delivery beyond voice and gesture to consider how 
it operates in media not limited to the oral, I claim that the sentence enacts rhetorical delivery, 
that the sentence, too, is a technology that delivers discourse.  In making this argument, I 
contribute to a line of scholarship that has focused attention on the sentence.  I do not, however, 
return to the sentence because of a literacy crisis, because Johnny can’t write.  Rather, I return to 
the sentence because both scholarship on delivery and scholarship on stylistics under-theorize the 
work of the sentence.  Or, stated more boldly, both misunderstand what a sentence does on the 
page and what it might do.  Consequently, Composition fails to account for the capacities of the 
sentence as a mediated discourse.  Paul Butler has argued that Composition’s lack of attention to 
style contributes to the field’s lack of credibility in the public eye (Out of Style 121-23); I agree, 
and I would go one step further.  Composition’s lack of attention to style contributes to the 
field’s lack of attention to style––that is, it feeds itself: by failing to examine the mediated 
rhetoricity of the delivered sentence, Composition writes off the sentence.  And once written off, 
there is no reason to return.   
 In what follows, I make a space for this project.  I begin with an account of the demise of 
sentence-level instruction in the 1980s and the resurrection of delivery in the 1990s.  Placing 
these narratives alongside each other enables me to speak to the significant overlap between 
delivery and style, an overlap I argue has its roots (in part) in Aristotle’s use of the vague term 
lexis.  In order to work within this overlap, and in order to think through what delivery looks like 
within writing, I then argue for setting aside voice and gesture, offering instead Performance, 
Display, and Location as key terms for syntactic delivery.   
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1.1  THE TRAJECTORIES OF STYLE AND DELIVERY 
 
This project brings together two beleaguered canons of rhetorical practice.  I do not offer, here, 
an extensive history of style’s place within Composition.  Others have carried out that project, 
and carried it out well.5  Rather, I sketch style in relation to delivery so as to see the broad 
contours shared by each and the sites of inquiry produced when the two come together.  I begin 
with the 1960s-80s, a time Paul Butler calls the Golden Age of Style (Out of Style 7).  The 
Golden Age of Style was marked by scholarship and teaching devoted to the sentence-level of 
writing, scholarship whose primary concerns, according to Butler, were cohesion, coherence, 
how nominal and verbal constructions contribute or hinder readability, imitation, usage and 
convention, and meaning and semantics (7-12).  These concerns were addressed through three 
dominant sentence-level pedagogies: sentence combining, sentence imitation, and Francis 
Christensen’s rhetoric of the generative sentence (Connors “Erasure”).   
 A word on these three pedagogies.  Sentence combining has a long history within the 
teaching of writing, dating back over one hundred years (Rose).  Students are given short 
sentences and they are to combine them, either by any means of their choice or with a specific 
grammatical construction given by the teacher.  From William Strong’s popular textbook 
Sentence-Combining:  
1.1 A young woman sits alone. 
1.2 She sips from her coffee cup. 
                                                
5 For histories of style, see Robert Connors’s excellent articles, “The Rhetoric of Mechanical 
Correctness,” “Grammar in American College Composition: An Historical Overview,” and “The 
Erasure of the Sentence.”  See also Shirley Rose’s “Down from the Haymow: A Hundred Years 
of Sentence-Combining,” Paul Butler’s Out of Style: Reanimating Stylistic Study in Composition 
and Rhetoric, and T. R. Johnson and Tom Pace’s edited collection Refiguring Prose Style: 
Possibilities for Writing Pedagogy.  
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1.3 It is chipped along the rim.  (40) 
From these, a student could write, “A young woman, sitting alone, sips from her chipped coffee 
cup.”  Or, choosing to emphasize the chipped cup: “Sipping from her coffee cup––chipped along 
the rim––a young woman sits alone.”  With a dependent clause: “Although the young woman sits 
alone, she sips coffee from her chipped cup.”  The possibilities are endless, and the rationale 
behind sentence combining is that it teaches students dexterity with their sentences, a nimbleness 
in how they put ideas in relation one to another.  Later exercises ask students to combine a dozen 
sentences into a paragraph.  The latter pages of Strong’s textbook breaks the prose of published 
writers into short sentences and asks students to combine them and then compare their 
compositions with the original (176).   Through encouraging students to work with, play with, 
and manipulate language, sentence combining, according to Strong, teaches a “heightened 
awareness (or ‘felt sense’) of how prose works on the page” (“How Sentence Combining Works” 
335).  
 Imitation exercises date back to ancient Greece and Rome, students using the speeches 
and writings of famous rhetors as models for their own prose.  Ross Winterowd identifies “three 
aspects of discourse that can be imitated … (1) subject matter in general, (2) larger form (in the 
sense of organization and development), and (3) style” (161).  The rationale behind imitation 
exercises hinges upon internalized habit.  Through inhabiting the prose of others, working within 
the sentences of others, students familiarize themselves with those forms, internalizing them, 
such that when the occasion demands the student can summon up these forms easily, naturally, 
habitually.    
 Christensen’s generative sentence rests on his claim that composition teachers “need a 
rhetoric of the sentence that will do more than combine the ideas of primer sentences.  We need 
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one that will generate ideas” (21, emphasis Christensen’s).  What he proposes is a pedagogy 
built around teaching from John Erskine: “When you write, you make a point, not by subtracting 
as though you sharpened a pencil, but by adding” (Erskine 254 qtd. in Christensen 21).  Students 
begin with a simple sentence and add clauses and phrases to it, each addition bringing “layers of 
structure” to the sentence (24).  An example, as Christensen lays one out on the page, a sentence 
from Sinclair Lewis: 
1     He dipped his hands in the bichloride solution and shook them, 
     2     a quick shake, (NC) 
            3     fingers down, (Abs) 
                 4     like the fingers of a pianist above the keys. (PP)  (26) 
Within Christensen’s rhetoric, this is a right-branching sentence, and he labels each part, layer 2 
a Noun Cluster, layer 3 an Absolute, and layer 4 a Prepositional Phrase.  Christensen argues the 
generative sentence “represent[s] the mind thinking,” its “mere form” producing discourse: “It 
serves the needs of both the writer and the reader, the writer by compelling him to examine his 
thought, the reader by letting him into the writer’s thought” (23).  Sentence combining, imitation, 
and the generative sentence define the composition classroom and the teaching of writing during 
the Golden Age of Style, and together they dominated the professional discussions within the 
field.  Connors points to 112 articles published from 1960-85 in “general-composition journals” 
addressing Christensen, imitation, or sentence combining (“Erasure” 462). 
Yet the sentence-level pedagogy of the Golden Age of Style is hardly as monolithic as it 
might appear.  There’s Richard Lanham’s 1974 Style: An Anti-Textbook, which rejects the 
premise that prose must be clear and argues the drive toward clarity is what makes writing drab: 
“We pare away all sense of verbal play, or self-satisfying joy in language, and then wonder why 
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American students have a motivation problem and don’t want to write” (10).  There’s Winston 
Weathers’s 1976 “Grammars of Style: New Options in Composition,” a precursor to his 1980 An 
Alternate Style: Options in Composition; in both, Weathers argues that “Grammar A” concerns 
itself with logic, and in response he offers “Grammar B,” which values “variegation, 
synchronicity, discontinuity, ambiguity” (“Grammars” 221).  There’s Richard Ohmann’s 1979 
“Use Definite, Specific, Concrete Language,” wherein Ohmann pushes against Strunk and White, 
arguing the advice to write definite, specific, and concrete sentences is ideologically grounded in 
an a-historic, empiricist, fragmented, solipsistic world view that denies any sort of conflict 
inherent in the writing situation (184). All three push against what Lanham identifies as a 
“ludicrous process,” the “travesty” depicted in most textbooks: “I have an idea.  I want to present 
this as a gift to my fellow man.  I fix this thought clearly in mind.  I follow the rules.  Out comes 
a prose that gift-wraps thought in transparent paper” (18).  Lanham resists this framing through 
bringing a sense of stylistic play and pleasure to writing.  Weathers resists it by teaching figures 
of thought and speech that work against simplicity and clarity: the crot, the labyrinthine sentence, 
the sentence fragment, the list, the double-voice, repetitions/repetends/refrains, synchronicity, 
and the collage/montage (226-37).  Weathers further complicates his teaching by advocating 
writers work within “both grammars [to] have the greatest range of all” (237).  Ohmann is, in 
some ways, the odd man out in this group, for while Lanham and Weathers specifically address 
classroom instruction, Ohmann’s is a critique of standard language as taught in the textbooks, 
offering no pedagogical turn or guidance for teachers; Ohmann raises awareness of a problem 
while Lanham and Weathers work toward solutions.6 
                                                
6 For a recent piece making a similar argument as Lanham, Weathers, and Ohmann––one that 
resists clarity as the utmost virtue of writing––see Eric Hayot’s “Academic Writing, I Love You. 
Really, I Do.”  See also Paul Butler, who argues an obsession with clarity has “held the field 
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The field did not take up their work.  At a time when Composition was heavily 
influenced by transformational grammar and the descriptive apparatus it provides, Lanham, 
Weathers, and Ohmann offer something markedly different––perhaps too different.  In their 
work, I see an understanding of the complexity of sentence-level instruction, a complexity within 
a theory of stylistics, a vision of what teaching the sentence could entail, something I hope to 
recover within this project. 
The Golden Age of Style had a richness in its understanding of the sentence, a richness 
that extends beyond sentence combining, imitation, and the generative sentence.  But despite this 
richness, the sentence was soon relegated to the margins of classroom instruction, even though 
Connors notes that sentence-level instruction was never shown to be ineffective at improving 
student writing (472).7  The question, of course, is how one defines “improving student writing,” 
which is why, I suggest, sentence-level instruction dwindled away.  Sentence-level instruction, as 
practiced during the Golden Age of Style, values writing that combines sentences well, that 
crafts sentences well.  Good writing is defined by stylistic agility.  From Christensen: “I want my 
students to be sentence acrobats, to dazzle by their syntactic dexterity” (32).  Such thinking could 
not stand up to the changing theoretical orientation of Composition in the mid-1980s.  Sentence-
level instruction was pushed aside by the process movement, the former suffering a pejorative 
association with current-traditional rhetorics, “a formalist approach to writing that emphasizes 
                                                                                                                                                       
hostage” (Out of Style 133), and T. R. Johnson, who argues clarity is a “rather misleading 
metaphor: language is never a transparent window into some extra-linguistic reality” (24).  
 
7 There were, though, challenges to sentence combining.  See Smith and Hull, who suggest that 
the gains from sentence combining “may not be long lasting” (289).  See also Smith and Combs, 
who claim they can “achieve” “in a single week” what a whole semester of sentence combining 
does just by being overt, that is, just by telling students to write longer, more complicated 




the written product (rather than its process), prescriptive rules that often conflate style with 
grammar and usage, and static language practices” (Butler “Introduction to Part One” 13).  These 
are the “competing concerns” Elizabeth Rankin suggests contributed, along with a lack of a 
sound theory of stylistics, to the demise of sentence-level instruction (240).8  Robert Connors 
offers a different account, suggesting the erasure of the sentence is a casualty of Composition’s 
coming into its own as a field and its growing skepticism of the formalism, behaviorism, and 
empiricism that can come to govern sentence-level instruction (“Erasure”).  The Golden Age of 
Style coincides with the emergence of Composition’s disciplinary identity, and style became a 
casualty of the field drawing its disciplinary lines, Composition seeking to differentiate itself 
from “speech, psychology, [and] education” (Connors “Erasure” 473). 
These factors come to a head in the early 1980s, and the death of the sentence––if that is 
not too dramatic a phrase––can be pinpointed to the 1983 Second Miami Conference on 
Sentence Combining and the Teaching of Writing, a conference that occurred five years after the 
first.  The papers were gathered by Donald Daiker, Andrew Kerek, and Max Morenberg and 
published by Southern Illinois University Press. On the back cover, the editors proclaim, 
“Sentence combining not only has survived the paradigm shift in the teaching of writing but 
continues to stimulate provocative, creative thinking about the writing process itself.”  Connors 
later identified this collection as the swan song of sentence-level instruction, “the last major 
statement made by the discipline about sentence rhetorics” (470).  Indeed.  The book was 
                                                
8 Paul Butler devotes his 2008 book Out of Style to rebutting the thinking Rankin represents.  
Butler notes that the Golden Age of Style coincides with the process movement, but claims the 
two are not at odds with each other.  Rather, they go hand-in-hand as each is concerned with 
invention––invention of the sentence, invention of content, invention of the self, invention of a 
voice.  Butler’s book builds on a 2003 argument advanced by T. R. Johnson, who notes that 
“sentence-level pedagogy reached its zenith of popularity in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, the 
moment that was also nearly the height of the process movement” (32).  Johnson, like Butler, 
points to the shared concern of invention as a possible explanation.   
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published in 1985, two years after the conference, the same year Elizabeth Rankin claimed “style 
is out of style” in the college writing classroom (239).  From 1986-98, there were a scant 15 
articles published on Christensen, imitation, and sentence combining in the major Composition 
journals––1.15 articles per year––roughly an 80% drop from 1981-85, which saw 28 articles 
published––about 5.6 articles per year (Connors “Erasure” 462).  
The Golden Age of Style comes to an end with the publication of Daiker, Kerek, and 
Morenberg’s Sentence Combining.  There is a 15-year lull, and in 2000 College Composition and 
Communication published Connors’s “The Erasure of the Sentence.”  Butler points to this 
moment as the start of Composition’s “stylistic turn” (“Introduction: The Stylistics (Re)Turn”; 
Out of Style 13).  In the early 2000s, a number of pieces worked to revive the sentence, most 
notably Laura Micciche’s “Making a Case for Rhetorical Grammar,” Johnson’s A Rhetoric of 
Pleasure, Sharon Myers’s “ReMembering the Sentence,” and Butler’s own Out of Style: 
Reanimating Stylistic Study in Composition and Rhetoric and edited collection Style in Rhetoric 
and Composition: A Critical Sourcebook.  I hesitate to endorse Butler’s claim that there has been 
a stylistic turn to the same extent that Composition had a social turn and a public turn.  Despite 
the perennial popularity of the sentence in the public sphere––books like Stanley Fish’s How to 
Write a Sentence and How to Read One, Kitty Burns Florey’s Sister Bernadette’s Barking Dog: 
The Quirky History and Lost Art of Diagramming Sentences, Steven Pinker’s The Sense of Style: 
The Thinking Person’s Guide to Style in the 21st Century, Lynne Truss’s Eats, Shoots & Leaves: 
The Zero Tolerance Approach to Punctuation, and Mary Norris’s Between You & Me: 
Confessions of a Comma Queen––and despite a surge of interest in the early 2000s, Composition 
is yet to return to the sentence.  I say this because (1) the frequency of these calls––every few 
years––suggests the field is yet to heed them, (2) the fragmentation and expansion of 
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Composition’s scholarly and pedagogical concerns make it difficult to posit claims regarding the 
trajectory of the field, and (3) I am not even sure what it would look like for the field to return to 
the sentence.  I will say that the leading journals in the field rarely publish pieces devoted solely 
to sentence-level instruction (as Connors’s data shows).  Scholarly work on sentences and style 
is rare.  
The question is why.  It could be a matter of the aforementioned fragmentation of the 
field.  Composition has expanded such that there is no longer a central set of tenets as to what 
writing instruction is, should attempt to do, or might be; the field is no longer organized around, 
or defined by, basic writing.  It could be a matter of the sentence falling by the wayside as course 
content dominates a curriculum––as Stanley Fish puts it, “Most composition courses that 
American students take today emphasize content rather than form, on the theory that if you chew 
over big ideas long enough, the ability to write about them will (mysteriously) follow” (“Devoid 
of Content” n. pag.).   
I suggest, though, that the sentence has not become a place of pedagogical and theoretical 
inquiry because the sentence is ordinary.  We may write dozens in the morning, read a few 
hundred in the afternoon, by the end of the week having engaged thousands, and by the end of a 
career, millions.  Sentences are a dime a dozen, and as such, their rhetoricity, their potential to be 
a place of critical inquiry, their ability to teach what it means to put together and represent the 
world through language can be overlooked.  They are small potatoes and, when held against the 
grand claims of (say) critical pedagogy, seem mundane, trite, conservative.  Composition has 
made its name by linking its concerns to Democracy, Revolution and the meetings of Knowledge 
and Power, Creativity and Freedom.  What has the sentence to do with that?  Well, as exemplary 





Let me put this story of the death of the sentence on hold in order to tell another.  There is a 
conventional narrative surrounding delivery, one rooted in the traditions of classical rhetoric in 
the American university, and that narrative is this: as rhetorical performance and instruction 
shifted over the years from the stage to the page––that is, from the senate, the courtroom, the 
theatre, and the pulpit to the written word––delivery became less and less a concern for teachers 
and students and practitioners of rhetoric.  Voice and gesture, it was assumed, were irrelevant to 
the medium of writing, as they are unique to oral rhetorical practice.  This narrative is common 
sense, and it pervades most discussions of delivery.  In 1978, William Tanner, for example, 
noted, “for many authors in the twentieth century, rhetoric has come to be almost exclusively 
restricted to the written language” and the consequence of this, according to Tanner, is that 
delivery is dismissed (27).  Edward P. J. Corbett does the same, noting that “discussions of 
delivery, as well as of memory, tended to be even more neglected in rhetorical texts after the 
invention of printing, when most rhetorical training was directed primarily to written discourse” 
(Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student 39).  He concludes: “Writers lack the advantage a 
speaker enjoys because of their face-to-face contact with an audience and because of their vocal 
delivery” (39).  On that reasoning, Corbett devotes nine pages to delivery in his 653-page 
textbook, delivery clearly not relevant to the work of a writer.   
Even Mina Shaughnessy, whose book Errors & Expectations defined a new relationship 
between the university and the student writer, writes,  “In a speech situation, the speaker has 
ways of encouraging or pressing for more energy than the listener might initially want to give.  
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He can, for example, use attention-getting gestures or grimaces, or he can play upon the social 
responsiveness of his listener; the listener, in turn, can query or quiz or withhold his nods until he 
has received the ‘goods’ he requires from the speaker” (11-12).  For Shaughnessy, delivery 
creates an economic exchange of energy between speaker and audience, and she too reifies the 
conventional wisdom that delivery is not applicable to writing: “Nothing like this open 
bargaining can go on in the writing situation, where the writer cannot keep an eye on his reader 
nor depend upon anything except words on a page to get him his due of attention” (12).  Once 
again, delivery is irrelevant to writing.  There are no visible gestures and no audible voice on the 
written page.  
I take Tanner, Corbett, and Shaughnessy as representative of the thinking that delivery––
a delivery defined by bodily voice and gesture––is not part of the writer’s work.  I do not intend 
these three to be scapegoats.  While they do represent a particular line of thinking I want to 
challenge, so too they offer a means by which to challenge it: each goes to style as a way to get 
around this perceived absence of delivery.  Tanner asks why, when rhetoric is not limited to the 
oral alone, “delivery is dismissed when the written word is considered?” (27).  He then suggests 
paragraphs, spelling, and punctuation are forms of delivery.  This move marks a shift in 
understanding delivery, a move away from voice and gesture as defining terms of the canon.  
Corbett makes a similar turn: Following his claim that writers “lack the advantage” a speaker has 
because of delivery, Corbett asserts, “[T]he only way in which the writer can make up for this 
disadvantage is by the brilliance of his style” (39).   
And to style, Corbett devotes lavish attention: a 180-page chapter accompanied by a list 
of figures in the opening pages of the book.  With this sleight of hand, Corbett brings together 
style and delivery, style a way to “make up for” the supposed dearth of delivery in the written 
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word.  Shaughnessy does the same.  After claiming “the writer cannot keep an eye on his reader” 
because all the writer has is the words at hand––no delivery possible––Shaughnessy concludes, 
“Thus anything that facilitates the transfer of his meaning is important in this tight economy of 
energy” (12).  Shaughnessy then moves into a discussion of error, as error muddles a writer’s 
ability to engage the reader within this economy of energy.  
The impulse toward style to replace delivery could be a product of the fact that Tanner, 
Corbett, and Shaughnessy each write during the Golden Age of Style, a time when the sentence 
was the answer to any pedagogical or writerly problem.  That may be, but I suggest there are two 
other factors at work here: a fundamental connection between delivery and style (which I will 
address momentarily) and an instinctive move to redefine delivery when it operates in contexts 
other than the oral.   
 Tanner, Corbett, and Shaughnessy tacitly redefine delivery; as I read them, they seem 
unaware of their use of style as a stand-in for delivery.  Other scholars soon followed suit in 
redefining delivery, and the first to redefine delivery knowingly and explicitly was Winifred 
Bryan Horner in her 1988 textbook Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition.  The textbook is similar 
to Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student in that both are organized around the five canons of 
rhetoric.  Here’s how Horner introduces delivery:  
Presentation for the orator and the writer involves the same principle: in the final 
analysis, it is the presentation of your ideas in the best and most appropriate way.  
Orators who slur their speech or slouch before the audience are ineffective––so 
also writers who do not understand the conventions of the essay exam or the 
research paper and turn in papers without appropriate citations, or with misspelled 
words and many erasures.  (378) 
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Horner eschews “delivery” as one of the canons and as a critical term, instead titling its chapter 
“Presentation.” 9  The redefinition of delivery continues with Kathleen Welch’s 1990 The 
Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse, where 
Welch argues for delivery as medium (99).  In 1993, John Frederick Reynolds’s edited collection 
Rhetorical Memory and Delivery: Classical Concepts for Contemporary Composition and 
Communication included four pieces on delivery, each one redefining the canon.  Welch’s 
contribution is the most significant.  Welch retells the familiar narrative of delivery: “A standard 
explanation for the removal of memory and delivery from the five canons relies on a simplistic 
idea that the burgeoning power of writing made memory and delivery less relevant because those 
two canons are said to be more powerful in orally dominated culture” (19).  Welch’s (and 
Reynolds’s) concern with memory is beyond my scope, but I note here how Welch retells this 
narrative in order to rewrite it.  She argues, “Memory and delivery do not wither with the 
growing dominance of writing; rather, they change form” (19).  Welch echoes the thinking 
behind Tanner’s, Corbett’s, Shaughnessy’s, and Horner’s work with delivery.  All have a tacit 
understanding that bodily voice and gesture are red herrings when thinking about the canon of 
delivery, and, as Welch argues, they are harmful to it (21).   Voice and gesture contributed to the 
demise of delivery, as rhetoricians could not see the forest for the trees.  
 The other contributions to Reynolds’s collection addressing delivery carry on this 
thinking.  Sam Dragga looks at technical writing through the lens of delivery, considering how 
bullet points and lists, the size of font, the layout of numbers on a graph, for example, are all 
aspects of a presented, rhetorical delivery.  Jay Bolter argues hypertext is delivery, “a new means 
                                                
9 In the forward to Horner’s textbook, Corbett praises her for “having found a way to restore 
attention to memory and delivery, even in a writing class” (vi).  I cannot help but read, in 
Corbett’s comments, a faint recognition of his own inability to do the same for memory and 
delivery in Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student.   
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of presenting or delivering text (and graphics)” (97).  And Robert Connors, building on Horner’s 
work with delivery-as-presentation though he does not cite her, offers a highly prescriptive 
rhetoric of manuscript presentation, likening it to “the conventions of dress, hygiene, and such, 
which are preconditions for effective verbal delivery” (66).  Connors gives advice on typeface, 
paper, paperclips vs. staples, and recommends writers “remove the ‘frelch’ paper with the tractor 
holes along the sides” (72).10  With each of these redefinitions, delivery moves further from its 
classical roots in voice and gesture.  
The scholarship on delivery published in the past 15 years continues this work of 
redefinition.  I note that the surge of recent interest in delivery overlaps with Butler’s stylistic 
turn.  This is more than a coincidence; it points, I believe, to the tacit relationship between 
delivery and style, a relationship I will tend to momentarily.  In 2000, John Trimbur claimed, 
“[N]eglecting delivery has led writing teachers to equate the activity of composing with writing 
                                                
10 Connors’s piece is curious in three regards.  First, it is a revision of an essay published ten 
years earlier in Rhetoric Review.  In the reprint for Reynolds’s collection, Connors notes, “Given 
the speech of technological change, it will probably be necessary to update [this essay] every 
decade” (65).  The first piece appeared in 1983, its revision in 1993.  Connors passed away in 
2000; I do not know if he planned another revision for 2003.   
Second, “Actio” has its roots in Connors’s 1979 “The Differences between Speech and 
Writing: Ethos, Pathos, and Logos,” where Connors claims, “There are only two ways writers 
can exert ethical appeal (outside the physical appearance of a handwritten or even a typed 
manuscript), and they are found in a writer’s style and in the sort of argument he or she chooses 
to use” (285).  In his acknowledgment that the presentation of a manuscript entails an ethical 
appeal, Connors is beginning to work toward his understanding of that same presentation as a 
matter of delivery, an understanding he’d flesh out in his “Actio” articles. 
And third, Connors’s piece does not know its audience.  It seems directed at students, 
given that teachers and professional writers would likely already be familiar with the 
conventions concerning font, margins, paper, printer frelch, etc.  Yet, Connors refers to the 
editors reading these manuscripts, which suggests Connors’s audience is actually colleagues 
submitting articles for publication (which is not to say students do not publish, but if they do, 
they are the exception).  And here is the trouble: if writing for students, Connors’s remarks 
concerning editors seem unnecessary; if writing for colleagues, Connors’s remarks concerning a 
coffee- or blood-stained manuscript seem patronizing; and if writing for writers in the general 
public, are those writers really going to be reading Reynolds’s collection? 
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itself and to miss altogether the complex delivery systems through which writing circulates” 
(189).  In response, he applies a Marxist understanding of economic circulation to delivery and 
asks, “How can we see writing as it circulates through linked moments of production, 
distribution, exchange, and consumption?” (196).  Following Trimbur were a flurry of pieces 
redefining delivery.  In 2003, Roxanne Mountford pressed against the traditional model of 
delivery privileging the male body.  In 2004, Carolyn Rude argued for delivery “not just as 
publication but also as a series of strategic actions. … Delivery is outreach after publication” 
(276).  In 2005, Lindal Buchanan furthered Mountford’s project, troubling the “corporeal terms” 
that define delivery in such a way that “assum[es] … rhetors are male, privileged, and able to 
speak publically,” Buchanan searching for “alternative forms of rhetorical presentation” (159).  
In 2006, Dànielle DeVoss and James Porter framed copyright law as a matter of delivery, “as a 
set of guidelines governing the relationship between writers, readers, and publishers” (185).   In 
2009, James Porter re-theorized delivery for digital rhetorics, offering body/identity, 
distribution/circulation, access/accessibility, interaction, and economics as its governing 
concepts; Jim Ridolfo and DeVoss transformed delivery into “rhetorical velocity” to describe 
how discourse circulates through a community; and Collin Brooke recovered delivery, like those 
before him, with performance and circulation.  In 2012, Ridolfo turned to circulation and 
distribution to study how activists deliver manifestos.  The spirit of this scholarship is captured 
well by Paul Prior et al., who in 2009 claimed the classical model of delivery “was never 
intended to address” the “cross-historical practices of contemporary rhetoric,” and who “argue 
for remapping rhetorical activity and for re-situating and re-mediating the canons, rather than 
continuing to pour even more, and even more alien, content into those ancient vessels” (n. pag.).  
This is the same thinking Welch articulated some 14 years earlier: delivery is more than voice 
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and gesture, voice and gesture limit what the canon can do, and the canon needs to be re-
theorized.  
In 2012, with the most ambitious and compelling redefinition of delivery to date, Ben 
McCorkle argued that delivery is, first and foremost, concerned with technology, with the means 
of delivering discourse to its audience.  McCorkle pushes against the narrative of delivery I 
mentioned earlier, the one that suggests delivery disappeared with the advent of writing.  That 
narrative has a second part: new media has prompted delivery’s return.  Such thinking appears, 
for instance, in Dragga’s claim that “Prior to the introduction of computerized word processing, 
graphics creation, and page design, writers virtually ignored the canon of delivery” (79).  
McCorkle refutes such thinking, arguing delivery never disappeared and never reappeared, but 
instead has always been the central concern of rhetorical practice.   
According to McCorkle, the reason delivery has been overlooked until the advent of new 
media is that delivery operates invisibly.  Borrowing the term remediation from Jay Bolter and 
Richard Grusin, McCorkle claims new media fashions itself after old media to ease the transition 
from old to new while simultaneously erasing its own presence.  McCorkle cites several 
instances.  For example, the remediation between oral discourse and alphabetic writing in ancient 
Greece: rhetors were “incorporating verbal forms of discourse in writing, [and] incorporating the 
increasingly complex linguistic structures of writing in oral discourse” (65).  The new 
technology of writing appropriated characteristics of the old technology of speech, and vice versa, 
so that the differences between the two media were ameliorated.  Another example, from the 
advent of print:  
Printed texts and handwritten manuscripts tended to resemble one another by 
adopting hypermediated elements such as ornately decorated drop capitals, 
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illumination, rubrication, and so on; in other cases, print and manuscripts tended 
to minimize their existence as media forms by adopting a less ornate, stripped-
down aesthetic.  (70) 
In all the instances McCorkle cites, new media influences and is influenced by old media, and 
because of such remediation, McCorkle claims, delivery is often invisible.  By refiguring the 
novelty of technology, remediation hides the work of delivery.  (I think of my Kindle housed in a 
leather case to look like a Moleskine notebook, or the Notes app on my iPhone that looks like a 
yellow notepad.)  Hence, the narrative that delivery disappeared when bodily voice and gesture 
were no longer primary concerns of rhetorical instruction and practice, and hence the narrative 
that delivery reappeared with the advent of new media: rhetorical theorists could not see delivery 




These two narratives––the death of the sentence and the resurgence of delivery––are connected.  
The sentence falls easily within the realm of a technology that operates invisibly, one that people 
use every day and yet think nothing about, one that is foundational to the work of any classroom 
and yet one that receives little, if any, attention.  All the scholarship on delivery I’ve cited can be 
read as working within McCorkle’s framework of invisibility; each labors to make visible the 
invisible work of delivery.  So too with the sentence.  Setting the fall of style alongside the rise 
of delivery calls attention to the mediated sentence, the redefinitions of delivery away from voice 
                                                
11 A prime example of the invisibility of delivery comes in William Fitzgerald’s Spiritual 
Modalities: Prayer as Rhetoric and Performance, which looks to the various technologies––
rosaries, candles, writing, song, etc.––that mediate prayer.  Fitzgerald argues prayer is delivered 
through those technologies, technologies that operate, for the most part, invisibly.  
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and gesture allowing for areas of rhetorical practice not previously under the purview of delivery 
to be studied as such.  
I place the narratives of the rise of delivery and the fall of style alongside each other 
because of their unavoidable overlap.  I’ve already noted that Tanner, Corbett, and Shaughnessy 
use style as a stopgap for delivery.  There is another overlap in Tom Pace’s and McCorkle’s 
respective claims concerning style, delivery, and the advancement of Composition.  Pace claims 
that every major theoretical and pedagogical movement in Composition has been brought about 
by the field’s fraught relationship with style.  The move from product-oriented, current 
traditionalist pedagogies to process was accomplished, in Pace’s understanding, “by arguing that 
current-traditionalism was interested in ‘mere’ style––that is, on the surface correctness of the 
finished product, with no attention given to invention and revision” (1).  So too, when process 
pedagogy gave way to the social turn in the late 1980s, it was again style that prompted the 
move: “[S]ocial constructionist theorists … suggested the process approach was too interested in 
an expressivist, individual style … and neglected the ways factors of context and community 
shape meaning far more powerfully than any particular feature of the author’s individual voice” 
(1).  There is a relationship, Pace argues, between advancements in the field and the field’s 
relationship to style; similarly, Ben McCorkle claims major advancements in rhetorical practice 
are related to technological advancements concerning delivery.  The shift from orality to literacy, 
the advent of the printing press, the rise of television, radio, and film, the emergence of 
hypertext––these developments in the means by which discourse is delivered coincide with 
developments in rhetorical theory and practice, these different and novel technologies 
dramatically influencing how the canon of delivery functions and vice versa.   
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Pace and McCorkle’s arguments are somewhat similar: they each argue advancements in 
the field are tied to Composition and Rhetoric’s relationship to style and delivery, respectively.  I 
do not read this as a matter of Pace being concerned with style and consequently seeing the field 
through style-colored lenses, nor is it a matter of McCorkle having an investment in delivery and 
consequently laying delivery over his understanding of the history of rhetorical theory and 
practice.  Rather, that each would pin significant developments in the field upon style and upon 
delivery speaks, again, to the relationship between the two, a relationship hinted at decades 
before in the writings of Tanner, Corbett, and Shaughnessy.   
This relationship between style and delivery has a long history, dating back much further 
than the Golden Age of Style to (at least) Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  The Rhetoric is divided by the 
canons of rhetorical practice, the bulk of books one and two handed over to invention, book three 
devoting itself to style, delivery, and (briefly) organization.  (Even less is said about memory.)  
The opening of book three, so characteristic of Aristotle’s orderly presentation of rhetorical 
practice: “The next subject to discuss is lexis, for it is not enough to have a supply of things to 
say but it is also necessary to say it in the right way” (3.1.2).  Aristotle’s use of “the next subject 
to discuss” implies lexis is its own subject apart from invention.12  But any tidiness here quickly 
comes undone with “necessary to say it in the right way.”  I read that phrase two ways, referring 
either to delivery or to style.  Aristotle begins with a (reluctant) discussion of the former, noting 
it is necessary to address delivery only because of the “corruption of the audience” (3.1.5).  After 
                                                
12 Convention asks that foreign words be italicized.  When using a foreign word as a foreign 
word––as I have with lexis in this footnote’s parent sentence, an instance where my use of lexis 
points back to Aristotle’s use of it––I follow convention and italicize the word.  But because so 
many Greek and Latin words have been taken up by Composition and are now terms of art for 
the field––words such as lexis, epideictic, ethos, pathos, logos, kairos, and the like––when using 
a word in this disciplinary sense, I do not italicize it.  This is an effort to signal Composition’s 
appropriation of the term and the shift of meaning such terms necessarily undergo when moving 
across time, culture, and contexts.  When quoting, I retain the formatting of the author cited.   
 26 
a few words on delivery, Aristotle moves into a lengthy treatment of style, covering in chapters 
two through twelve clarity, metaphors, diction, rhythm, syntax, faults in style, concision and 
bulkiness in language––all topics expected within the category of style.  But what is curious is 
how this teaching on style comes on the heels of Aristotle’s remarks about delivery, and how, in 
chapter twelve, Aristotle again returns to delivery, noting that each genre of rhetoric has a 
particular delivery suited to it.  He is jumping around, moving from delivery to style back to 
delivery, yet he closes this discussion with another heavy-handed signal giving the appearance of 
order: “This concludes the discussion of lexis, both in general about all of it and in particular 
about each genus.  It remains to speak about arrangement” (3.12.6).  With this transition 
Aristotle moves on, leaving lexis––a lexis that includes both style and delivery––behind.  
George Kennedy, in his translation of the Rhetoric, notes, “Lexis … refers to the ‘way of 
saying something’ in contrast to logos, ‘what is said’” (193).  This is a divide between form and 
content.  Kennedy clarifies these two meanings of lexis: “In some passages, Aristotle uses lexis 
in a broad sense of how thought is expressed in words, sentences, and a speech as a whole, but 
often he uses the term in the more restricted sense of ‘word choice, diction’” (193).  Lexis is 
ambiguous for Aristotle, referring at times to the more general sense of style within a piece of 
discourse and referring, at other times, to the specifics of that stylistics.  Corbett also points to 
the ambiguity of lexis, adding additional layers of meaning to the term and noting that the Greek 
word has “the triple notion of ‘thought’ and ‘word’ … and ‘speaking’” (Classical Rhetoric 414).  
The dual understanding of lexis Kennedy suggests is muddied by Corbett’s tri-part definition.  
Hence the ambiguity of “way of saying something.”  The relative imprecision of lexis accounts, 
in part, for Aristotle’s conflation of style and delivery within the same chapter of the Rhetoric, a 
book that strives to keep the parts of rhetorical practice distinct from each another.  Aristotle is 
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able to bring style and delivery together because the range of rhetorical arts lexis governs is so 
broad.  
I suggest there is something else at work here. Style and delivery get conflated in 
Aristotle, Tanner, Corbett, and Shaughnessy due to a tacit understanding of the bodily character 
of written prose.  What of the many metaphors of the body used to describe writing?  A writer 
has a voice.  Prose moves across the page.  All capital letters are read as shouting.  Consider the 
following, each using metaphors of the body to describe the work of the sentence:  
Jacques Barzun, from Simple & Direct: A Rhetoric for Writers 
 
A completed sentence, all agree, is a piece of construction; but we should 
not think of it as a house made of building blocks.  Rather, it resembles a 
skeleton, in which the joints, the balance, the fit of the parts and their inner 
solidity combine to make up a well-knit frame.  (46) 
Stanley Fish, from How to Write a Sentence and How to Read One 
 
Even the simplest first sentence is on its toes, beckoning us to the next 
sentence and the next and the next.  (100) 
Joseph Williams, from Style: Toward Clarity and Grace 
 
If you begin too many sentences with “There is” or “There are,” your 
prose will become flat-footed, lacking movement or energy.  (71) 
Virginia Tufte, from Artful Sentences: Style as Syntax 
 
Pronouns themselves are often repeated and varied to help establish a 
posture in relation to the readers, frequently creating an impression of 
informality, or of authority, and at times a speaking voice.  (49) 
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The Tufte passage merges both elements of a classical delivery into the work of the sentence: 
pronouns gesture––“establish a posture”––as well as shape a writer’s “speaking voice.”  A few 
more instances: Robert Connors and Andrea Lunsford describe editing as “spilling innocent 
blood across the page”––the sentence alive, blood coursing through its syntactic veins (158).  
Gerald Graff and Cathy Birkenstein, in their popular textbook They Say / I Say: The Moves that 
Matter in Academic Writing, on the tendencies of writers of disjointed prose: “What makes such 
writers hard to read, in other words, is that they never gesture back to what they have just said or 
forward to what they plan to say.  ‘Never look back’ might be their motto” (106).  Here, the 
writer gestures and glances backward or forward through syntax.  The prose itself moves.  
 These metaphors suggest that the work of the sentence is not that removed from 
rhetorical delivery.  There is a latent understanding that sentences act as bodies, that they 
perform on the page, that they move and gesture and speak.  And so, when I set the fall of style 
alongside the rise of delivery, the relationship between the two moves to the fore.  This project 
operates within the liminal space between style and delivery opened up by the ambiguity of lexis.  
I work here because, in troubling the relationship between style and delivery, I am able to 
interrogate the affordances and constraints of each, thinking through the writerly and readerly 
possibilities that emerge when delivery moves off the stage onto the page and when the sentence 
is recognized, finally, as a form of rhetorical delivery.   
 
1.2 ON METHOD 
 
In order to work at this intersection of delivery and style, I must, like all recent scholarship on 
delivery, set aside a delivery defined by bodily voice and gesture.  I do so with hesitation, given 
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that this project finds its genesis in an embodied, classical understanding of delivery.  I hesitate, 
too, given rhetoric’s rich history as an embodied practice (Hawhee; Johnstone; Fredal) and given 
the innovative work recuperating voice and sound as media for composition (Anderson; Ceraso) 
and using gesture to revitalize rhetorical figures of thought as inventive tools (Carillo; 
Fahnestock).   
Yet, I set aside bodily voice and gesture for four reasons.  First, as the Welch of my 
epigraph argues, “Delivery is weakened if it refers only to the gesture, physical movement, and 
expression that many commentators have dismissed it as doing” (“Reconfiguring” 21).  In this 
project, I think through how delivery delivers discourse to audiences, recognizing that voice and 
gesture are one means toward that end, but certainly not the only means.  Because delivery did 
not disappear with the advent of writing but rather how it operates evolved, I set aside voice and 
gesture in order to examine delivery within the medium of the sentence.   
Second, I set aside bodily voice and gesture because of the many, and smart, critiques 
leveled against them when they become metaphors to describe the written word.  In the late 
1980s, Irvin Hashimoto argued voice––this is voice as Expressivism understands it, a voice as 
persona, as self, as tone––has “anti-intellectual consequences” as it often focuses on an 
individual’s growth rather than research (77), and a dozen years later, Darcie Bowden pointed to 
the patriarchal and logocentric overtones of voice.  More recently, in 2014, Amy Vidali has 
noted the able-bodied metaphors pervading everyday speech.  Expressions like “I see what you 
mean” depend upon the metaphor of “knowing is seeing, which represents blindness as 
misunderstanding and disorder, while seeing is knowledge and coherence” (34).  These 
metaphors are everywhere in Composition: consider Richard Lanham’s “Paramedic Method” for 
“deaf and blind” prose (Revising x, 36), or Mike Rose’s critique of the medical metaphors that 
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dominated early 20th-century writing instruction: writing teachers “diagnose various disabilities, 
defects, deficiencies, and handicaps, and then tried to remedy them” (350-51).  Vidali argues 
such metaphors “[assume] that bodies have particular physical / cognitive / sensory experiences 
and related metaphorical expressions” (34).  That is, the metaphors posit a shared experience of 
the world, make that experience normative, and then oust alternative ways of thinking, knowing, 
and being within the world.  In setting aside bodily voice and gesture, I hope to move past the 
able-bodied metaphors they can encourage, metaphors that stifle other ways of understanding 
and practicing rhetoric.   
Third, I set aside bodily voice and gesture to distance this project from its classical roots 
so as to not appropriate classical rhetoric uncritically.  Lindal Buchanan highlights four problems 
with the classical model of delivery: it assumes male rhetors, it concerns itself with voice and 
gesture alone, it defines delivery solely by the body, and it often ignores the social context within 
which rhetorical practice always takes place (159).  Buchanan’s critique resonates with those 
I’ve addressed above concerning the metaphors voice and gesture, Buchanan showing forth the 
social and political aspects of rhetorical delivery that can be overlooked when voice and gesture 
are not critically framed.  I feel the weight of these critiques when moving toward a rhetoric of 
syntactic delivery, one that I hope will be available to all writers, move beyond voice and gesture, 
define delivery outside of the body alone, and operate with the rhetorical and social contexts of 
the written word.   
Last, I set aside bodily voice and gesture because they reflect a particular orientation of 
audience to speaker, an orientation that necessarily changes when delivery moves from the stage 
to the page.  Within an oral setting, the speaker delivers the speech.  The speaker projects her 
voice, gestures, moves across the stage, dresses a certain way, etc.  The audience observes that 
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delivery, and perhaps can be said to influence it––the speaker might raise her voice or make a 
gesture in response to the audience––but the audience does not have a part in actually performing 
delivery.  The responsibility for delivery sits, largely, on the shoulders of the speaker.  Not so 
with writing.  When a reader reads the delivered sentence, it is the reader who animates the prose, 
who makes it come alive.  Voice and gesture carry with them connotations of the speaker 
speaking and gesturing; they do not capture well the role of the reader engaging a text or the 
writer working on the page.  That is, voice and gesture are speaker-centric, and a rhetoric of 
syntactic delivery, while it certainly does depend on the work of the writer, is just as much about, 
perhaps more so, the work of the reader.  I set aside the terms, in part, to bring forward the role 
of the reader in this project.  
 As an effort to address these concerns with voice and gesture, in the chapters that follow I 
offer Performance, Display, and Location as critical terms to describe the work of the delivered 
sentence.  These terms are not intended to replace voice and gesture, but rather to expand the 
reach of delivery beyond oral settings.  Before I begin that discussion, I turn now to a piece of 
student writing to think through how it might be read in light of the connection between the 
sentence and delivery. 
 
1.3 INTERCHAPTER: THE SENTENCE, DELIVERED 
 
I asked students to write in response to a poem of their choosing.  Then, as a revision of that 
essay, I asked them to bring an outside source to bear upon their reading.  The following comes 
from a student responding to a blogger’s post on Robert Frost’s “Stopping by Woods on a Snowy 
Evening.”     
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One analysis I took interest in was that of yahoo blogger Bridget Delaney’s, who 
viewed the poem in a more spiritual context.  Where she saw God I saw danger.  
It makes me wonder how much of my interpretations of fiction have been 
influenced by non-fiction. 
I would have preferred the student engage a source more academic than a blogger on Yahoo, but 
that is not my concern here.  Rather, I want to think through how these sentences might be read 
as delivered.  If I were reading as Fish does, looking for sentences that take my breath away, I 
would be drawn to the second sentence, “Where she saw God I saw danger.”  Its terse seven 
words, sandwiched between 16- and 22-word sentences, call attention to themselves.  The 
student does not use a comma; instead, the iambs of “where she saw God” force a pause mid-
sentence and they contrast against the trochees of “I saw danger”.  Syntax places “she” and “I” in 
opposition, just as it sets “God” and “danger” against each other.  The sentence divides itself in 
two, clearly setting the blogger’s reading of Frost against the student’s, situating each in relation 
to the other.  But what of the other two sentences, the sentences that don’t take my breath away, 
the sentences that are––to be frank––clunky?  
The first sentence––“One analysis I took interest in was that of yahoo blogger Bridget 
Delaney’s, who viewed the poem in a more spiritual context”––is broken in half by a comma.  In 
the first half, the subject is complicated.  “One analysis I took interest in” is an inversion of the 
conventional sentence word order, moving from object (“One analysis”) to subject (“I”) to verb 
(“took interest in”).  The student rearranges the word order so as to transform a sentence into a 
noun phrase, a noun phrase that can become the subject of a new sentence.  There is the phrasing 
of “that of,” a phrase that could be deleted for the sake of brevity if the writer was to heed Strunk 
and White’s canonical rule 17: “Omit needless words.”  But the question then rises: what words 
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are needless?  The sentence could have been written “Yahoo blogger Bridget Delaney viewed the 
poem in a more spiritual context,” a leaner 12 words in comparison to the original’s 22.  But now 
the inverted subject and the “that of” are erased, as is the presence of the writerly “I.”  Also 
absent is the lengthy dependent clause in the original modifying “Delaney’s,” “who viewed the 
poem in a more spiritual context” now swallowed up by the predicate of the revised sentence.  
The complex subject of the original, “that of,” and the dependent clause modifying 
“Delaney’s” are all efforts on the part of the student to sound like an academic.  I read these 
moves––which could be revised away in service of omitting needless words––as anything but 
extraneous.  They have a job to do.  The student is trying to write as an academic, or, at least, 
how she imagines an academic writes.  The first two moves––the complicated subject and “that 
of”––I read as moments of struggle.  They give an air of formality to the writing, a learned and 
schooled stiffness.  But the dependent clause modifying “Delaney’s” is a success, a sound way to 
modify a sentence by adding additional information, a move academics make all the time (as I 
am in this sentence).  It is an enactment of what Stanley Fish, in How to Write a Sentence, calls 
the “additive style” (61-88), what Virginia Tufte, in Artful Sentences, calls a “branching sentence” 
(171-87).  It is a sentence that embodies Francis Christensen’s claim that “the structure itself 
becomes an aid to discovery” (“A Generative Rhetoric of the Sentence” 20).  The base clause of 
the sentence prompts inquiry, on the part of the student, as to why Delaney’s blog post interests 
her, and the student discovers, in the relative clause, that it is because of the tension between 
Delaney’s and her own reading of Frost.  And it is within this third move that the student begins 
her interpretive work, both on Delaney and Frost, by telling how she reads Delaney’s 
interpretation of Frost.  Were this first sentence revised to be shorter––“Yahoo blogger Bridget 
Delaney viewed the poem in a more spiritual context” as opposed to the original “One analysis I 
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took interest in was that of yahoo blogger Bridget Delaney’s, who viewed the poem in a more 
spiritual context”––the student’s intervention into Delaney’s and Frost’s work would be glossed 
over.  I am not convinced that the student’s needless words are actually needless.  Yes, the 
sentence is longer than it could be, and yes the sentence is perhaps not as graceful as it might be, 
but within its strained syntax the student is trying out a way of writing, practicing moves that will 
someday be natural.  
Consider again, now in relation to the first sentence, “Where she saw God I saw danger.”  
I note that the student again inverts her word order.  “I saw danger where she saw God” could 
arguably be more conventional.  The subject comes first, followed its verb and object, the reader 
receiving a simple sentence that is then modified by an adverbial.  But when read aloud in 
relation to the sentence preceding it, “I saw danger where she saw God” just doesn’t sound right.  
Something is off.  The student, wisely, flips the sentence on end.  By flipping it, the student 
enacts what Kolln and Gray call the “known-new contract” (86-90).  Kolln and Gray use contract 
to denote the implicit agreement between writers and readers, the expectation that the reader will 
be given something familiar first (in the subject position) and that information will then be 
expanded upon as the sentence continues (in the predicate).  The first half of the sentence gives 
readers old information, referring to things already known, and the second half gives readers new 
information set amid, building upon, complicating, extending, etc., the old.13  “Where she saw 
God I saw danger” is a moment of transition, giving readers known information––how Delaney 
reads Frost––then shifting to new information––how the student reads Frost.  The remainder of 
the paper then elaborates the student’s reading.  This sentence, then, becomes the means of 
                                                
13 Composition knows the known-new contract best from Williams’ Style: Toward Clarity and 
Grace (48).  I write again, and at length, about the known-new contract in the Interchapter “The 
Sentence, Inhabited.”  
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locating the student within a conversation.  The student organizes her world in relation to Frost, 
his work, the blogger, the blogger’s reading of Frost, the student’s own reading of Frost, as well 
as to readers––Frost’s readers, the blogger’s readers, and the student’s.  
The third sentence––“It makes me wonder how much of my interpretations of fiction 
have been influenced by non-fiction”––is different from the preceding two.  “One analysis I took 
interest in was that of yahoo blogger Bridget Delaney’s, who viewed the poem in a more 
spiritual context” and “Where she saw God I saw danger” both have definitive halves.  In the 
first, the student uses a comma to break the sentence.  By splitting the sentence as she does, the 
writer calls attention first to Delaney and then, in the second half, to Delaney’s reading of Frost.  
This opening sentence nicely equates Delaney and a spiritual reading of Frost by means of a 
syntax that builds to the former, pauses, and then builds to the latter.  A similar move is made in 
the second sentence, though the writer does not rely on a comma but on iambs to craft that pause.  
The pause here places “God” and “danger” against each other.  Whereas in the first sentence, 
“Delaney’s” and “spiritual context” are aligned by a syntax that places the two side-by-side, here, 
in the second sentence, “God” and “danger” are set against each other by that same syntactic 
move of dividing the sentence in two. 
That work ceases in the third sentence, where the student begins a different project.  After 
establishing the landmarks of her analysis––Delaney, a spiritual reading of Frost, God, and 
danger––the student begins moving through them.  The student’s “It” refers back to her reading 
of Frost in terms of danger.  That reading then prompts her to “wonder how much of my 
interpretations of fiction have been influenced by non-fiction.”  From an initial interpretation of a 
single poem, the student interrogates her reading practice in general.  She moves from the 
specific to the general, using her own experience as a reader reading a particular poem as a 
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gateway into considering larger questions of readerly practice.  There is a move here toward 
abstraction from the tangible, toward theory from praxis.  Granted, her key terms are a bit 
slippery.  Throughout her essay, the student uses “fiction” to refer both to poetry in general and 
to Frost’s work in particular and “non-fiction” to refer to her own lived experience.  But her 
entire paper relies on these words, which I read as her latching onto key terms and building a 
project around them.  While those key terms should be pressed, what the student is doing here, 
again, is trying to deliver prose like an academic who identifies key terms and then uses them 
diligently.  Even if it does not yet sound right, the student is speaking more and more like a 
scholar as she navigates the key terms that hold together her project.   
Something else happens in this third sentence.  “Me” plays two roles.  First, “me” is the 
object of “makes”: “It makes me.”  The “It”––this reading of Frost in light of danger––acts upon 
the student grammatically: it makes her.  And what does it make her?  It makes her do something, 
which is the second role of “me” in the sentence.  “Me” becomes the subject (of sorts) of the 
sentence within a sentence here.  “It makes” this thing happen: “me wonder how much of my 
interpretations of fiction have been influenced by non-fiction.”  On the one hand, this 
construction––It makes me do X––is commonplace, but here, within this student paper, it is 
remarkable.  The student has positioned herself by way of syntax as both object and subject, as 
both someone acted upon and as someone who acts.  Is that not what education, what writing, 
what reading, what learning, does to all students?  Act upon, and in so doing, prompt action?  
This sentence, then, is an enactment of education itself, of the ways the individual is shaped by 





I have attempted to read this student’s sentences as delivered by attending to the sentence as an 
enactment of a Performance on the page, a Display of the writer, her syntax Locating her in 
relation to Frost and the blogger and her readers.  I find myself struggling.  I want to set aside 
voice and gesture, and yet, throughout this reading, I retreat to phrases suggestive of the classical 
embodied model of delivery.  I write of how her writing “sounds,” of the “moves” she makes.  It 
seems I cannot escape voice and gesture, much as I try.  The language of voice and gesture is 
ingrained in discussions of writing, suggestive again of the relationship between delivery and the 
sentence.  I do not think, though, that this inability to get away from voice and gesture is 
necessarily problematic.  Part of working toward a rhetoric of syntactic delivery is just that: 
working toward it, recognizing that such delivery is not easily described, not easily written about.  
Syntactic delivery merges two canons of rhetorical practice that, while related, do not have a 
vocabulary as tidy as voice and gesture, as exhaustively catalogued as figures of speech and 
thought.  But therein lies its richness, for syntactic delivery asks that readers and writers and 
teachers and students find other ways to describe the work of the sentence, find new language to 
account for what the sentence does on the page.  This project works toward what that language 





















We need to go very much farther back, to consider all the ways and 
senses in which saying anything at all is doing this or that––
because of course it is always doing a good many different things.  
 
J. L. Austin 




To solve a problem, the ordinary language philosopher will attempt 
to reach a clear view of the picture that gives rise to it.  This is 
usually done by looking closely at the way the problem is 
formulated.  This is the work of ordinary language philosophy.  An 
ordinary language analysis consists in the careful examination of 
specific examples, and therefore has to include extensive quotation.  
 
Toril Moi 
“ ‘They practice their trades in different worlds’: 
Concepts in Poststructuralism and  






In 2006, Graphics Press published Virginia Tufte’s Artful Sentence: Syntax as Style.  Tufte is not 
read by Composition; she is a Miltonist, a Linguist, a Transformational Grammarian who had a 
small and scattered publication record.1  The book opens with an epigraph from Anthony 
                                                
1 Tufte published two book reviews and co-authored a textbook on transformational grammar.  
She collaborated twice with Barbara Myerhoff (a colleague of Tufte’s at University of Southern 
California), once on an edited collection on representations of the family (Myerhoff was an 
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Burgess––“And the words slide into the slots ordained by syntax, and glitter as with atmospheric 
dust with those impurities which we call meaning”––to which Tufte responds: 
Anthony Burgess is right: it is the words that shine and sparkle and glitter, 
sometimes radiant with an author’s inspired choice.  But it is syntax that gives 
words the power to relate to each other in a sequence, to create rhythms and 
emphasis, to carry meaning––of whatever kind––as well as glow individually in 
just the right place.  (9) 
With that, Tufte begins her project: presenting readers hundreds of sentences where the syntax 
gives words the power to relate to each other in sequence, where syntax creates rhythms and 
emphasis, where syntax carries meaning, where syntax allows the words––impurities and all––to 
glow in just the right place.  Tufte divides Artful Sentences into fourteen chapters: “Short 
Sentences;” “Noun Phrases;” “Verb Phrases;” “Adjectives and Adverbs;” “Prepositions;” 
“Conjunctions and Coordination;” “Dependent Clauses;” “Sentence Openers and Inversions;” 
“Free Modifiers: Branching Sentences;” “The Appositive;” “Interrogative, Imperative, 
Exclamatory;” “Parallelism;” “Cohesion;” and “Syntactic Symbolism” (Tufte’s term for when 
the form of a sentence mirrors its content).  Each calls attention to how a sentence might 
transform the basic grammatical principle named by its title.  There is a progression from chapter 
to chapter, beginning with what Tufte calls “content words” (the noun, the verb, the modifier) to 
“structure words” (the preposition, the conjunction) to how these words might be set in relation 
                                                                                                                                                       
anthropologist) and once on an essay about teaching a class “to allow old people to tell their life 
stories” (Myerhoff and Tufte 250).  Tufte published a single monograph, The Poetry of 
Marriage: The Epithalamium in Europe and Its Development in England.  The book grew out of 
her 440-page dissertation “Literary Backgrounds and Motifs of the Epithalamium in English to 
1650,” written at the University of California, Los Angeles under the direction of Hugh 
Swedenberg, Jr.  (Philip Levine sat on her committee.)  From that project, Tufte also published 
High Wedlock Then Be Honoured, a collection of wedding poems “from nineteen countries and 
twenty-five centuries” (title page).  
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to one another (branching sentences, parallelism, cohesion), this act of setting words in relation 
to one another the central concern of Tufte’s project––hence her epigraph from Burgess.2   
To give a sense of her project, I quote at length from the first chapter of Artful Sentences, 
“Short Sentences.”  I note that in what follows I deal primarily with her first chapter (one 
curiously titled in comparison to the technical titles the other thirteen).  I focus on Tufte reading 
short sentences because she notices what can easily be overlooked.  This is perhaps no more 
evident than in dealing with short sentences, where the seemingly simple progression from 
subject to verb to object / predicate nominative / predicate adjective may appear to offer little 
fodder for rhetorical, stylistic, syntactic analysis.  But it is here, in these sentences that don’t 
seem to be doing much grammatically, that Tufte demonstrates her abilities as a reader.  And it is 
here, too, that Tufte has much to teach regarding how one might read, write, teach, and study 
sentences.     
Tufte begins the chapter with a list of four basic types of short sentences: equations with 
be, equations with linking verbs, intransitives, and transitives.  Here is Tufte on the first type:  
  The simplest form of the be-pattern is the exact equating of two noun phrases: 
   
   Nat was Nat. 
 
    Bernard Malamud, The Assistant, 130 
 
   So that was that. 
 
    Eric Ambler, Intrigue, 300 
 
   “A Pangolin is a Pangolin.” 
 
    Willie Ley, Another Look at Atlantis, 8 
 
   “Unfair’s unfair.” 
                                                
2 The division of content words and structure words comes from Tufte’s Grammar as Style (69-
70).   
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    Brooks Atkinson, Brief Chronicles, 176 
  
  (Tufte 11, emphasis Tufte’s) 
 
This is typical of Tufte’s method.  Each chapter in Artful Sentences opens with a claim about the 
grammar principle in question and then presents a few examples drawn from disparate texts, the 
examples prefaced with Tufte’s brief commentary.  Once Tufte establishes a basic form, she 
offers variations.  The following comes immediately after the section quoted above:  
Although such an assertion [that a be-phrase equates two noun phrases] may seem 
minimal, it can provide a telling emphasis. … Below, an equative clause 
reinforces an argument: 
 As I was saying, fair’s fair. 
  Katha Pollitt, Subject to Debate, 38 
Variations abound.  Inserting a prepositional phrase as a modifier, on each side of 
the equation, enlarges meaning: 
 The reality of art is the reality of imagination. 
  Jeanette Winterson, Art Objects, 151 
In the next example, the author uses adjective modifiers in a pair of sentences to 
create a persuasive finale: 
The individual voice is the communal voice.  The regional voice is the 
universal voice. 
    Joyce Carol Oates, The Faith of a Writer, 1 
Next, the rhythm of a repeated noun itself measures the intervals of time the 
author is describing in the remarkable sentence italicized below: 
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And beyond any particular clock, a vast scaffold of time, stretching across 
the universe, lays down the law of time equally for all.  In this world, a 
second is a second is a second. 
 Alan Lightman, Einstein’s Dreams, 34 
Lightman demonstrates his point by imaginatively extending a basic syntactic 
pattern, as appropriate in its context as the well-known words of Gertrude Stein: 
   Rose is a rose is a rose is a rose. 
    Sacred Emily, 187 
  (Tufte 11-12, emphasis Tufte’s) 
Tufte continues like this for 270 pages, drawing readers to notice particular aspects of syntax via 
her commentary and italics.  Note how Tufte expands the work of the simple, short sentence.  
Initially it equates two noun phrases.  That move becomes a means to reinforce an argument, to 
enlarge meaning, to craft a finale, to mirror the subject matter of the sentence––all this from a 
simple sentence connected by to be.  Tufte moves from the grammatical to the rhetorical.  
As the chapter continues, Tufte’s reading of the short sentence and its rhetorical 
affordances becomes increasingly complex, the short sentence crafting synecdoche and metaphor, 
making an urgent point, drawing the stress of a sentence.  Once she has established the basic 
moves of a short sentence, Tufte quotes entire paragraphs, her readers now attuned to what a 
short sentence might be doing within that larger piece of discourse: 
Parallel patterns of the be-phrases are useful in the set of descriptive examples 
below, two recounting a dull, dreary routine and the third a scene of evacuation or 
absence: 
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Casualties were very few, and supply was regular … It was dreary.  There 
was danger, but it was remote; there was diversion, but it was rare.  For 
the most part it was work and work of the most distasteful character, work 
which was mean and long. 
 Norman Mailer, Advertisements for Myself, 133 
My classes were dull, my masters with a few exceptions were dull, the 
school-life in general, apart from the sports, was dull.  
    John Drinkwater, Inheritance, 235 
The big sycamore by the creek was gone.  The willow tangle was gone.  
The little tangle of untrodden bluegrass was gone.  The clump of dogwood 
on the little rise across the creek––now that, too, was gone. 
 Robert Penn Warren, Flood, 4 
In vivid contrast to the above is the convening of intransitives and transitives, 
with limited expansion, to portray a frenzy of violent action.  The whole 
paragraph is guided by a parallelism of subject-opened, brief declarative forms, 
sometimes compounded:  
He began to curse.  He scrambled down the rock, found a too heavy stone, 
moved it about a yard and then let go.  He threw himself over the stone 
and went cursing to the water.  But there was nothing visible within reach 
that he could handle.  He went quickly to the top again and stood looking 
at the headless dwarf in terror.  He scrambled back to the too heavy stone 
and fought with it.  He moved it, end over end.  He built steps to the top of 
a wall and worked the great stone up.  He drew from his body more 
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strength than he had got.  He bled.  He stood sweating among the papers at 
last.  He dismantled the dwarf and rebuilt him on the stone that after all 
was not too heavy for education and intelligence and will. 
 William Golding, Pincher Martin, 80 
  (Tufte 20-21, emphasis Tufte’s) 
I quote at length from Tufte because the nature of her project demands it.  And though I have no 
evidence Tufte was reading them, I place Tufte among Ordinary Language Philosophers, 
thinkers whose method, as my epigraphs claim, depends upon amassing examples of language 
use.  Tufte gathers hundreds of sentences because those sentences help her “consider all the ways 
and senses” in which sentences can do things (Austin, Philosophical 238); those sentences 
evidence “the work of ordinary language philosophy” (Moi 803, emphasis Moi’s).  Tufte’s is an 
argument by catalogue, such that a summary of Artful Sentences could not capture well Tufte’s 
method, her interaction with these sentences drawn from so many different sources and presented 
decontextualized on the page.  Tufte disorients her readers via the decontextualized sentence 
while simultaneously offering guidance into those sentences via her commentary.  If this is a 
pedagogy––and I claim it is––it is both familiar and strange.  It is familiar in that Tufte gathers 
sentences much like any other book of sentence appreciation, but strange in that Tufte does not 
present them to be marveled at.  Rather, she uses her sentences to teach a performativity within 
the written word.  She models a particular way of thinking about what sentences do on the page.   
Tufte’s project is hard to know how to read.  It is not quite a sentence museum, but not 
quite a textbook either.  It is not quite leisure reading, nor a grammar handbook, nor a linguistic 
study on sentence forms, nor a literary anthology––and it has not been received well.  The book 
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garnered a single review in the academic journals.  Joseph Williams wrote it for Modern 
Philology, the final piece Williams published before passing away.3   
Williams believed Tufte’s project sought to provide “a systematic description of how 
skilled writers use grammatical forms to good effect” (181-82).  He must discern this on his own, 
for Tufte does not provide anything in Artful Sentences that would speak to an aim for her 
project; there is no introduction, no prefatory notes, no commentary that would offer a theoretical 
framework or overview of what Tufte hopes to accomplish with Artful Sentences.  Perhaps this 
dearth of theoretical framing feeds into Williams’s first complaint: “The book has no thesis” 
(182).  Williams says the lack of a thesis would not necessarily be a “fatal flaw” had Artful 
Sentences endeavored to provide a catalogue “that links particular constructions to particular 
reader responses” (182).  That project, Williams asserts, “would no more need a thesis than does 
the OED” (182).  But the problem comes, in Williams’s reading of Tufte, in that the “book 
contributes little, if anything, to our understanding of the relationships between specific points of 
style and their effects and less to our thinking about the study of style in general, either in theory 
or in practice” (182).   
 This is the Joseph Williams who also wrote the seminal Style: Toward Clarity and Grace, 
a book concerned precisely with the affective capabilities of style.  The book casts a long shadow 
over Williams’s assessment of Tufte’s scholarship.  In Style, Williams complains that 
impressionistic descriptions of style––such as “clear” and “turgid”––“do not describe sentences 
on the page; [they] describe how we feel about them.  Neither awkward nor turgid are on the 
page.  Turgid and awkward refer to a bad feeling behind the eyes” (17, emphasis Williams’s).  
                                                
3 Aside from Williams’s review, my own reference of Tufte’s work in a book review, and 
Benjamin Torbert’s mention of how he uses Artful Sentences in teaching undergraduate grammar, 
Artful Sentences has not been cited––as far as I know––in any Composition-, Linguistics-, or 
Literature-related journals.  
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Williams seeks “To account for style in a way that lets us go beyond saying how we feel;” he 
wants “a way to explain how we get those impressions” (17).  These desires inform the two-fold 
agenda of Style: first, to find a method for writing about style that does more than mere 
impressionistic description––he wants precision––and second, to use that method to connect 
stylistic moves to rhetorical effects.  
 This orientation toward style accounts for the verdict Williams passes on Tufte’s project: 
“it nicely illustrates how a critic of style should not write about it” (182).  Williams lists seven 
grievances, accompanying each with examples from Tufte’s book.  First, “the book abounds with 
obvious and empty generalizations”; second, “many of the specific observations offer nothing 
other than the self-evident”; third, the observations are “vaguely appreciative in a manner that 
provides no insight … Appreciation is not analysis”; fourth, the claims that are eventually made 
“are so often hedged about with qualifiers that they become virtually meaningless”; fifth, Tufte 
fails to provide enough contrasting examples; sixth, “some of her general claims are just 
unreliable”; and seventh, Tufte’s own writing is poor: “I think it reasonable to expect that a book 
called Artful Sentences should exemplify them.  But too many sentences here should never have 
seen the light of day” (182-84).  
 Williams’s critique is vitriolic, and it crumbles under the least bit of resistance.  
Concerning the first and second complaints, for example, Tufte is modeling a way of reading, a 
way of paying close attention to the sentence that is generally not practiced today.  She must, by 
necessity of her project, first show readers the obvious so that they may in turn find it on their 
own later and second, show readers the obvious so that she can move within each chapter to 
increasingly complex iterations of the grammatical principle in question.  Concerning Williams’s 
complaint regarding Tufte’s qualified claims: Tufte must hedge her claims, because in doing so 
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she avoids a simplistic view of style and rhetorical practice wherein doing X always 
accomplishes Y.  Concerning Williams’s perceived lack of sufficient examples: the book’s 
bibliography spans 24 pages and documents some 500-odd authors; the book quotes over 1,000 
sentences; sample size is not a problem.  
 I could continue rebutting Williams, but my main concern here is not as much Williams’ 
particular complaints as it is the final sentence of his review: “The only readers who might find 
this book useful would be those looking for an indirect object (or other point of grammar) written 
by a competent writer or for a clinic in how not to write about style” (184).  Both claims are 
wrong.  Tufte offers more than a compendium of grammar, more than a reference book of 
stylistic tricks and rhetorical moves, and she offers it to a wider range of readers than just those 
looking for a point of reference or clarification regarding grammar or convention.  Williams is 
correct in that Tufte offers a clinic––but it is a clinic that puts into practice a particular way of 
reading, writing, and thinking about the sentence grounded in an understanding of the sentence 
as fundamentally performative.  It is not a clinic in how to write about style, but a clinic in how 
to read sentences.  
 I do not intend for Williams to become a straw man, nor do I want to pick a fight with 
him.  I begin with Williams, and I note the problematic areas of his review, because Williams 
can speak for the frustrations encountered when reading Tufte, frustrations grounded in the 
difficulty of engaging a text without a stated theoretical framework, without a stated argument, 
without the signposts that guide much academic scholarship.  
Earlier I mentioned that Tufte does not provide an explicit theoretical framework for 
Artful Sentences.  I qualify that claim––yes, the framework is not articulated in Artful Sentences, 
but Artful Sentences is not without method: Tufte outlined it decades earlier in her 1971 
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Grammar as Style and its accompanying workbook Exercises in Creativity.4  Tufte left the 
theoretical apparatus of Grammar as Style out of Artful Sentences.  (I address this omission 
later.)  Other than that, Grammar as Style is quite similar to Artful Sentences, collecting and 
presenting readers hundreds of sentences with Tufte’s commentary.  And like Artful Sentences, 
Grammar as Style received a single review––a negative one––Bernard Baum concluding Tufte’s 
project is little more than “an opulent thesaurus of stylistic exploits by modern writers” (87).5   
Artful Sentences does not simply grow out of Grammar as Style and the Exercises; it is a 
revision of a project began during the Golden Age of Style, a revision taken up during 
Composition’s supposed Stylistic Turn.  Tufte’s work coincides with these significant moments 
in Composition, even though Tufte is outside of Composition, not someone Composition claims 
as one of its own, not someone Composition reads, not someone who reads Composition, even.  
In what follows, I value Tufte’s work.  I think through what performance means for the work of 
the sentence by looking first to J. L. Austin and then to Stanley Fish before turning to Tufte, 
situating her work amid theirs.  Tufte’s project (both its 1971 and 2006 iterations) skirts around 
the canon of delivery, appropriating it without acknowledging it.  I suggest Tufte’s way of 
                                                
4 Grammar as Style and Exercises in Creativity credit Garrett Stewart as co-author.  Stewart took 
his BA from the University of Southern California in 1967 (where Tufte taught) and “contributed 
substantially” to the project (Tufte Grammar vi).  He is listed on the title pages of both Grammar 
as Style and the Exercises.  In writing about these texts, I will refer to Tufte as the author, not to 
lessen Stewart’s contribution, but because Tufte herself writes in the first-person singular 
throughout each book, her “I”––as I read it––suggestive of her ownership of the project.  
 Stewart has recently turned to ordinary language philosophy, but his work is beyond the 
scope of this present chapter.  
 
5 And, again like Artful Sentences, Grammar as Style is rarely cited, aside from a passing 
mention by Frank Heny, a reprint of its opening chapter “The Relation of Grammar to Style” in 
Butler’s 2010 edited collection Style in Rhetoric and Composition: A Critical Sourcebook, and 




reading the sentence shifts attention away from what sentences say toward what they do, toward 
how they perform on the page.  My goal here is not only to redeem Tufte’s misread and 
maligned project, but also to show that Tufte’s way of reading and writing and teaching and 
studying the sentence manifests understanding of the delivered, performed sentence. 
 
2.1 READING AUSTIN READING SENTENCES 
 
Tufte presents sentences as short, dramatic performances, and it is useful, I think, to turn to J. L. 
Austin’s classic How To Do Things with Words to read her project.6  Although there is no 
evidence Tufte read Austin, they do share a common interest in Noam Chomsky’s 
transformational grammar.  Tufte co-authored a textbook on it (Aurbach et al.), and Austin 
included Chomsky on the reading list for his Saturday Morning discussion group at Oxford 
(Longworth n. pag.).  Austin begins a tradition thinking about language (and teaching) that leads 
to Fish’s and Tufte’s work and that will echo with other figures in other chapters.  Informed by 
Austin, I encounter Fish and Tufte, who, throughout their respective careers, collect sentences.  
How To Do Things with Words is a collection of lectures Austin gave at Harvard in 1955.  
In the first lecture, Austin proposes a distinction between two types of speech.  One is the 
constative, which describes or reports and which is either true or false.  These are the statements 
Austin claims language philosophers are habitually concerned with, to their own fault.  The 
second is the performative.  Performative utterances have two defining characteristics.  First, 
they “do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or false,’ ” and second, 
“the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which again would not 
                                                
6 In this discussion, I rely on How To Do Things with Words, though Austin covers many of 
these same ideas in Philosophical Papers (220-39). 
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normally be described as, or as ‘just,’ saying something” (5, emphasis Austin’s).  Austin offers a 
few illustrations: from a wedding, “I do;” from a christening, “I name this ship the Queen 
Elizabeth;” from a will, “I give and bequeath my watch to my brother;” from a wager, “I bet you 
sixpence it will rain tomorrow” (5).  With each statement, an action is performed––a couple is 
wed, a ship is named, a watch is handed down, a bet is placed––and it is the utterance of those 
words that performs the action. 
Because performative utterances perform an action, they cannot be judged true or false.  
It would be ludicrous to write a will only to have someone read it and declare, “That’s false.”  
One could still object to the will on other grounds––its legality, for instance––but those grounds 
would not be on the basis of the veracity of the will.  The objection would have to stem from 
some other basis, and that basis, according to Austin, is how well the performative utterance 
conforms to convention.  Austin clarifies:  
Thus, for naming the ship, it is essential that I should be the person appointed to 
name her, for (Christian) marrying, it is essential that I should not be already 
married with a wife living, sane and undivorced, and so on; for a bet to have been 
made, it is generally necessary for the offer of the bet to have been accepted by 
the taker (who must have done something, such as to say “Done”), and it is hardly 
a gift if I say “I give it to you” but never hand it over.  (9, emphasis Austin’s) 
Note Austin’s use of “essential” and “generally necessary;” following each is a requirement, a 
convention that must be heeded in order for the performance to occur.  It is in this sense that 
performative utterances are neither true nor false but rather appropriate to their circumstances.  
Austin calls an utterance that fails to meet its conventional demands “infelicitous,” and in a move 
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characteristic of How To Do Things with Words and its continual taxonomies (Austin offered the 
first in his division of speech into two types), Austin lists six types of infelicity: 
(A.1)  There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances, and further,  
(A. 2)  the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked.  
(B.1)  The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and 
(B.2)  completely. 
(Γ.1)  Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain 
thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on 
the part of any participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the 
procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings, and the participants must 
intend so to conduct themselves, and further 
(Γ.2)  must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.  (14-15) 
Austin calls this his “doctrine of the things that can be and go wrong,” his “doctrine of 
Infelicities” (14, emphasis Austin’s).  Austin-the-taxonomist is at work here: he uses Roman 
letters for the first four conditions and Greek for the last two to distinguish two varieties of 
infelicity.  If one of the first four is violated (the Roman letters), the act is not performed at all, 
whereas if one of the last two is violated (the Greek letters), the act is still performed, albeit 
insincerely.  
If I am sitting in the bleachers and I call a runner out at third, my utterance will not 
perform any action.  While I have followed convention in calling the runner out (A.1), I have not 
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been given the authority to make such a call; I am not an umpire.  Because I am not the person 
“appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked” (A.2), my utterance is 
infelicitous, and the performance does not take place.  Nothing is accomplished, nor performed, 
by my uttering––or, rather, calling––“He’s out!”  But if I were the umpire, and I had been bribed 
into making the call, and therefore did not “in fact have those thoughts or feelings” that would 
make the call sincere, I have violated Γ.1 and Γ.2.  The performative utterance occurs and has 
force––the runner is out, the inning is over, the game is finished––but the call is infelicitous 
because it is an “abuse of the procedure” (16).   
Austin wants to distinguish between the performative and the constative, but as he moves 
through the lectures, he finds that the simple test of whether a statement can be true or false, or 
felicitous or infelicitous, is not robust enough to demarcate between the two.  So Austin looks to 
grammar.  He notes that all the performative utterances he has offered are in the first person 
singular, present indicative active: I do, I bequeath, I christen, I bet.  But Austin quickly finds 
exceptions.  In the second person: “You are hereby authorized to pay.”  In the third person, and 
in the passive: “Passengers are warned to cross the track by the bridge only” (57).  Having found 
exceptions to the first person singular, present indicative active on the grounds of person and 
voice, Austin then finds exceptions on the grounds of mood and tense.   Mood is not a criterion 
for the performative, “for I may order you to turn right by saying, not, ‘I order you to turn right,’ 
but simply ‘Turn right’” (58).  Performative utterances can occur in the imperative as well as the 
indicative.  As for tense, the sentence “I give (or ‘call’) you off-side” has the same force as “You 
were off-side,” as with “I find you guilty” and “You did it” (58).  Mood, tense, person, and voice 
insufficient, Austin suggests vocabulary could be the marker of the performative: “In the place of 
‘dangerous corner’ we may have ‘corner,’ and in the place of ‘dangerous bull’ we may write 
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‘bull’” (59).  The single word carries in it the performative of warning: You are hereby warned 
there is a dangerous bull behind this fence.  But, here too, Austin finds an exception: the sign 
reading “bull” might be informative, reporting that there is a bull behind the fence––and 
therefore a constative––rather than a warning.   
Austin soon concludes that constative utterances can perform actions too, and even 
performative utterances have some element of statement in them.  Consider, for example, that “I 
pronounce you husband and wife” is both an action and an announcement of the union.  In place 
of his performative-constative binary, Austin proposes a model of speech wherein each utterance 
has three aspects: the locutionary, “which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence 
with a certain sense and referent,” that is, the words themselves as uttered; the illocutionary, 
“such as informing, ordering, warning, undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances which have a certain 
(conventional) force,” that is, the actions undertaken by an utterance, what it attempts to do; and 
the perlocutionary, “what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, 
persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading,” that is, what an utterance actually 
accomplishes (109, emphasis Austin’s).  Austin finds his trifold model of speech preferable to 
the performative-constative binary as it allows him to describe, with more nuance, what an 
utterance does.  
The way Austin proposes an idea and then comes to discard it is characteristic of how he 
moves through his lectures.  Within each lecture, Austin follows a pattern, dismantling his 
carefully built argument.  He proposes an idea early in the lecture, interrogates it, refines it, and 
concludes the lecture, offering numerous examples and taxonomies along the way.  The next 
lecture begins with a summation of the previous lecture(s), but then will find a problem from the 
content already covered that needs remedied.  The conclusions of the previous lecture are called 
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into question, challenged, and eventually discarded.  Austin signals that this will be his method 
early in the lectures.  A footnote, on the fourth page of the first lecture: “Everything said in these 
sections is provisional, and subject to revision in the light of later sections” (4).  Yet, against that 
caveat, Austin often declares his subject matter “obvious”: “The phenomenon to be discussed is 
very widespread and obvious, and it cannot fail to have been already noticed” (1).  Prefacing his 
list of six conditions for felicity: “I fear, but at the same time of course hope, that these necessary 
conditions to be satisfied will strike you as obvious” (14).  Later: “The answer to this is obvious” 
(23).  This sense that all Austin’s observations and claims are obvious, self-evident, is accented 
by his taxonomies, the taxonomies giving the appearance of confidence, of control, of verifiable 
truth.   
And so a tension emerges in the text, a tension between Austin’s seeming confidence in 
the system he is creating and his continual revision of these systems.  Amid a sea of obvious 
statements, Austin unravels his lectures.  When Austin searches for a grammatical criterion to 
distinguish between the performative and the constative, he admits, in a parenthetical, “(I must 
explain again that we are floundering here.  To feel the firm ground of prejudice slipping away is 
exhilarating, but brings its revenges)” (61).  After offering a few examples of the illocutionary, 
again in a parenthetical: “(I am not suggesting that this is a clearly defined class by any means)” 
(99).  These parentheticals give the sense Austin is speaking under his breath, though their 
frequency suggests this continual second-guessing is vital to Austin’s method.  After offering 
some tests to distinguish the perlocutionary and the illocutionary: “The general conclusion must 
be, however, that these formulas are at best very slippery tests” (131).  As Austin concludes his 
lectures, preparing to outline five classes of illocutionary force: “Well, here we go.  I shall only 
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give you a run around, or rather a flounder around” (151).  And, following that list of 
illocutionary forces: “I am not putting any of this forward as in the very least definitive” (152). 
Austin calls his lectures How To Do Things with Words, and I suggest this method of 
discarding previous conclusions might be one of the Things Austin teaches his students How To 
Do.  Through the show of confidence and its subsequent undoing, Austin performs for his 
students the actions of a thinker, a philosopher, a writer, modeling what he would like his 
students to do with their own words.  His syntax manifests this method: 
For clearly any, or almost any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in 
sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with or without calculation, of 
any utterance whatsoever, and in particular by a straightforward constative 
utterance (if there is such an animal).  (110, emphasis Austin’s) 
Austin begins with a claim of certainty––“For clearly”––and that certainty is strengthened by 
“any” and then emphasized by its italics.  But he immediately hedges: “or almost any.”  Austin 
moves from subject to verb––“perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off”––his use of “is 
liable to” adding the question of whether it will or will not be “brought off.”  Austin then 
qualifies that already qualified claim: “in sufficiently special circumstances.”  Austin tries to tell 
what can bring off this perlocutionary act in these sufficiently special circumstances (“by the 
issuing”) but he before he can complete that phrase, he again interrupts himself with a 
qualification: “with or without calculation.”  He finally finishes the phrase: “of any utterance 
whatsoever,” the “any” and “whatsoever” echoing the confidence and assurance of the 
sentence’s opening, a confidence and assurance that has just been called into question.  Austin 
then adds yet another qualification to the sentence: “and in particular by a straightforward 
constative utterance.”  The irony here is that phrase is the most “straightforward” grammatically 
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of the entire sentence, a constative utterance if ever there was one.  But Austin, as his project has 
been working to ferret out the difference between performative and constative utterances, 
immediately recoils from such a firm statement with another parenthetical: “(if there is such an 
animal).”  The sentence’s opening claim is now in doubt, the sentence itself enacting the same 
method as Austin’s lectures.  
 Austin’s method––his syntax full of qualifications and his lecturing based upon revisions 
of previous lectures––can be traced to his view of truth and falsity, the very issue that prompted 
the lectures of How To Do Things with Words.  In the Philosophical Papers, Austin speaks on 
truth:  
But actually––though it would take too long to go on about this––the more you 
think about truth and falsity the more you find that very few statements that we 
ever utter are just true or just false.  Usually there is the question are they fair or 
are they not fair, are they adequate or not adequate, are they exaggerated or not 
exaggerated?  Are they too rough, or are they perfectly precise, accurate, and so 
on?  “True” and “false” are just general labels for a whole dimension of different 
appraisals which have something or other to do with the relation between what we 
say and the facts.  If, then, we loosen up our ideas of truth and falsity we shall see 
that statements, when assessed in relation to the facts, are not so very different 
from all pieces of advice, warnings, verdicts, and so on.  (237-38) 
In loosening up ideas about truth and falsity, Austin challenges readers to revise their 
understanding of the constative and the performative, to think in terms other than true and false, 
to see the performativity of all language.  Consequently, he must take apart his text, for in its 
self-consumption, Austin can model the way of thinking he wants to teach his students.  Austin is 
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not content to merely build a system, an interpretative framework: he wants to know its limits, its 
failings.  And knowing its failings, Austin then crafts a better system, a system he necessarily 
must dismantle once he builds it. 
Because Austin’s conclusions become fodder for the following lecture, thereby calling 
into question all his own constative statements, Austin draws attention to the performance of his 
text.  Just as he argues, in his first lecture, that language does more than merely constate facts, so 
too, Austin’s lectures are an argument that a lecture can do more than merely constate facts.  
This is evident how he titles his lectures––not Things Done with Words, which would emphasize 
the content of the lectures, but rather How To Do Things with Words, calling attention to the 
performativity not only of words, but also of Austin as teacher, writer, thinker, scholar, and 
student of language.  The book is a lesson in, and an argument for, a way of thinking about 
language not bound to meaning alone.  It is a book on method, a how-to book.  
 
2.2 READING FISH READING SENTENCES 
 
Much has been made of Austin’s work, most of it in the 1970s––the Golden Age of Style, the era 
of Grammar as Style––concerned with the divide between ordinary and literary language.  
Richard Ohmann uses speech-act theory to uphold the disciplinary lines between literature and 
writing, between Literature and Composition.  He argues that literary language is defined by a 
suspension of illocutionary force, such that Donne’s “Go and catch a falling star” cannot and 
could never “convey a command” (“Speech, Literature, and the Space Between” 52; see also its 
precursor, “Speech Acts and the Definition of Literature”).  Fish engages Ohmann, using the 
same speech-act theory to dismantle disciplinary divides (see “How To Do Things with Austin 
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and Searle” and “How Ordinary is Ordinary Language?”).7  In a similar effort to muddy 
disciplinary bounds, Mary Louise Pratt turns to speech-act theory to bring together linguistics 
and literature.  Speech-act theory, for Pratt, emphasizes the social, such that the study of 
literature becomes the study of the context in which utterances are made and written, and the 
study of linguistics becomes the study of how context shapes the meaning and interpretation of 
literature (viii). 
 These uses of Austin do not accord with the spirit of his lectures.  While Austin does 
categorize uses of language, demarcating bounds between disciplines is not his agenda.  There is 
one piece from the 1970s that reads Austin along the lines of what I offer above, that is, with an 
eye toward the lessons about reading practice Austin teaches in How To Do Things with Words, 
lessons about the performativity of words and how words do things in various contexts.  That 
piece is Fish’s “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics.” 8 
                                                
7 The ordinary and the literary is not the only matter Ohmann and Fish disagree upon; see also 
Fish’s “What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible Things about It?” where Fish 
challenges Ohmann’s deviation model of stylistics.   
 
8 Outside the 1970s, Austin has remained a point of reference, most notably for Jacques Derrida.  
Derrida reads Austin in the way Austin asks to be read––as a search for an alternative way of 
thinking about what language can, and might, do––and it is this search that attracts Derrida to 
Austin.  In “Signature Event Context,” Derrida works to dismantle a logocentric view of 
language, one wherein words represent a stable meaning behind the text.  Derrida turns to Austin, 
as it would appear that Austin, by proposing another function of language beside merely 
reporting or representing, “has shattered the concept of communication as a purely semiotic, 
linguistic, or symbolic concept” (13).  But Derrida is not satisfied with Austin’s model––
attractive as it is––as an alternative to logocentrism, for Austin relies too heavily (in Derrida’s 
view) upon context as a determiner of a speech-act’s success, and context (again, in Derrida’s 
view) is too closely aligned with intention.  The problem with intention is that it presupposes an 
intentional meaning, “even if that meaning has no referent in the form of a thing or of a prior or 
exterior state of things” (14).  Context, as it leads to intention, as it leads to an intentional 
meaning, is the very model Derrida pushes against, the very model Austin’s work upholds.   
 The issues raised by Derrida are beyond the scope of my project here.  See Derrida’s 
“Signature Event Context;” John Searle’s defense of Austin, “Reiterating the Differences”; and 
Derrida’s response to Searle, “Limited Inc a b c …”  See also Reed Way Dasenbrock’s “Taking 
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In “Literature in the Reader,” Fish takes up the central concern of Austin’s project (in my 
reading of him, at least):  trying to find another way to talk about, and understand, language use.  
The curious thing, though, about “Literature in the Reader” is that Fish does not once mention 
Austin (nor Searle, nor speech-act theory, nor the performative, nor the constative). Austin’s 
influence, nevertheless, is strong.9   
In the essay, Fish proposes a way of reading sentences, proposing that readers substitute 
the question normally asked of literature––“What does this sentence mean?”––for “another, more 
operational question––what does this sentence do?” (25).  The substitution has immediate 
consequences.  The sentence “is no longer an object, a thing-in-itself, but an event, something 
that happens to, and with the participation of, the reader” (25, emphasis Fish’s).  This shift from 
the sentence-as-object to the sentence-as-event necessitates a shift in where meaning resides, for 
“it is this event, this happening––all of it and not anything that could be said about it or any 
information one might take away from it––that is, I would argue, the meaning of the sentence” 
                                                                                                                                                       
It Personally: Reading Derrida’s Responses”; Raoul Moati’s Derrida/Searle: Deconstruction and 
Ordinary Language; Toril Moi’s “ ‘They practice their trades in different worlds’: Concepts in 
Poststructuralism and Ordinary Language Philosophy”; as well as Fish’s “With the Compliments 
of the Author: Reflections on Austin and Derrida.”  
 For another use of Austin, see Joseph Harris’s excellent 2006 Rewriting: How To Do 
Things with Texts, which uses the notion of words doing things as a means to teach revision. 
Harris is one of the few in Composition working with Austin.  
 
9 “Literature in the Reader” is reprinted in Fish’s Is There A Text in This Class? The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities, a book that enacts a method not unlike Austin’s How To Do Things 
with Words.  Is There a Text collects 16 of Fish’s essays, ordered chronologically.  Its preface 
explains the overall trajectory of Fish’s thought, and a short note before each essay has Fish 
explaining its strengths and shortcomings and how the essay at hand extends or complicates his 
previous work.  Like Austin, by the end of Is There a Text, Fish comes to abandon (or, at the 
least, refine) a handful of the conclusions reached in the earlier chapters.  Both are self-
consuming artifacts.  
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(25, emphasis Fish’s).10  Fish and Austin both seek to shift reader’s attention from what language 
means to what it does.  Fish wants to reorient readers in relation to the text, to recalibrate what it 
is readers read for when engaging the text.  Fish calls this a “provocative thesis” (25), and he 
elaborates on how one might read in such a manner: “The concept is simply the rigorous and 
disinterested asking of the question, what does this word, phrase, sentence, paragraph, chapter, 
novel, play, poem, do?” (27, emphasis Fish’s).  In asking “what does this sentence do?” Fish not 
only shifts attention toward the work of the sentence itself, but so too he calls attention to the 
effects of the sentence upon the reader: “And the execution involves an analysis of the 
developing responses of the reader in relation to the words” (27).  The response of the reader 
bears upon the interpretation of the text just as much as the text itself.   
 I pause here to consider what Fish means by the “doing” of a sentence, and I suggest it is 
a doing grounded in performance.  But Fish is not concerned with performance in the same way 
Austin is.  For Austin, doing comes to be equivalent with performing an action, and as such 
Austin devotes much of his attention to the performative utterance and, later, the illocutionary 
speech act, as each concerns the actions undertaken by an utterance, whether that be ordering, 
vowing, promising, denying, thanking, sentencing, levying, etc.  Fish, however, given his 
concern with “the developing responses of the reader in relation to the words,” is more attuned to 
the effects brought about by speech acts.  Whereas Austin is interested in how an uttered phrase 
performs an action (its illocutionary force), Fish is interested in how the same utterance might be 
a threat, or a promise, or a surprise, or any number of things (its perlocutionary force).  (Neither 
                                                
10  In “The Marquis Went out at Five O’clock: On Making Sentences Do Something,” 
Christopher Beha turns Fish’s question “What does this sentence do?” into a writing problem, 
asking “What do I need this sentence to do?” (n. pag.).  Beha does not cite Fish, but the method 
of writing he proposes––one grounded in attention to “what role the sentence plays in its 
paragraph, what role the paragraph plays in its scene, the scene in its story”––is predicated upon 
the same idea of sentences doing something on the page.    
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seems to care that much about the locutionary force of the sentence, that is, what it actually 
says.)  What a sentence does, within Fish’s framework, concerns the effects of the sentence––the 
“Affective Stylistics” of Fish’s title. 
 Fish’s method depends on the “temporal flow of the reading experience,” one wherein “it 
is assumed that the reader responds in terms of that flow and not to the whole utterance” (27, 
emphasis Fish’s).  For Fish, meaning is made not once an entire sentence is read and understood, 
but word by word, as each word acts upon the previous to shape the reader’s understanding––and 
response to––what is being said.  Misreading, then, is a fundamental part of reading; the reader is 
always projecting, imagining, how a sentence might end, what meaning it might be in the process 
of making, and the tension between that projected meaning and the meaning the reader finally 
arrives at is just as important as––if not more important than––the eventual meaning the reader 
settles upon.  After all, it is the experience of the sentence, Fish tells us, that is the meaning of 
the sentence, and that experience is a direct outcome of how a sentence performs.      
 To illustrate Fish’s concern with what a sentence does, I turn to his reading of the 
following sentence by Walter Pater (a favorite of Fish’s): “That clear perpetual outline of face 
and limb is but an image of ours” (30).  I choose Pater’s sentence because it is one that very well 
could be included in Tufte’s chapter on short sentences.  And Fish, like Tufte, sees much 
possibility in the sentence.  Fish notes that many critics would find Pater’s sentence 
“distressingly straightforward and non-deviant, a simple declarative of the form X is Y” (30).  
The benefit of Fish’s way of reading sentences, though, is that it makes sentences that do not 
appear to be doing much stylistically or grammatically or rhetorically––sentences like the one 
quoted from Pater––available for analysis.  Fish’s method is to ask what each word, in sequence, 
is doing in the sentence, and though he notes it would be easy to dismiss Pater’s opening “That” 
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as “simply there,” Fish claims, “But of course it is not simply there; it is actively there, doing 
something, and what that something is can be discovered by asking the question ‘what does it 
do?’” (30, emphasis Fish’s).  Answering his own question:  
“That” is a demonstrative, a word that points out, and as one takes it in, a sense of 
its referent (yet unidentified) is established.  Whatever “that” is, it is outside, at a 
distance from the observer-reader; it is “pointable to” (pointing is what the word 
“that” does), something of substance and solidity.  In terms of the reader’s 
response, “that” generates an expectation that impels him forward, the expectation 
of finding out what “that” is.  (31, emphasis Fish’s) 
Fish’s amplification of “that” reveals a rhetoricity about the word, a rhetoricity that can easily be 
missed had the reader not asked what the word was doing in the sentence––doing in the sense of 
its perlocutionary effects upon the reader.  If “that” were to be read in terms of its illocutionary 
force, as Austin might understand it, it could be understood, perhaps, as a promise, a promise 
that there exists, outside the reader, some objective item one could point to. “That” orients the 
reader in relation to the world of the sentence, as Fish notes by using language of location, of 
placement––“out,” “in,” “outside,” “at a distance,” “pointable to.”  The “substance and solidity” 
suggested by “that” speaks again to this promise, a promise that shapes the remainder of Fish’s 
reading:  
The adjective “clear” works in two ways; it promises the reader that when “that” 
appears, he will be able to see it easily, and, conversely, that it can be easily seen.  
“Perpetual” stabilizes the visibility of “that” even before it is seen and “outline” 
gives it potential form, while at the same time raising a question.  That question––
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outline of what?––is obligingly answered by the phrase “of face and limb,” which, 
in effect, fills the outline in.  (31, emphasis Fish’s) 
All this happening before the verb of the sentence appears.  Fish continues: 
 
By the time the reader reaches the declarative verb “is”––which sets the seal on 
the objective reality of what has preceded it––he is fully and securely oriented in a 
world of perfectly discerned objects and perfectly discerning observers, of whom 
he is one.  But then the sentence turns on the reader, and takes away the world it 
has itself created.  With “but” the easy progress through the sentence is impeded 
(it is a split second before one realizes that “but” has the force of “only”); the 
declarative force of “is” is weakened and the status of the firmly drawn outline the 
reader has been pressured to accept is suddenly uncertain; “image” resolves that 
uncertainty, but in the direction of insubstantiality; and now the blurred form 
disappears altogether when the phrase “of ours” collapses the distinction between 
the reader and that which is (or was) “without” (Pater’s own word).  Now you see 
it (that), now you don’t.  Pater giveth and Pater taketh away.  (31)11 
What makes Fish’s reading of Pater work is the tension between the reader’s expectations of how 
the sentence should resolve itself and how the sentence actually does resolve itself, and that 
tension is heightened by Fish’s insistence that meaning is created word by word as the reader 
wades through a sentence, Fish’s analysis of Pater showcasing that semantic progression.  For 
instance, Fish reads “clear” as making a promise to the reader, but the sentence rips it away as 
                                                
11 The reading I offered earlier of Austin’s sentence and the way it takes itself apart is clearly 
influenced by Fish’s question of “What does this sentence do?”, my reading moving word-by-
word through Austin’s prose.  Many of the sentences Fish analyzes in “Literature in the Reader” 
are sentences like Austin’s and Pater’s, sentences that unravel, sentences that make a claim and 
then undo themselves.  Fish has a preference for such sentences, and I suggest it is because the 
unraveling of the sentence has strong affective outcomes on the reader.  
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Pater calls that world into doubt.  Each word, as it becomes part of the temporality of the 
sentence’s doing, either fulfills or subverts the expectations set by the words preceding it.  The 
relationship between the reader’s expectations and the work of the sentence at hand is only 
possible within a framework that understands grammar manipulating basic syntactic structures.  
(There is a strong undercurrent of transformational grammar here, one to which I will attend 
when I address Tufte’s work.)  Hence Fish’s emphasis on reader response.  His primary concern 
is how a writer uses the sentence to create affective responses.  And so, when Fish argues for a 
way of reading predicated upon asking “what does this sentence do?”, he advocates a method 
based not upon the extraction of meaning or the decoding of some truth statement, but rather 
upon the actions, the doings, the affective outcomes of a sentence, working within the tension 
between a reader’s expectations of what a sentence will do and what the sentence actually does.   
 At the end of “Literature in the Reader,” Fish turns to the classroom, claiming his method 
is a “language-sensitizing device” (67).  Using it, students will “become incapable of writing 
uncontrolled prose, since so much of their time is spent discovering how much the prose of other 
writers controls them, and in how many ways” (67).  The assumption here is that students will 
internalize this method, internalize these forms, ever asking “What does this sentence do?” both 
in their reading and in their writing.  And the suggestion here is that “uncontrolled prose” is the 
product of an unawareness of what sentences do on the page.  Using this method of reading 
sentences, Fish’s students discover the affective powers of prose, and, aware of how language 
acts upon them, are then able to employ sentences to the same purposes.  How one writes is a 
direct product of how one reads.  
While I appreciate this pedagogy––especially the connection between reading and writing 
practices––it has problems.  Fish assumes a universal, stable reader.  Fish speaks of a reader in 
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the singular, and writes about this reader as “the reader” throughout his essay.  Though Fish 
acknowledges that due to the “uniqueness of the individual, generalization about response is 
impossible” (44), his method depends for its very livelihood on such generalizations.  Fish 
justifies his generalizations on the grounds that a shared understanding of how language works 
allows him to speak of the response of “the reader” (44-45).  We share a common language, so 
Fish argues, and that common language brings about common responses to particular linguistic 
events.  Fish necessarily, then, depends on sentences enacting rhetorical performances that 
reliably produce X effect, thereby yearning for the same rhetoric Williams hoped Tufte’s project 
would provide, a rhetoric that accounts for reliable affective responses to rhetorical figures of 
speech.  
But sentences are not that predictable, or reliable, and Fish’s method does not leave room 
for multiple, or simultaneous, readings and re-readings of a text.  Nor does his method account 
for how previous readings or outside influences shape the interpretation of a text.  When Fish 
reads, the sentence says what it says.  While meaning is contextual within the temporal flow of 
the sentence and the reader’s developing responses to that sentence, the sentence is still 
decontextualized from the larger work, Fish never reading sentences in relation to those 
preceding or following.  Late in the essay, Fish does note, in a parenthetical, that “(reading has to 
be done every time)” (66).  Yet, throughout “Literature in the Reader,” Fish’s own readings are 
put forth as authoritative.  There is a finality about them that silences any dissenting read of the 
same text.  
This authority is most evident in Fish’s How to Write a Sentence and How to Read One, a 
mass-market book enacting the method offered in “Literature in the Reader.”  (Just as Tufte’s 
two books are published in the Golden Age of Style and the Stylistic Turn, so too are “Literature 
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in the Reader” and How to Write.)  In How to Write, Fish offers a reading of Updike’s sentence 
describing Ted Williams’s final at-bat in Fenway Park.  Williams hit a homerun, and Updike 
wrote, “It was in the books while it was still in the sky.”  Two short sentences joined by “while,” 
it is another that Tufte could have included in her short sentences chapter.  Fish, answering the 
question “What does this sentence do?”: 
The fulcrum of the sentence is “while”; on either side of it are two apparently 
very different kinds of observations.  “It was in the books” is metaphorical.  
Updike imagines, correctly, that this moment will be memorialized in stories and 
at the Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York, and he confers that 
mythical status on the moment before it is completed, before the ball actually goes 
out of the park.  Indeed, in his sentence the ball never does get out of the park.  It 
is “still in the sky,” a phrase that has multiple meanings; the ball is still in the sky 
in the sense that it has not yet landed; it is still in the sky in the sense that its 
motion is arrested; and it is still in the sky in the sense that it is, and will remain 
forever, in the sky of the books, in the record of the game’s highest, most soaring 
achievements.  On the surface “in the book” and “in the sky” are in distinct 
registers, one referring to the monumentality the home run will acquire in history, 
the other describing the ball’s actual physical arc; but the registers are finally, and 
indeed immediately (this sentence goes fast), the same: the physical act and its 
transformation into myth occur simultaneously; or rather, that is what Updike 
makes us feel as we glide through this deceptively simple sentence composed 
entirely of monosyllables.  (9-10) 
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Fulfilling the promise of its title, How to Write a Sentence offers a handful of imitation exercises 
accompanying Fish’s readings.  Based off this analysis of Updike’s sentence, Fish offers his own 
imitations: “It was in my stomach before it was off the shelf,” “She was enrolled at Harvard 
before she was conceived,” “He had won the match before the first serve,” “They were 
celebrating while the other team was still at bat” (10).  Fish does not “make any great claims” for 
his imitations, but he does sit pleased knowing he has taken Updike’s syntax and used it to create 
a similar effect (10).      
 Fish says he could “do it forever”––that is, keep writing versions of Updike’s sentence 
(10).  And that is the problem: no one would want to keep doing it forever, no one could keep 
doing it forever, and no reader would want to read anything that kept on playing this game 
forever.  And of course, no writer would keep on doing it forever, not if the writer actually cared 
about her subject and her readers and her sentences.  Fish’s pedagogy is a mixed blessing: 
readers ask “What does this sentence do?” to learn sentence forms, and readers internalize the 
forms through imitation, but in their application, the sentences can easily become habitual.  Fish 
hopes that writing sentences like Updike’s will become habit, but he fails to recognize that it can 
become habit in a negative sense too.  Rote.  Mechanical.  Lifeless.    
Like Austin, Fish models a way of reading sentences.  But unlike Austin, Fish’s 
performance expects applause.  Whereas Austin brings readers alongside, such that when he 
revises his ideas from the previous lecture, the sense is not so much admiration but a communal 
journey toward a new idea––Austin is driving the car, but we’re right there with him, along for 
the ride––Fish expects his readers to be in awe, dumbstruck at his readings of Pater, of Updike.  
Though Fish encourages his readers to ask “What does this sentence do?”, his mastery in 
answering the question turns it into a stage for his own readings.  Fish performs for his readers, 
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showboating a way of reading that ideally readers would be able to emulate but that is quite 
difficult to do. In the opening of How To Write a Sentence, Fish confesses to being a “sentence 
collector … always on the lookout for sentences that take your breath away” (3).  When he finds 
such a sentence, the first response “is a rueful recognition that you couldn’t do it yourself even 
though you also have two hands and feet” (3).  The same is true of Fish’s readings: a rueful 
recognition that I couldn’t produce the same reading of Updike, even though I too am literate.  
Fish’s performance is one of amplification.  He amplifies sentences, brings them to life, such that 
asking “What does this sentence do?” is perhaps not the best question to ask, but instead, “What 
am I doing to this sentence?” or even “How do I read this sentence?”  Those questions get at the 
role of the reader in reading the performative sentence.12 
 
2.3  READING TUFTE READING SENTENCES 
 
I turn now to Tufte.  I read Fish as a leap forward from Austin, and Tufte as another leap forward 
from Fish.  Tufte’s Artful Sentences is as much about reading the sentence as it is about writing 
the sentence, as much about teaching the sentence as it is about studying the sentence.  Artful 
Sentences makes a single reference to Grammar as Style, Tufte noting (on the acknowledgments 
page) that the former “grows out of” the latter (5).  This indebtedness is evident in the nearly 
identical ordering and titles of the book’s chapters, in the internal structure of the chapters 
themselves, and in the number of sentences recycled from Grammar as Style into Artful 
Sentences.  
                                                
12 I’ve written elsewhere on Fish and Updike.  See “Of Scorebooks and Commonplace Books.” 
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 But there are significant differences between the two, such that I read Artful Sentences 
not so much as a sequel of Grammar as Style, but as a fundamental revision of the project.  The 
1971 Grammar as Style was published by Holt, Rinehart, and Winston and was accompanied by 
a workbook, Exercises in Creativity.  The project, as evident by its publisher, is clearly 
pedagogical.  Also, Grammar as Style opens with a preface and an essay explicating Tufte’s 
method, both of which are noticeably absent from Artful Sentences.  Artful Sentences has a 
different audience, a different aim, than the project Tufte started 35 years prior.  
 Tufte began work on Grammar as Style prompted by her dissatisfaction with how style 
was being written about.  In the opening to Grammar as Style, Tufte laments that most 
discussion of style “is often subjective, impressionistic, unhelpful, sometimes misleading” (2).  
Readers use personal reactions to prose to asses style, and “we need only see how vague, how 
various, even how contradictory these intuitive, untutored reactions to language can be to 
appreciate the need for a more certain vocabulary in discussing style, to wish that something at 
least resembling the clear categories of syntax might be available to stylistic analysis” (2).  She 
echoes Louis Milic, (writing five years earlier in 1966) who argues there is “still no method 
beyond the method of impressionistic description and a vague use of rhetoric” in stylistic 
analysis (“Metaphysics” 124).  Because he believes literary scholars will not embrace “the 
rigorous means derived from linguistics and the quantitative sciences” for handling style, Milic 
argues for a return to classical rhetoric to give teachers and writers the vocabulary to talk about 
style (126).  Tufte shares in Milic’s lament about the lack of a good framework for analyzing 
style, quoting him even, but rather than stray from linguistics, she dives right in.  She is, after all, 
a transformational grammarian, and she uses the resources of transformational grammar to build 
her project.  She is hesitant, though, to completely discard an impressionistic reading of style 
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since it “attests to the richness of language,” but she does concede “The beginning writer … like 
the critic, needs a more accurate and consistent method, a more concrete vocabulary, for 
examining the work of others and for remaking his own” (4).  These are the same concerns, I 
note, that prompt Williams’s Style (17), the same concerns that lead Elizabeth Rankin to lament 
in 1985 that there still is no “sound, complete, and adequate theory of style” (240).  Each 
searches for a new vocabulary and framework to write about style. 
 Searching for this new way to write about style, Tufte is careful to signal that Grammar 
as Style is anything but a sentence-appreciation book.  The title is a polemic.  She writes:  
The goal of this book is to explain its title.  The task is quite ambitious enough, 
for Grammar as Style is not just a topic, or two topics.  It is a thesis.  It does not 
merely advertise that the book it names will discuss the paired subjects of 
grammar and style, but it presumes that grammar and style can be thought of in 
some way as a single subject.  (1) 
Tufte sets this argument against two schools of thought concerning the relationship between 
form and content.  One––the ornamental school––understands form and content as apart from 
each other, form being mere decoration to the content of an idea.  This is the classical view of 
style, reaching back to Aristotle.  The other––the organic school––understands form and content 
as intimately connected, as one in the same.  But Tufte wants to theorize grammar as style, and 
to do so, “a position must be secured between the opposing forces of the ornamental and the 
organic schools” (4, emphasis Tufte’s).  Neither school satisfies Tufte, for the ornamental 
approach negates the possibility that grammar might be style (4-5).  So too, the organic approach 
falters in that “if style is meaning, grammar can claim only small and unconvincing credit for the 
full impact of any piece of prose” (5).  
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 In working through the organic and ornamental schools, Tufte cites Richard Ohmann, 
who makes a similar argument concerning the faults of the organic school (“Prolegomena”). 
Milic is part of this conversation as well, outlining three approaches to style before eventually 
settling on rhetorical dualism (“Theories”).13  But Tufte’s project is distinct from Ohmann’s and 
Milic’s.  She does not merely want to settle on a theory.  Rather, she wants to see language at 
work.  As the Toril Moi of my epigraph claims, ordinary language philosophers are not as 
interested in concepts as they are in examples: Tufte wants to read sentences.   
 At the time of her writing, the organic view “[had] almost won the day,” and Tufte 
pushes against that unified view of form and content because it limits the options of both reader 
and writer (5).  The ornamental approach fails to give enough attention to the work of stylistics, 
as style becomes an afterthought, and the organic approach fails to give agency to the writer, in 
that if form and content are linked, the writer has little liberty to mess with either.  Tufte does not 
dispute that form and content can be one, but rather than take an organic relationship as given 
Tufte sees it as a stylistic achievement, something that occurs only rarely in the best-crafted 
prose.  Hence the progression from the opening chapter “Kernel Sentences” to the final chapter 
“Syntactic Symbolism: Grammar as Analogue,” a chapter full of sentences like the following:  
The isolated adverb “again,” oddly set off by commas and then repeated, creates 
in the next sample another syntactic pivot, about which the sentence swings in a 
fine grammatical reproduction of the described voices swinging back on silence: 
Our voices, curving slowly around the woods, again, again swung back on 
silence. 
                                                
13  For other ways to theorize the form and content relationship, see Richard Lanham’s 
“Style/Substance Matrix.”  See also Paul Butler for a critic of Milic’s “Theories” (Out of Style 
138-40).  
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––Truman Capote, The Glass Harp, p. 51. 
  (Tufte Grammar as Style 241)14 
Tufte’s reading of Capote assumes that such a marriage of form and content does not happen in 
every sentence, that it is an achievement, that such a sentence is a moment of masterful craft.  
This reading is made possible by the sequencing of her book’s chapters: the progression from the 
simple sentence to the noun phrase to the verb phrase to the adverb to the preposition aids 
readers in recognizing what each does within this sentence.  It is a reading made possible by 
transformational grammar, by the belief that the writer transforms kernel sentences into larger 
and more complex sentences, arriving at syntactic symbolism.  The sequence of her chapters and 
their progression toward increasingly complex grammatical constructions is an effort to teach 
students to recognize how language use builds upon itself––so too does reading practice, Tufte’s 
students becoming more adept readers as each chapter builds upon the grammar of the previous, 
making possible the readings of the latter chapters. 
As a collection of sentences, Grammar as Style is equally as impressive as Artful 
Sentences.  Tufte gleaned her sentences primarily from writers of her day; the majority of the 
sentences come from texts published within five years of Grammar as Style (iv).  And the writers 
she includes are wide-ranging.  In the span of two pages, for instance, Tufte moves from George 
Orwell to William Empson to The Way Things Work, An Illustrated Encyclopedia of Technology 
to Thomas Hardy to The Sierra Club Wilderness Handbook back to Thomas Hardy and then to 
Vladimir Nabokov, all in service of exemplifying the various places a noun phrase can appear in 
a sentence (42-43).  This is typical Tufte; the variety of authors she pulls from is key to her 
                                                
14 The formatting of Grammar as Style’s presentation of sentences––the italics of Capote’s name, 
the em dash prefacing it, the italics of the page number––are different than that of Artful 
Sentences.  I retain the original formatting for each book.  
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method.  It is an effort “not to depend on old assumptions about style but to take a fresh look, 
through syntactic glasses, at the actual practices of today’s writers” (Grammar iii). 
Tufte’s reliance upon such a variegated group of writers could be a response to a critique 
of the work of her colleague at the University of Southern California, Francis Christensen.  
Christensen––who did much to advance syntactic and linguistic study of the sentence for 
Composition, and who wrote a popular middle- and high-school curriculum, the Christensen 
Rhetoric Program––spent his career attempting to define a “mature” style in writing.  
Christensen was a literal bean counter, sitting in his study, reading the works of famous authors, 
and depositing coffee beans into jars whenever he came across certain grammatical constructions, 
the jars with labels such as “participial phrase in initial position, adverb clause in medial position, 
absolute phrase in final position” (Stewart vi).15  Aside from doubts concerning the merits of the 
transformational grammar Christensen’s work depends on, and aside from doubts concerning 
whether sustained attention to the sentence alone can improve student writing, the strongest 
critique of Christensen’s work comes from questions over whose prose Christensen read for his 
bean counting.  Christensen relied, primarily, on descriptive and narrative fiction writing––not 
the type of writing that is typically taught in first-year writing courses, whose duty (critics of this 
mind argue) is to teach expository, academic prose (see Connors “Erasure” 464-65; Johnson 
                                                
15 Christensen passed away in 1970, just as Grammar as Style went to press.  Tufte notes this, 
and her indebtedness to him, in the preface (5).  Christensen’s influence on Grammar as Style is 
strong; for instance, Tufte’s chapter Free Modifiers, with its delineations into Right-, Mid-, and 
Left-Branching sentences, takes its terminology straight from Christensen.  For recent work with 
branching sentences, see Steven Pinker’s The Sense of Style (108-15).  
Following Christensen’s passing, his widow Bonnie Jean revised the Rhetoric Program 
in 1979, and later gave the rights of the curriculum to Donald Stewart, who has since added two 
workbooks to it and renamed it the Stewart English Program.  Stewart has become the custodian 
for Christensen’s work, not only keeping the curriculum in circulation as a middle- and high-
school grammar, but also reprinting Notes Toward a New Rhetoric, a collection of Christensen’s 
essays.    
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“Some”; Tibbets).  Defining a mature style based on the prose of Hemingway does not translate 
to teaching freshman to write research papers.   
This critique is a smart one: it notes the problematic divergence between Christensen’s 
sample group and the prose taught in the composition classroom.  And Tufte––whether she is 
responding to this critique directly or not––obviates it through her selection of authors.  Tufte’s 
definition of “today’s authors” is so far-reaching (Nabokov and the Sierra Club cited side by 
side) that it necessitates an equally far-ranging definition of “actual practices,” one that spans 
multiple genres.  As such, Tufte brings together “novelists, poets, playwrights, biographers, 
reporters, columnists, critics, historians, statesmen, scientists, professors” (Grammar iv).  I note 
that Tufte leaves out an “and” at the end of that list, its absence suggestive that the list is not 
complete, Tufte pulling from a seemingly unlimited range of writers.  Granted, one could still 
object that in an introductory writing course, students are not being taught to write as novelists, 
poets, playwrights, etc., but Tufte, in amassing such a range of writing, does so because “There is 
much to be learned, by every aspiring writer, from every good writer. … We are encouraged, 
therefore, to borrow syntactic examples from any place good writing is going on” (Exercises 6).  
For Tufte, the genre itself is not as important as is grammar, the style, performed by the sentence, 
not as important as the aspiring writer, the act of good writing, the deed of it.  As such, though 
Grammar as Style and its attendant workbook Exercises in Creativity may seem geared toward 
the composition classroom, Tufte’s orienting of the piece in relation to the writers of such a 
broad swath of genres gives her mobility, her project not confined to the first-year classroom but 
applicable to writers of any genre, within any rhetorical situation.  This is one reason, I suspect, 
that the theoretical apparatus is absent in Artful Sentences; Tufte recognizes her project can speak 
to readers outside the classroom. 
 75 
The sheer breadth of Tufte’s quoted texts prompts the following caveat:  
Although I have examined a fair number of samples––many more than are 
quoted––it may well be that in some instances other samples would have 
supported different conclusions.  I hesitate even to use the word conclusions; 
observations is more accurate.  The book is exploratory rather than definitive, and 
its method is more important than its statements.  (Grammar iii, emphasis Tufte’s) 
Here, Tufte signals how Grammar as Style is to be read.  Lest those actual practices of today’s 
writers be construed as hard-and-fast rules, lest her work be interpreted as prescriptive or 
positivist, Tufte warns against such legalism.  And, I would suggest, the size of Tufte’s sentence 
collection precludes it.  It is difficult, impossible even, to make any firm declarations on 
convention and usage and rhetorical effect when working from such a disparate and large set of 
texts.  Tufte knows this––it is a defining strength of her project––and she notes that other 
sentences likely would have produced different analyses, different observations (rather than 
conclusions).  So too, the same sentence could be put to other uses within the book.  I think, for 
example, of the previously quoted sentences Tufte pulls from Alan Lightman––“And beyond any 
particular clock, a vast scaffold of time, stretching across the universe, lays down the law of time 
equally for all.  In this world, a second is a second is a second” (Artful 12, emphasis Tufte’s)––
Tufte uses Lightman for his be-clause, an example of the work of a short sentence.  But so too, 
Lightman could have appeared in Tufte’s Syntactic Symbolism chapter, the rhythm of “a second 
is a second is a second” mirroring that of a clock’s tick tock.  
 Because the sentences she quotes could serve such varied purposes, Tufte does not offer 
any conclusions.  She offers examples, lots of them.  She celebrates instances of linguistic and 
rhetorical practice that, in the end, can’t be resolved into tidy conclusions about how language 
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works and what rhetoric does.  She resists rhetorics like those of Williams’s and Fish’s, theories 
of the sentence that want the sentence to be scripted, for students to always write great sentences, 
for students to be incapable of writing uncontrolled prose.  Though Williams and Baum, in their 
respective reviews of Tufte’s work, see her project as no more than an “opulent thesaurus” 
(Baum 87), readers looking for definitive direction on how to use the appositive, for example, or 
how to set up a mid-branching sentence, ought to look elsewhere.  So too, readers looking for a 
guide along the lines of X stylistic move produces Y affective response will be disappointed (as 
was Williams).  
 What readers will find in Tufte is a method enacted, a method, as I said earlier, grounded 
in transformational grammar.  Tufte believes the short sentence to be the foundation of language 
and that it is transformed into countless forms.  Consider the following, wherein Tufte sounds 
very much like the Chomsky of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax:  
Whether he is aware of it or not, any reader of this book already has a built-in 
understanding of grammatical patterns.  All of us are able to comprehend literally 
millions of spoken or written sentences we have never heard or seen before––
simple sentences and complicated ones, fact and fiction, prose and poetry.  We are 
able to understand each new sentence only because all English sentences are built 
on a limited number of standard patterns.  (Grammar as Style iv) 
Tufte is speaking here, in a roundabout way, of the deep structures of language, the deep 
structures that form the foundation of transformational grammar, the deep structures that shape 
humans’ innate capacity for language.  In this view of grammar, underlying every sentence is a 
deep structure.  The deep structure is how words relate to one another at the most fundamental 
level.  Deep structures differ from surface structures, which are the structures we read, write, 
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hear, and speak, and one arrives at the surface structure, according to Chomsky, “by repeated 
application of certain formal operations called ‘grammatical transformation’ to objects of a more 
elemental sort” (16-17). The two are distinct from each other, even if the deep structure appears 
to have undergone little transformation to become a surface structure.16  
 There is a complex relationship between Chomsky, Tufte, transformational grammar, 
kernel sentences, and deep and surface structures.  Chomsky took the kernel sentence from his 
teacher Zellig Harris but soon discarded it, Chomsky believing it not to have a “distinctive role 
in the generation or interpretation of sentences” (17-18).  Tufte casts aside Chomsky’s deep and 
surface structures––“important as they are,” she says––instead focusing on “the manifest 
structures of English sentences, the structures that actually appear in modern prose” (Grammar 
iv).  But Tufte retains the kernel sentence, as “It is the germ from which other patterns grow and 
branch, and to which others can be grafted, whole or part” (13), even using the term to title a 
chapter.  
When she takes up Grammar as Style some three decades later, Tufte casts aside all 
explicit references to transformational grammar.  Though the book is still sequenced from short 
sentences to syntactic symbolism, and though each chapter is still sequenced internally from 
                                                
16 Deep and surface structures could account for Fish’s method of reading the sentence.  Fish 
depends on the tension between what a reader expects a sentence to do and what the sentence 
actually does.  Such a tension is made possible from a reader recognizing, intuitively, deep 
structures and then being surprised when the writer manipulates them in certain ways.  Fish, 
however, would bristle at any association with transformational grammar, on at least two 
grounds.  First, as he argues in “What Is Stylistics and Why Are They Saying Such Terrible 
Things about It? Part II,” every act of description is a priori an interpretation.  Transformational 
grammar has an air of objectivity about it, an objectivity Fish resists.  In his opening remarks to 
the essay, Fish says his argument linking description and interpretation “not only challenge[s] the 
claims of stylistics but [also] challenge[s] the very project of linguistics itself” (246).  And 
second, Fish’s interest with the sentence is predicated upon its ability to evoke an affective 
response from the reader; transformational grammar does not do enough to recognize the 
affective, rhetorical actions of sentences.  The two work from different sets of concerns. 
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simple sentences to increasingly complex grammatical constructions––the book is still built 
around a transformational grammarian’s understanding of language––Tufte takes efforts to hide 
that allegiance through small, but significant, revisions.  Her chapter “The Passive 
Transformation” is folded into Artful Sentence’s chapter on verbs.  Her chapter “Kernel 
Sentences” is retitled “Short Sentences.”  “Kernel” and “transformation” are absent from the new 
table of contents.  The preface situating Tufte in relation to transformational grammar and the 
ornamental and organic schools is absent too, as is the polemical first chapter “The Relation of 
Grammar to Style” where Tufte offered the framework within which to read Grammar as Style.  
As I read Tufte, these revisions are an effort to recast the project, to locate the sentence in space 
and time, in the lived human experience.  “Short sentence” is much more ordinary, much more 
vernacular, than the critical terminology of transformational grammar.  So too, these revisions 
are an effort to move her project out of the classroom into the public conversations about writing.  
This much is evident by the fact that Artful Sentences has no accompanying workbook, no 
exercises, no assignment sheets.   
The question, then, is why Tufte sets aside the theoretical apparatus offered by 
transformational grammar.  I suggest it is for some sense of disillusionment at the grand claims, 
the millennial promises, made in the name of transformational grammar, the notion that with this 
new knowledge the problem of teaching writing would be solved.  Though not a transformational 
grammarian, Fish made those sorts of claims in “Literature and the Reader,” that his students 
would be “incapable of writing uncontrolled prose” (67).  Richard Ohmann, on the importance of 
grammar within a course: 
One way or another the student should be made aware of the abundance of 
syntactic patterns available to him.  If this happens, he will find it easy to extricate 
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himself from those impasses that occur when he has begun a sentence or a 
paragraph infelicitously; and he may for the first time get a sense of genuine 
stylistic choice.  (“In Lieu of a New Rhetoric” 21) 
Tufte herself makes claims in this same spirit.  In Exercises in Creativity, Tufte outlines the 
coursework of the student reading Grammar as Style.  And that work is imitation.  (She is not 
unlike the Fish of How to Write a Sentence in this regard.)  Tufte sequences her imitation 
assignments, moving, in the “Kernel Sentences” chapter, for instance, from imitation of simple 
proverbs constructed around be-clauses (such as “knowledge is power”) to rhetorical uses of 
these proverbs, as seen in the ninth exercise: “Try an experiment.  Write a short passage, three or 
four sentences, and punctuate the close of it with a kernel proverb, one of your own or from the 
list of illustrations” (Exercises 12).  This progression is typical of the Exercises.  Tufte gives a 
grammatical form, the student imitates it, then Tufte invites the student to use it in a longer 
passage.  Another example, the tenth exercise: “Develop a paragraph in which you use a very 
short sentence as a focus, pivot, or summary.  Place the sentence at the beginning, middle, or end 
of the paragraph” (13).   
 This teaching leads Tufte to make a claim not unlike that of Fish, not unlike that of 
Ohmann.  “With this new access to the countless effective ways of putting ideas down on 
paper”––the access a product of her corpus of sentences––“writers may well become eager to 
make use of appositives, say, or of nominative absolutes, of devices learned for subordinating 
ideas, of right-branching sentences maybe, or of the previously undreamed of benefits of 
parallelism” (Grammar 6).  From this, it would seem Tufte’s pedagogy is one predicated upon 
introducing students to the wide range of linguistic and rhetorical options they have available, 
inviting them to experiment with those options using her exercises grounded in imitation.  The 
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students “may well become eager” to do so.  She continues: “Doing this, writers are likely to 
think through their ideas, elaborate and sharpen them, until they deserve such professional 
treatment.  When this becomes habitual, the actual teaching of style is over” (6).  
 The teaching of style is over.  That is the promise of Grammar as Style.  Tufte believes, 
in 1971, that close attention to describing what a sentence does and imitation of those sentences 
will lead the writer to think through ideas, refine them, elaborate them, sharpen them, this 
method of reading and writing becoming so ingrained that the teaching of style is over.  Tufte 
admits “there is no magic or talent” in her way of reading: “Attentive reading of good prose 
should bring you up against some [sentences] just as interesting everyday” (Exercises 6).  Once 
students learn to read as Tufte does––once this becomes habit, once the magic is shown to 
actually be just a well-schooled method––students can teach themselves, finding sentences doing 
interesting things in any text they read.  
But three decades later, these promises vacate Tufte’s project, Tufte offering readers just 
her collection of sentences, no apparatus to read it with.  It could be that in 1971 she was part of 
those who held a “widespread, though naïve, belief that transformational grammar had panacean 
powers” (Luthy 352) and by 2006 came to see inadequacies in transformational grammar.  
Melvin Luthy, in his 1977  “Why Transformational Grammar Fails in the Classroom,” suggests 
most transformational grammarians sought two things: “a model of language that would help 
them teach language skills and a description of language that would help them teach the structure 
of English sentences” (352).  If Tufte sought those things––and I assume she did given the 
pedagogical structure of Grammar as Style and its attendant Exercises––the two-fold goals of a 
transformational grammarian can speak to Tufte’s relationship to transformational grammar in 
2006.  She sets aside the transformational grammarian’s method for teaching––Artful Sentences 
 81 
has none of the textbook apparatus that Grammar as Style and the Exercises do––while retaining 
the transformational grammarians’ understanding of the structure of English, as the chapters of 
Artful Sentences (both their sequencing and their internal structure) are heavily––though tacitly–
–influenced by transformational grammar.   
Luthy pinpoints the demise of transformational grammar on its lack of pedagogical use in 
the classroom; it is a tool for understanding how language works, not for teaching it, “just as the 
study of botany helps us understand and appreciate flowers but does not make us good flower-
arrangers” (355).  Tufte learned this.  35 years the wiser, Tufte makes no grand promises with 
Artful Sentences, no claims that her readers will find a way to solve the problem of how to teach 
style.  She has realized that such promises (in 1971 and more so in 2006) are a tough sell.  She 
asks readers to make sense of her project on their own and––like Williams––many are unable, 
Artful Sentences left unread.  
 
2.4  A PERFORMATIVE READING PRACTICE 
 
I am left with the question of pedagogical value, of what worth the performative sentence––in its 
various instantiations from Austin, Fish, and Tufte––is to the classroom.  Austin’s version of 
performance shifts readerly attention from what words say to what they do.  He comes to the 
conclusion that all language is performative, even when it appears to be merely stating a fact.  
The act of stating itself is a performance.  Austin makes no pedagogical turn, but the import to 
the classroom is clear: in tending to performance, Austin addresses the rhetoricity of language, 
acknowledging that all linguistic acts are performative acts working toward doing things with 
words.  And so, he models a way of thinking, a way of engaging a topic, method his primary 
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focus, as the title of How to Do Things with Words suggests.  In “Literature and the Reader,” 
Fish’s builds upon this act of reading.  Fish turns this question of performative language into one 
of literary and rhetorical analysis.  His project might have been titled “How Things Have Been 
Done with Words.”  Whereas Austin’s work was grounded in everyday language use, Fish brings 
performance to bear upon the literary.  Fish helps readers recognize this performativity, and he 
offers a method for analyzing it, a method that emphasizes the role of the reader.  And, late in his 
career, Fish turns this method of analysis into one of production in How To Write a Sentence, 
leaning hard on imitation to ingrain sentence forms so that their use becomes instinctive, habitual, 
second nature.  
 And then there is Tufte.  I read elements of both Austin’s and Fish’s performativity in her 
work.  She attends to the things words can do through performance.  She attends also to the 
production of discourse via imitation in Grammar as Style.  But in Artful Sentences, she casts 
aside imitation as well as transformational grammar, offering her readers a pedagogy grounded 
in something quite different.  There is an evolution from the Tufte of 1971 to the Tufte of 2006.  
Transformational grammar and imitation give way not to mere sentence collecting, not to mere 
sentence admiration, but instead to a richness of performative sentences that teaches readers 
through their performance on the page.  Tufte is teaching a method of reading.  Her project is one 
where reading––in and of itself––teaches writers to write.  That is why she discards the 
theoretical apparatus.  That is why she discards the jargon of transformational grammar.  That is 
why she discards imitation exercises.  She does not want these to distract from the reading itself, 
and she trusts that her demonstration of reading––the display of a careful reader at work––can be 
instructive.  It is a teaching grounded in showing forth a method.  
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 This teaching via demonstration is evident in Tufte’s commentary on her collected 
sentences.  She believes, “Prose is linear.  It is read and is said to move.  It must by nature, 
therefore, generate a symbolics of spatial and temporal movement widened by its context beyond 
the limits of the actual sentence read from left to right in so many seconds.  In whatever context, 
the movement may resemble accumulation or attrition, progress or other process, even stasis, or 
any one of these interrupted, turned, reversed” (Artful 271).  Tufte’s project seeks to provide a 
language to describe the movement of such prose.  She continues: “In space or time or both, it 
[the sentence] can go in any direction as continuous or repetitive, accelerated or retarded, smooth, 
halting, or halted.  The variety is enormous” (271).  I note how performative her reading is:  
Tufte has sentences continuing, repeating, accelerating, retarding, halting, progressing, 
processing, interrupted, turned, reversed.  She reads sentences as doing something.   
Consider, for a moment, Tufte’s commentary on short sentences, from Artful Sentences’s 
opening chapter.  I will not offer the sentences themselves, just Tufte’s readings so as to draw 
attention to her display of a reading practice:  
Since the kind of idea that is compressed into minimal shape (or that naturally 
assumes it) tends to be rudimentary, short sentences of this sort often serve well 
as introductory sentences in a paragraph.  As the writer moves into a new topic, in 
fiction or nonfiction, the be-sentence defines and introduces … (23) 
A simple flat statement can also appear in the middle of a paragraph.  Here, in an 
essay, it serves as a kind of pivotal assertion … (24) 
An equative sentence can also stand by itself as a paragraph to summarize … (25) 
Here action closes down to finish in a static be-sentence.  (25) 
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The same sort of sentence is used twice in the next paragraph, for doubled 
emphasis, an insistent finality.  (25) 
The intransitive can also provide a quick restatement at the end of a paragraph, 
leaving us suspended.  (27) 
Or, an abrupt conclusion.  (28) 
Or, it can itself constitute a paragraph of transition.  (28) 
With each commentary, Tufte considers the sentence via performance, searching for the 
language to describe what it does within a piece of discourse.  The short sentence is a means to 
define and introduce, to make a pivotal assertion, to summarize, to close down action, to 
emphasize doubly, to restate, to conclude, to transition.   
Tufte’s commentary could be read as answers to Fish’s question “What does this 
sentence do?”, but I also see a carefulness in Tufte’s readings, her unwillingness––and inability, 
perhaps fostered by the sheer breadth of examples she cites––to draw any conclusions (Grammar 
iii).  That care is evident in the following, coming after 11 sentences of linking verbs; again, I 
care not about the sentences themselves, rather, her commentary: 
In these linking examples, the major emphasis tends to fall on the predicate 
compliment or, sometimes, whatever word or structure is at the end of the 
sentence (unless the word is a pronoun or has a pronoun as headword), giving 
added weight to what tends, anyway, to be the most important information, the 
real news of the sentence.  Opening the sentence, the subject is likely to be a 
character or thing we already know or an idea that has been under discussion, 
sometimes a pronoun that refers backward.  Often it is a person or a thing or an 
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idea carried over to receive some new predication: the chief interest is likely to be 
found in the second half of the sentence.  (Artful 16) 
This paragraph resonates with the sentence from Austin I read earlier (“For clearly any, or almost 
any, perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off …”).  Both are full of hedges, of corrections, of 
nuances to the claim made.  Tufte uses “tends” twice, “likely” twice, “or” seven times, “often” 
once.  She begins her first two sentences with an adverbial phrase that limits their claims (“In 
these linking examples” and “Opening the sentence”).  Such qualifications drew Williams’s ire 
in his review of Artful Sentences (183), Tufte so carefully couching her claims that those claims 
seem to lose any authority they once had.  
 Williams’s review of Tufte stems from a fundamental misreading of her project.  
Williams comes at Tufte expecting constative utterances.  He wants her to teach facts, to draw 
conclusions, to make firm claims about writing, to declare statements.  Her project is nothing of 
the sort.  It is performative.  Artful Sentences has no thesis, makes no claims, draws no 
conclusions, has no declarations.  It is a celebration of action, offering insights into the 
performances of sentences, performances that are one-off instances, performances that can’t be 
repeated or exactly reproduced because of the uniqueness of the circumstances governing the 
writing of each individual sentence––hence all of Tufte’s qualifications.  Language use is 
provisional, and Tufte demonstrates this provisionality through her reading practice.  
Artful Sentences is a demonstration, a showing forth of a reading practice, a display of a 
careful reader at work, and through it, Tufte teaches students not how to use an absolute phrase 
or how to write a left-branching sentence, but instead how one might read sentences.  Tufte’s 
performance of reading performed sentences brings together style and delivery in its attention to 
how sentences move on the page via grammar and style.  She attends to this syntactic delivery 
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primarily from the perspective of the reader, showing forth her own reading practice.  In the 
latter pages of this chapter on performance, display has emerged as an important term for 
thinking about Tufte’s demonstration of a pedagogy and reading practice; in Chapter Three, I 
continue this discussion of display and how it bears upon of the teaching of writing.  
 
2.5 INTERCHAPTER: THE SENTENCE, PERFORMED 
 
In her notes to the 1981 edition of Raymond Queneau’s Exercises in Style, translator Barbara 
Wright tells how Queneau’s book came to be.  Queneau heard Bach’s The Art of Fugue 
performed at the Salle Pleyel in the 1930s, and “What particularly struck Queneau about this 
piece was that, although based on a rather slight theme, its variations ‘proliferated almost to 
infinity.’  It would be interesting, he thought, to create a similar work of literature” (Wright 
“Notes” 4).  Queneau began writing a story of a scuffle on a bus, varying it stylistically with each 
retelling.  When he had 12 versions of the story in 1942, he sent it to a publisher.  The editor, 
confused as to what the pieces were and what they attempted to do, rejected them.  But Queneau 
kept writing, amassing 99 exercises by 1946 and finding a publisher, the first edition of 
Exercises in Style published in 1947 (Wright 4).17   
Each exercise is a paragraph or two long.   Queneau takes some from classical rhetoric 
(Homeoptotes, Onomatopoeia, Parechesis).  Others he makes up: Rainbow (where Queneau 
litters the piece with the colors of the rainbow), You Know (Queneau inserts the phrase ad 
nauseam), and Gustatory (abounding in food metaphors).  Queneau adopts different genres 
                                                
17 Queneau stopped at 99 pieces because he thought 99 “to be sufficient; neither too many nor 
too few; the Greek ideal, you might say” (Wright “Notes” 4).  Queneau eventually wrote 124 
exercises, and each edition of the Exercises contains some compilation of 99 pieces.  Exercises 
in Style has been translated into 32 languages.  
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(Official Letter, Notation, Opera English) and different discourse communities (Medical, 
Mathematical), even devolving, at times, into nonsense (Permutations by Groups of 5, 6, 7, and 8 
Letters).  The piece is a stylistic tour de force. 
I asked my students to read Queneau.  Some objected, thinking Queneau a show-off and 
not writing anything of substance.  Both are smart readings.  The book does read as a masterful 
display of writerly ability, at times a bit full of itself.  Regarding their objection that Queneau is 
not writing anything of substance––indeed, the story of the bus ride quickly becomes 
monotonous––that too hits on a key element of Queneau’s project.  Queneau (in my reading of 
him) tells a mundane story 99 times because he wants readers––just as Austin does, and Fish, 
and Tufte too––to break away from reading sentences for their meaning and to instead consider 
what they do.  By telling (and retelling, and retelling again) a story that, ultimately, is boring, 
Queneau points readers toward the performativity of style, grammar, and syntax, the story not 
distracting from what Queneau’s sentences do in each exercise.  
Because the passive voice is so often vilified, I asked my students to read Queneau’s 
Passive exercise as Fish might, asking “What does this sentence do?” (“Literature in the Reader” 
25).  Here is the Queneau they worked with:   
It was midday.  The bus was being got into by passengers.  They were being 
squashed together.  A hat was being worn on the head of a young gentleman, 
which hat was encircled by a plait and not by a ribbon.  A long neck was one of 
the characteristics of the young gentleman.  The man standing next to him was 
being grumbled at by the latter because of the jostling which was being inflicted 
on him by him.  As soon as a vacant seat was espied by the young gentleman it 
was made the object of his precipitate movements and it became sat down upon.   
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The young gentleman was later seen by me in front of the gare Saint-
Lazare.  He was clothed in an overcoat and was having a remark made to him by a 
friend who happened to be there to the effect that it was necessary to have an 
extra button put on it.  (72-73) 
With this assignment, I was not seeking a grammar lesson on the passive, nor a condemnation of 
the passive, nor even an endorsement of the passive.  I wanted students to think about what the 
passive does, what actions it performs, what effects it has on the reader, what role it plays in the 
sentence, the paragraph, the scene, the story, the piece as a whole.  I realize that Queneau’s 
paragraph may not be the best text to address these issues, as it is rare a reader or a writer would 
encounter or create a text written entirely in the passive, or even nine passive sentences back-to-
back-to-back.  Still, by the sheer repetition of the passive, I hoped Queneau’s piece could 
highlight what this grammatical construction does, or could do, both within and for his writing as 
well as within and for the students’ own writing. 
Consider the following, from an exchange student: 
They [passive sentences] make readers feel there is a force that push everything 
into their positions.  I feel a kind of unpleasent and involuntery when I read these 
sentences.  The sentence: “The bus was being got into by passengers,” for 
example, shows that the bus doesn’t want to take anyone in but people get into by 
force.  
The student builds his reading of Queneau’s performative sentences around “a force that push 
everything into their positions.”  There is a helplessness about the passive voice, this student 
contends, a helplessness brought about by this force that pushes things into positions.  The 
student reads the bus as not wanting any passengers; the “people get into by force.”  Although 
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the student does not address how syntax creates this feeling of helplessness, it is clear how it 
happens: by moving the object to the subject position of the sentence, its acted-upon-ness is 
emphasized.  The student seems aware of this ability of the passive to alter emphasis: “Sentences 
in Passive change the motivation of the story. … Sentences really allow a writer to change 
definitions of stories and direct readers’ emotions.”  I read the student’s use of “motivation of the 
story” and “change definitions” as statements concerning the emphasis of the sentence, an 
emphasis changed when the passive reorients subject and object.  The student is primarily 
concerned with the affective outcomes of this performance, ascribing to the sentence the ability 
to “direct readers’ emotions.”  
The link between the passive and an affective response was common.  Here’s another 
reading of Queneau, one by a student not nearly as disturbed by the passive:  
Although the passage (Passive) sounds particularly normal, I noticed in the 
beginning he kept on using the word being.  This word allows for a more laid 
back type of tone when reading this passage.  These sentences make it feel like 
what’s going on isn’t that serious, It’s just happening, “It’s all good and chill.”  
This passage makes everything seem non-chalant as tho it does not matter. “He 
was clothed in an overcoat and was having a remark made to him by a friend who 
happened to be there to the effect that it was necessary to have an extra button put 
on it.” 
Whereas the first student took the passive to be a matter of force producing an unpleasant, 
involuntary, helpless feeling, this student reads the passive as “laid back,” as “all good and chill.”  
He does so by homing in on the use of “being.”  “The bus was being … They were being … A 
hat was being …The man standing next to him was being …” This student has recognized that 
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the passive is not a world of nouns doing things but of nouns having things done to them, the 
nouns just “being” while they are acted upon.  The nonchalant tenor of the passive, the feeling it 
projects that “it does not matter,” stems, in part from the length of passive sentences.  Note the 
length of the sentence the student quotes at the end of his piece: 37 words to say what could be 
said in 15: He wore an overcoat, and his friend said to put an extra button on it.  There is no 
urgency about Queneau’s use of the passive, his long, meandering sentences contributing to the 
“all good and chill,” “laid back,” just-being-there quality of the piece. 
A third reading of Queneau, from another exchange student:18  
Passive exercise emphasizes the object, not the person.  The objects become the 
characters of the story and the characters become objects.  The sentences in the 
passive voice slow down the action, giving us the pictures of the effects of action, 
not the action itself.  In the sentence “a vacant seat was espied by the young 
gentleman” the emphasis is shifted from the man onto the seat––firstly vacant and 
then suddenly taken.  We know the effect (taken seat) but we cannot read the 
action.  We cannot see through the text the process of taking the seat by the man. 
Passive voice is also seen as emotionless.  There is no action, and we 
focus on emotionless object rather than people (or we treat people as objects), so 
for me this exercise hides the emotional part of the story. 
This reading of Queneau brings together the concerns of the first two.  The student addresses 
how the passive sentences “slow down the action,” perhaps recognizing the same qualities about 
the passive that prompt the second student to read it as “chill.”  But this third reading of Queneau 
                                                
18 I note that two of the three students I quote here are exchange students, and they wrote some of 
the most provocative readings of Queneau in the class.  I suggest it is because working in a 
foreign language brings with it a heightened sensitivity to what that language does.  
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goes further.  She notes that the passive is “giving us the pictures of the effects of the action, not 
the action itself.”  The student sees that the passive shifts focus from what happens in a sentence 
to the outcomes of that action.  As such, “We know the effect (taken seat) but we cannot read the 
action.  We cannot see through the text the process of taking the seat by the man.”   
This reading of Queneau in terms of the passive erasing the action of the sentence departs 
from how the passive is used in scientific writing: to call attention to the action performed.  The 
beaker was filled, the hydrogen was added, 12 specimens were dilated, etc.  But for this student, 
the passive, because it gives readers a picture of the action but does not depict the action itself––
in that it does not have a subject doing something––erases the processes taking place.  This 
erasure of the action elaborates on the concerns of the first student that the passive can “change 
the motivation of the story … and direct readers’ emotions.”  But rather than read the passive as 
directing the reader’s emotions, she reads it in terms of the emotion in the writing itself.  Because 
the passive has no action, she argues, readers “focus on emotionless object rather than people.”  
This is evident in her quotation of Queneau––“a vacant seat was espied by the young 
gentleman”––a sentence that has readers looking at a seat rather than the man preparing to sit in 
it.  The student reasons that because the seat has no emotion yet is the focus of the sentence, the 
passive suppresses emotion by directing readers’ attention to seats rather than people.  The 
passive has another outcome: “(or we treat people as objects).”  The student presents the 
objectification of people as a parenthetical.  Yet this is an idea too important to be a parenthetical 
aside.  It is what prompts, I think, the first student’s adverse response to the passive as making 
him feel “a kind of unplesent and involuntery,” the fear of the passive having “a force that push 
everything into their positions.”  People are objectified, helpless, removed of agency, objects to 
be acted upon rather than to act by their own accord. 
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There is much that could be done here.  The first student, for example, could be asked to 
articulate further his understanding of this ordering force of the passive and whether the active 
voice also forces things into position; the second student could explain his curious claim that the 
passive “sounds particularly normal”; the third student could be pressed on her assertion that the 
passive erases action.  But these are questions of analysis, and these readings could be turned 
into means of production.  The students could rewrite Queneau’s passage in the active voice and 
discuss the effects of that rewrite.  They could turn to a paragraph––or single sentence, or string 
of sentences––of their own, rewrite into the passive, and discuss the effects of that rewrite.  The 
questions here would be why a writer would want to write in the passive, what it allows the 
writer to do, what it keeps the writer from doing––what actions these sentences perform––the 













He’s going to use everything he’s got, what he’s heard or read, 
what he’s only half-learned.  And he’s going to hammer it, twist it, 
wring it until what isn’t familiar becomes familiar, does what he 
wants it to do.  
   
William E. Coles, Jr. 






The Plural I: The Teaching of Writing is William E. Coles, Jr.’s narrative account of teaching 
Humanities 1, a required first-year composition course at (then) Case Institute of Technology.  
The Plural I began as a 297-page, typed report titled “English is a Foreign Language: A report on 
an experimental Freshman English course taught Fall semester, 1965-66, at Case Institute of 
Technology.”  The report sought to determine the feasibility of instituting a writing curriculum 
based off the one Coles taught at Amherst, a curriculum learned under the direction of Theodore 
Baird (a).1  Coles knows his report will not “be read in its entirety by everyone” but he believes, 
                                                
1 Coles taught at Amherst from 1960-65 and at Case from 1965-70.  He then taught at Drexel 
University from 1970-74 before coming to the University of Pittsburgh, where he retired in 1998.  
While teaching at Case, Coles completed his dissertation “Novelist of Style: A Critical Reading 
of the Novels of Thomas Love Peacock” for advisor Franz Montgomery at the University of 
Minnesota in 1967.  Coles published nothing from his dissertation, and Peacock does not appear 
in any of Coles’s subsequent scholarship or teaching materials.  Montgomery published little, 
though in the 1930s he did co-edit a textbook Essays in Science and Engineering: Selected 
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nonetheless, that “everyone connected with that mysterious thing we refer to as the process of 
education at Case ought to have a copy of it” (b).   
The report, the book, and the course they dramatize are oriented around a sequence of 30 
writing assignments.  There is no textbook; the course generates its own materials via its 
assignment sequence, and class discussion focuses on student papers written for that day’s 
assignment.  Each chapter of The Plural I covers one class period, presenting an assignment, two 
or three student essays in response to it, and Coles’s narrative of the ensuing classroom 
discussion.  Coles dramatizes the classroom discussion; it is not a transcription (The Plural I 4).  
He says he made nothing up in his representation of the class: “I have rendered, not invented; 
selected rather than imagined” (“English is a Foreign Language” II).  The Plural I is an unusual 
book in Composition’s professional literature: pedagogical theory that relies on narrative while 
taking the form of a quasi-epistolary novel built around nearly 100 pieces of student writing.  It 
is, as Coles says in his report, “an account of how we moved from class to class … a record of 
where we started and where we came out” (a).  
  A note before I progress: In a later essay, Coles explains that the teacher of The Plural I 
is a persona (The Plural I––and After 273).  There are plural Coleses here: the teacher Coles as a 
character within the narrative, and the writer Coles crafting the story and presenting a pedagogy.  
Early on in the book, the teacher is distressed.  He pulls no punches describing his 
students’ writing: it sounds like the Jolly Green Giant, their writing a put-up job, phony, a cop-
out, bulletproof.  Of the first stack of essays from the course, he says, “Each of them was as 
suggestive of training, capability, and intelligence; as flawlessly organized; as free from 
conventional errors––and as depersonalized, as empty, as ultimately meaningless as this:”––and 
                                                                                                                                                       
Readings for Students of Composition.  The textbook, predicated on imitation exercises, is 
representative of the pedagogy Coles resists, his own classroom built around student writing.  
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now he brings in his first piece of student writing, titled “In Defense of the Ambitious 
Amateur”––“The question of the amateur’s place in a society of professionals is one that has 
been greatly changed by the scientific and cultural revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries” (The Plural I 19).  This stale writing does not surprise Coles; he expected as much.  
After reading the essays in response to Assignment 3––another stack of cop-outs––Coles 
proposes a game: “Let’s play Themewriting” (36).  Coles asks for three words.  The students 
volunteer “man,” “black,” and “TNT.” Their laughter reveals they know the game Coles is 
asking them to play.  Coles writes the three words on the board and asks a student to compose a 
Theme.  One student offers:  “The day that Man invented TNT was the blackest day in the 
history of humanity” (36).  They do it again; from “chicken,” “arm,” and “drugstore,” a student 
composes, “Any drug store can arm itself against failure by selling chicken” (36-37).  From 
those openings, the Theme would write itself, as it has been in the students’ papers thus far in the 
course.  Coles paraphrases their ensuing discussion:  
How does one proceed?  Well, the opener, of course, set everything up.  With the 
chicken sentence you’d go on to say that chicken was: one, delicious; two, 
nutritious; three, easy to prepare––devoting, say, a paragraph to each.  With the 
sentence on TNT you’d talk first about peaceful uses of the explosive, in mining, 
railroading, etc., and then you’d turn to killing, particularly the killing of 
something called wimminenchildren, then to destruction by remote control, and 
finally to man’s inability to you know what with something like this as a windup: 
“In spite of the many benefits which the invention . . . great achievements . . . 
control of the environment . . . master of the universe. . . . BUT, when weighed 
against . . . hideous brutality . . . only conclude . . . not master of himself.”  (37). 
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The ellipses here are Coles’s.  They signify that there are certain signposts the Themewriter must 
reach, shared values like benefits, achievements, control, and mastery.  How the Themewriter 
arrives at each is inconsequential––hence the ellipses––and, for that matter, the students already 
know how to get to each destination; Coles does not need to teach those moves.  With the TNT 
example, the Themewriter begins with the benefits of dynamite before turning to its costs, 
weighing pros and cons.  The Themewriter then invokes some value shared with their audience–
–“something called wimminenchildren,” the “something called” suggestive not only of the 
problematic abstraction of “wimminenchildren” but also the flippant use of it.  The Themewriter 
is playing a game here, not engaging in serious writing.  The final “windup” repeats the broad 
movements of benefits weighed against costs, with a well placed “BUT” leading to the 
conclusion, a conclusion both inevitable––the writer can “only conclude”––and moralistic, 
cautionary.   
 Coles––the writer––uses this scene to establish what he understands as the starting point 
for any writing class.  The students know the routines.  It is the teacher’s job to call their bluff, to 
get in the way, to make them think about their delivery.  But just as the students are going 
through the motions, the teacher in this scene can be read as doing the same.  Coles admits, “The 
first day of class I began exactly as I have been starting my classes for the past ten years” 
(“English is a Foreign Language” 1).  When Coles calls their work Themewriting, when he 
proposes the Themewriting game, when he decries put-up jobs and phoniness in writing, he too 
is following a script.  It is a script that asks him, the teacher, to disrupt their tried-and-true 
Themes, and the script and Coles’s performance of it make students uneasy.  In response to the 
Themewriting game, one student protests, “But it gets you by … you have to know how to do it” 
(37).  Coles concedes that students do have to know Themewriting, but he presses on, undeterred.  
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This is the drama of the book: finding a replacement for Themewriting, trying to write in a style 
that Coles might value.   
In what follows, I suggest Themewriting is a display of a student’s ability to wield a 
particular discourse within a given context.  Though Coles never uses the term (neither within 
The Plural I nor his other work), his students enact what classical rhetoric calls the epideictic: 
the rhetoric of display, of demonstration, of showing forth, of making known, of (in some 
translations) shining.2  Coles provides a provocation to consider how the rhetoric of display 
operates within a classroom, and how this rhetoric of display is a matter of delivery.  With the 
Themewriting game, Coles calls attention to delivery, to the moves students make in service of a 
particular way of talking, a particular way of engaging material.  So too, the Themewriting game 
is an epideictic display predicated upon demonstrating agility with a learned discourse.  The 
Plural I, then, revolves around both display and delivery: Coles displays his course (its syllabus, 
assignments, essays, and discussions); the students display their writing, their writing itself a 
display of the moves valued within a particular discourse; and the book as a whole displays a 







                                                
2 These are common definitions of the epideictic.  See, for example, Jost (17); Prelli (2); 
Rosenfield (135); Walker (Rhetoric 9).  
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3.1 THE RHETORIC OF PRAISE AND BLAME 
 
In Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, Jeffrey Walker corrects Composition and Rhetoric’s 
fundamental understanding of classical rhetorical theory and practice.3  Most histories of rhetoric 
uphold a divide between epideiktikon and pragmatikon.  The pragmatic, Walker notes, “was 
traditionally understood to include two main types of civic discourse: speeches of accusation and 
defense in courts of law; and speeches proposing, supporting, or opposing laws or resolutions in 
political assemblies (or speeches of advice presented in council or to a magistrate or ruler)” (7).  
The pragmatic is the rhetoric of the courtroom (judicial, also called forensic) and the rhetoric of 
the senate (legislative, also called deliberative).  Against that is the epideictic, which “was more 
amorphous and inclusive, though it was generally identified with discourse delivered outside 
judicial and legislative forums, such as speeches performed at festivals and ceremonial or 
symposiastic occasions, and it was typically conceived of as the discourse of praise and blame” 
(7).  Epideictic rhetoric is generally associated with poetry rather than argument, a catchall of 
literature, of drama, of anything from “from funeral speeches to after-dinner speeches” (Sullivan 
“Epideictic Rhetoric of Science” 231).   
This divide between the pragmatic and the epideictic is problematic, Walker argues, 
because the epideictic comes to be associated with the literary; the literary comes to be seen as 
distinct from the rhetorical; the rhetorical comes to be associated with the pragmatic; and the 
pragmatic comes to be the privileged form of public discourse, as it has practical outcomes: 
going to war, raising or lowering taxes, convicting or acquitting defendants, etc.  Consequently, 
                                                
3 The argument concerning the epideictic Walker advances in Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity 




the epideictic is set aside as having little consequence in comparison to the weighty matters 
handled by pragmatic uses of language.  The epideictic is seen as “ ‘secondary,’ derivative, and 
inferior” (Walker Rhetoric vii).  Walker finds this division between the epideictic and the 
pragmatic unsatisfactory not only because it denigrates the work of the epideictic and incorrectly 
represents the relationship between rhetoric and poetics, but more so because it fails to articulate, 
or leave space for, the primacy of the epideictic.  And so he works to upend it.  Correcting the 
record on the Greeks, his project offers a revisionary history of classical rhetorical and poetic 
theory and practice.   
Walker reclaims the epideictic by reworking its definition, grounding his project in the 
practices of classical rhetoricians and poets.  Pushing against definitions of the judicial, 
deliberative, and epideictic based on subject matter (the legal, the political, the artistic), location 
(the courtroom, the senate, the theatre), time (the past, the future, the present), and/or form 
(argument versus poetry), Walker claims the audience’s disposition is what determines whether 
discourse is pragmatic or epideictic.4 
  Relying on Aristotle, Walker asserts that pragmatic discourse is spoken to an audience 
of judges, “people who have been formally empowered to make rulings within a particular 
institutional setting” (8).  Because the rhetoric of the court or the senate depends so heavily upon 
making judgments––whether a “decision of guilt and the assessment of a punishment (or an 
acquittal), the enactment (or rejection) of a law, or the enactment (or rejection) of a proposal”––
the pragmatic is defined by “the production of … institutional transactions of the public business” 
(8).  Against that is the epideictic, which Walker concedes could be defined by “its lack of a 
                                                
4 The division of judicial, deliberative, and epideictic based on time comes from Aristotle.  
George Kennedy objects to this schema, calling it “somewhat strained” (Rhetoric 1.3.4, fn. 81).  
Walter Beale also believes it to be forced (“Rhetorical Performative Discourse” 221-22).  
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pragmatic business function” (8).  The epideictic does not decide on matters of war, it does not 
convict or acquit, it does not reject or enact proposals: “there is no vote and no verdict … The 
audience simply applauds, disperses, and goes home (or, in the case of a published text, the 
audience stops reading, puts down the scroll, and goes on to the next thing)” (8-9).   
But this assessment of the epideictic, Walker contends, is not generous enough.  The 
audience of epideictic rhetoric does do something––and something important, at that.  Again 
looking to Aristotle, Walker notes that “the role of an epideictic audience is not to be a kritês 
[that is, a judge] but a theôros, that is, one who is to make ‘observations’ (theôriai) about what is 
praise-worthy, preferable, desirable or worthy of belief in the speaker’s logos” (9).  Walker 
clarifies: “The role of the theôros, in short, is not to make rulings but to form opinions about and 
in response to the discourse presented” (9, emphasis Walker’s).  The task set before the audience 
changes from pragmatic to epideictic discourse.  With the epideictic, the audience does not sit in 
judgment over the subject matter as they do in the courts or in the senate; instead, the audience is 
to observe, to form opinions but not necessarily take action.   
This difference in how an audience ought to respond to pragmatikon as opposed to 
epideiktikon gives the epideictic the unique ability to shape the shared values of a community.  
Walker argues the epideictic “lead[s] its audience of theôroi to contemplation (theôria) and 
insight and ultimately to the formation of opinions and desires on matters of philosophical, social, 
ethical, and cultural concerns” (9).  He continues: 
In this view, “epideictic” appears as that which shapes and cultivates the basic 
codes of value and belief by which a society or culture lives; it shapes the 
ideologies and imageries with which, and by which, the individual members of a 
community identify themselves; and, perhaps most significantly, it shapes the 
 101 
fundamental grounds, the “deep” commitments and presuppositions, that will 
underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic 
forums.  (9) 
The epideictic shows forth before an audience, leading the audience to contemplation, that 
contemplation shaping the shared values of the immediate audience and the larger community.  
Those shared values, in turn, become the shared values from which a rhetor argues within the 
pragmatic settings of the courtroom or the senate.5  And so, even though the epideictic has no 
vote, no ostensible outcome in the same way that a trial does, its outcome is this: the reification 
of existing beliefs, or, at times, the challenging and refinement of those beliefs, those very beliefs 
becoming the beliefs from which people argue in the course of pragmatic rhetoric.6 
Walter Jost elaborates on the epideictic’s relationship to a community’s identity: “It can 
function philosophically, transforming criteria and reconvening a community, clarifying what the 
community may not have known it knew, or convening a new community by virtue of what 
readers learn about how they might come to order themselves, however provisionally” (151).  
Note the introspective, reflective, contemplative character Jost ascribes to the epideictic.  The 
epideictic clarifies for a community what it did not know about itself.  Note too the pedagogical 
overtone: “what readers learn.”  The epideictic teaches how that community might grow into 
something different, reformed, renewed.  Through the rhetorical acts of praise and blame––not 
its ends, but its means––epideictic rhetoric performs an educational function: it offers a space 
both to teach the audience what it means to praise and blame in accordance with the shared 
                                                
5 As Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca claim, argument begins with agreement, with 
“adherence to the propositions from which [the speaker] will start” (65).  See also Sheard (766). 
 
6 For other scholars expanding the bounds of the epideictic beyond praise and blame, see 
Michael Carter; Walter Beale (“Rhetorical Performative Discourse”); Walter Jost; Lawrence 
Rosenfield; Cynthia Sheard; and Dale Sullivan. 
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values of a community, but so too it offers a space to resist those shared values, to reshape them 
in accordance with the changing needs of the community.  Teaching what it means to be part of a 
community while also working to refine that community situates the epideictic as pedagogical: 
the epideictic indoctrinates an individual––whether child or adult––into a community’s customs, 
traditions, and beliefs by way of the repetition and enactment of those shared values.7 
Because of this relationship to the shared values of a community, Walker claims the 
epideictic is foundational to all rhetorical practice.  The epideictic “shapes and cultivates the 
basic codes of value and belief by which a culture lives” (Rhetoric 9).  Those codes then inform 
pragmatic rhetorics, as they are the foundation upon which arguments are built.  The epideictic 
“shapes the fundamental grounds, the ‘deep’ commitments and presuppositions, that will 
underlie and ultimately determine decision and debate in particular pragmatic forums” (9).   
When the poet praises courage, the community reinforces its valuing of courage, such that the 
lawyer will speak of his defendant’s courage in making a case for his character.  The epideictic, 
in teaching what the community values, creates and refines and reinforces the values upon which 
the community in turn bases its deliberative and judicial acts.8 
Yet, this cultivation of the shared values of a community contributes to the degradation of 
epideictic rhetoric.  Walker notes that the epideictic can possess “a deeply conservative, even 
oppressive social force” (12).  Because the epideictic traditionally is associated with poetry––
                                                
7 See Dale L. Sullivan’s “A Closer Look at Education as Epideictic Rhetoric” and “The 
Epideictic Character of Rhetorical Criticism,” both of which connect the epideictic and the 
classroom.   
 
8 Dale Sullivan has argued that the epideictic is problematic because in cultivating the shared 
values of a community, epideictic rhetoric assumes and perpetuates a homogenous community, 
thereby calling into question the relevance of epideictic rhetoric in a post-modern world (“The 
Epideictic Character”).  Though not addressing epideictic rhetoric outright, see also Joseph 
Harris’s “The Idea of Community in the Study of Writing” and Mary Louise Pratt’s “Linguistic 
Utopias,” both of which challenge the idea of a homogenous community.  
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with crafted, metered, beautiful language––it has a hypnotic quality about it.  This hypnotic 
quality enables the epideictic to lull its audience into compliance with the values it advocates.  
Walker elaborates: “One is hypnotized by the beautiful words repeating themselves forever, and 
constrained in thought by composition principles that lend themselves more to the copious 
stacking-up of equivalent phrases than to reasoned inquiry” (12).  Walker notes too the 
“ancestral/archival authority” of the epideictic, this authority drawing upon a community’s 
reservoir of shared values, the ancestral and the archival becoming resources for future rhetorical 
invention and education  (12).  By invoking the ancestral and the archival, the epideictic teaches 
what it means to be part of a community, and herein is the problem: often, the epideictic leans 
toward the repetition of those values and away from critical, reasoned inquiry into them.  
This relationship between the epideictic and the shared values of a community creates 
two possible dangers for the epideictic rhetor.  The first is a boring speech.  Chaim Perelman and 
Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca note this tendency, cautioning against discourse whose conclusion is 
known in advance.  As examples, they point to sermons and epideictic discourse; with each, the 
audience anticipates the argument, its progression, and its conclusion, such that “no freedom is 
left to the speaker,” the speech becoming “trite and banal” (469).  The other risk is the inverse of 
the boring speech: self-aggrandizing display.  Because content is already agreed upon, the 
epideictic orator can focus more on form.  The emphasis upon form feeds into the association 
between the epideictic the literary, the epideictic orator performing a masterful display of her 
poetic sensibilities.  Jost elaborates: “[T]his same opportunity for self-display runs the risk of 
deliquescing into crass showmanship, false posing, hollow oracularity, empty verbiage” (148).  
This is “mere” display, the view of the epideictic that denigrates it from the status given to the 
pragmatic.  Whereas the rhetorics of the courts and of the senate have a certain gravitas about 
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them, whereas the rhetorics of the courts and of the senate deal with issues of consequence, 
whereas the rhetorics of the courts and of the senate make decisions with tangible outcomes, the 
epideictic is flashy, showy, little more than a display of the speaker’s skills.  Because its 
conclusions are known in advance, the epideictic rhetor must do something to hold an audience, 
and that something is an extravagance of display: “This remains a standing temptation to any 
epideictic rhetor, and marks an extreme distance from the epideictic’s original concern with the 
health of the civic polity” (Jost 148).  
I note how similar the poles are that mark the extreme distance Jost identifies: the 
redemption and disparagement of the epideictic both hinge upon its relationship to the shared 
values of a community.  At one end is the mindless repetition of the shared values of a 
community: epideictic rhetoric as crass showmanship.  At the other is the cultivation of the 
shared values of a community: epideictic rhetoric as community enrichment.  Thus, the basis for 
the degradation of epideictic rhetoric––its relationship to, and cultivation of, the shared values of 
a community––becomes a means of redemption.  In the histories of rhetoric Walker seeks to 
rewrite, the epideictic is of little consequence because it merely affirms beliefs already held by 
the audience; it does not accomplish much in comparison to the pragmatic and its decisions 
concerning war and peace, guilt and innocence.  Yet, the epideictic can be reclaimed by 
acknowledging that yes, the epideictic does concern itself with these shared values, and yes, 
there are dangers inherent in the mindless (though stylish) repetition of those values––but so too 
the rhetorical function of the epideictic resides in its potential to reify, reshape, or refine those 





As a rhetoric of display, the epideictic has within its purview delivery, for delivery, as it sets 
something before an audience, is all things epideictic rhetoric is commonly defined as: a display, 
a showing forth, a demonstration, a making known, a shining.  But delivery is inherently 
persuasive, and to equate epideictic rhetoric with delivery risks ascribing value to the epideictic 
solely because it has pragmatic qualities, thereby affirming the pragmatic as the measure of 
rhetorical worth and undoing Walker’s sound argument.  I recognize this tension, but I want to 
pursue the relationship between persuasive delivery and demonstrative epideictic rhetoric 
because of its pedagogical implications.  The epideictic asks––requires, even––that audiences 
engage discourse not within a paradigm of logic-driven argumentation aimed toward persuasion, 
but within a framework of praise and blame critiquing a demonstration of rhetorical ability.  This 
shift in audience priorities broadens the range of what an Argument might accomplish, 
persuasion no longer the golden standard (or sole purpose) of rhetorical practice.  
This effort to broaden the capacities of what rhetoric might accomplish is, I think, one 
reason these scholars turn to the epideictic.  Pragmatic rhetorics rest solely upon argumentation, 
but the epideictic does much more.  Dale Sullivan lists five functions of, and unique to, 
epideictic rhetoric: education, legitimation, demonstration, celebration, and criticism (“The 
Epideictic Rhetoric of Science”).  Through these, Sullivan argues, the “epideictic builds cultures 
by establishing and maintaining beliefs, values, and ways of seeing that serve as a form of life 
for everyday activities” (232).  This link between rhetorical practice and everyday activities is 
vital.  I cannot help but think of the epideictic as the rhetoric of Tufte and her reading practice 
grounded in Ordinary Language Philosophy.  The epideictic is the rhetoric of the everyday, the 
rhetoric that then informs everyday rhetorical practice, as circular as that is.   
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This epideictic influence is perhaps most evident in the classroom.  The discussion, the 
close reading, the essay assignment––these establish and maintain certain values and beliefs.  
They establish the everyday activities of the classroom, the classroom producing the discourses it 
strives to teach.  But this practice of epideictic rhetoric in the classroom is not always easy, as 
Coles’s teaching shows.  His students work within a confined system.  They hold fast to the 
Theme, a discourse learned and valued within their previous schooling.  Coles brings new 
assignments, the unfamiliar, and his students struggle to reconcile it with the everyday practices 
they know, the everyday practices years of epideictic rhetoric has taught them to value.  They 
write as the epigraph to this chapter describes, using everything they’ve got, whatever they’ve 
heard or read, whatever they’ve half-learned, and they are hammering it, twisting it, wringing it 
until what isn’t familiar becomes familiar and does what they want it to do.  That is, they 
approach Coles’s pedagogy with unease and try to shoehorn it into the discourses they are 
familiar with, the discourses they know and can practice well.  It is a moment where two value 
systems clash, each attempting––through an epideictic display of its values: the students display 
their writing; Coles displays his criticism––to bring the other around.   
 
3.2 COLES AND AMHERST 
 
The Plural I sits on the fringes of Composition, seldom read and cited.  In its day, it was quickly 
dismissed.  Bruce Horner notes how Coles’s work (along with David Bartholomae’s) has been 
“unusually liable to mixed, sometimes contradictory interpretations” (Terms 193).  Coles is 
linked to “hard rhetoric” and “ ‘manly’ plain-spokenness” (Dillon 64, qtd. in Horner 193; see 
also Catano and Coles’s response to him), but also to the Expressivists who value the student-
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centered, therapeutic classroom where students find and free the self (Berlin makes this 
connection; see Horner 193-94).9  Horner suggests such competing readings come from Coles’s 
“resistance … to ready commodification” (193), that is, that Coles resists the dominant traditions 
and pedagogies shaping Composition and consequently is hard to read, hard to place.  I add that 
the conflicting readings come also from the strong presence of the teacher-character Coles 
presents in the classroom (a character quite blunt) set against Coles’s emphasis on voice: he does, 
after all, open the first day of class discussion with “What sort of voice speaks in this paper?” 
(The Plural I 21).  Coles presents plural Coleses in The Plural I such that the project is read in 
many, and conflicting, ways. 
 In his 1987 College English article “The Plural Text/The Plural Self: Roland Barthes and 
William Coles,” Joseph Harris offers one of the most nuanced reading of Coles, arguing that 
while Coles is concerned with voice, “this concern is predicated on the belief that our language is 
never fully our own, that a writer’s text is always a patch work of other texts” (162).  Pushing 
against Berlin’s reading of Coles as an Expressivist, Harris argues, “Berlin’s problem in reading 
Coles is, I think, that he sees him starting with the self of the writer and then moving to the 
question of what language best expresses that self.  The movement is actually the opposite.  
Writers start with a language common to us all and try to claim some part of it as their own” 
(162).  Harris does not use the term epideictic in his reading of Coles, but there are epideictic 
                                                
9 Another common way to read Coles is to trace him back to Amherst.  See, for instance, Boe 
(6); Garay (101); Keith (Review of Composing 68); Higgins (106); Horner (Terms 179-87); 
Russell (441); Varnum (222); L. Walker (254-55).   
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overtones in Harris’s argument that writers begin with a common language and reshape it to 
meet their needs.10  
 That reshaping is evident in Coles’s own relationship to Baird’s pedagogy.  Baird 
oversaw freshman writing at Amherst College from 1938-1966, directing the required two-
semester course English 1-2.  His writing curriculum eschewed textbooks in favor of student 
writing as the central text of a course.  Students wrote a new essay for each and every class 
period, the essays in response to a sequence of assignments addressing themselves to some 
nominal topic in order to get at the real subject of the course: writing.  A writing course, in 
Baird’s view, must be a course in writing, not on literature or politics or the hobbyhorse 
(whatever it may be) of the teacher. 11 
                                                
10 In a review dated July 8, 2012 on Good Reads, Joseph Harris posted the following regarding 
The Plural I: “Reread for the Dead Poets project.  This was the focus of the first academic essay 
I ever published, so it was interesting to revisit.  I remember being powerfully moved by reading 
it.  I’m less so, now.  It seems a little clunky and aggressive.”  Though less impressed with The 
Plural I than he had been, Harris still gives it four out of five stars.  
 
11 Aside from a handful of internal memos and Amherst publications, Baird did not write about 
English 1-2.  For more on the course, see John Boe’s “From the Editor: Puritan English,” James 
Broderick’s “A Study of the Freshman Composition Course at Amherst: Action, Order, and 
Language,” Walter Gibson’s “Theodore Baird,” Margery Sabin’s “Evolution and Revolution: 
Changes in the Literary Humanities,” and Bruce Horner’s “Resisting Traditions in Composing 
Composition,” “Traditions and Professionalization: Reconceiving Work in Composition” and 
Terms of Work for Composition: A Materialist Critique.  Robin Varnum’s Fencing with Words: 
A History of Writing Instruction at Amherst College during the Era of Theodore Baird, 1938-
1966 is the most exhaustive.  For Coles’s own account of teaching at Amherst, see “Teaching 
Writing, Teaching Literature: The Plague on Both Houses.” 
Rueben Brower taught at Amherst under Baird before taking English 1-2 to Harvard, 
where the course in composition evolved into a course in reading, Humanities 6.  The two share 
many affinities; for descriptions of Humanities 6, see Brower’s “Reading in Slow Motion” and 
Richard Poirier’s “Hum 6, or Reading before Theory.”  
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Though Coles is part of what Ann Berthoff calls the “Amherst Mafia” (72), his 
relationship to Baird is complicated.12  In interviews with Robin Varnum, Coles and other 
members of the Amherst Mafia “displayed what I [Varnum] took to be a desire to disabuse me of 
any notion I might have had that they were acolytes of Baird” (224).  But Baird’s shadow looms 
over Coles’s teaching and scholarship, Coles confessing that Baird “helped me to find myself as 
a teacher” (Composing II 1) even though Coles admitted to Varnum that “Baird had made it 
impossible for others to imitate him” (Varnum 224).  Baird’s influence appears on a stylistic 
level with Coles’s frequent use of capital letters to call attention to common ideas he wishes to 
subvert, something Baird does in his own writing.  It appears in Coles’s vocabulary, taking 
(among other phrases) Themewriting from Baird, as well as the admonition that students stop 
Throat Clearing (that is, writing empty introductions).  It appears in Coles’s scholarship arguing 
that writing courses should be courses on writing.13  It appears at the level of course design, 
Coles relying heavily on a writing pedagogy predicated upon sequenced writing assignments, a 
hallmark of Baird’s English 1-2.  It appears in Coles’s dedications of Composing and Teaching 
Composing to Baird, and in Coles’s use of Baird as an epigraph to “The Teaching of Writing as 
                                                
12 In addition to Coles, the Amherst Mafia includes Jonathan Bishop, Rueben Brower, John 
Butler, Armour Craig, Benjamin DeMott, Walker Gibson, Richard Poirier, William Pritchard, 
Roger Sale, and William Taylor (Varnum 222).   
 
13  See, for instance, “The Teaching of Writing as Writing,” Composing, Composing II, 
“Freshman Composition: The Circle of Unbelief,” The Plural I, and The Plural I––and After.  
The argument that a writing course ought to be a course in writing has currency still; see, for 
instance, David Sumner’s “Don’t Forget to Argue: Problems, Possibilities, and Ecocomposition,” 
which pushes against composition courses that hope to convert students to an instructor’s own 
political views at the expense of teaching writing.  
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Writing” and “English is a Foreign Language.” 14  And it appears, most strongly, in Coles’s 
assignment sequences.   
In “The Teaching of Writing as Writing,” Coles lays out a course design.  What Coles 
proposes draws heavily on Baird’s English 1-2 in that there is no textbook, no instruction on how 
to write a Theme, no attention given to basic skills; it is a “departure from the traditional college 
course” and “Its subject is writing” (111).  The daily work of the course: students write in 
response to a set of sequenced writing assignments, producing an essay for each class meeting.  
Student writing is reproduced on anonymous mimeographs, and that writing is the primary text 
of the class.  Each class period is a discussion of (usually) two or three pieces of student writing.  
Regarding the assignment sequence: 
Every year I make a new sequence of assignments dealing with a new and 
different problem, so that for all concerned, this is always a new course, a fresh 
progression in thought and expression, a gradual building up of a common 
vocabulary, a more precise definition of terms.  The assignment usually puts the 
student in a position to isolate a bit of his experience, and then asks him 
something about what he has done in this act of separating one thing from 
                                                
14 That Baird appears in an epigraph is significant, for Coles rarely cites or quotes anyone.  When 
he does, the citation usually has an Amherst connection.  For instance, Coles engages a passage 
from John Genung to open “Freshman Composition: The Circle of Unbelief.”  At the end of “An 
Unpetty Pace,” Coles makes a sly allusion to Robert Frost: “That, I take it, is what it means to 
have promises to keep” (382, emphasis mine).  Another allusion to Frost, coming at the end of 
“Teaching the Teaching of Composition: Evolving a Style”: “that makes all the difference in his 
or her effectiveness” (270, emphasis mine).  In a rare instance of Coles quoting someone outside 
of Amherst, in “Freshman Composition: The Circle of Unbelief,” Coles pulls 19 sentences from 
19 textbook introductions to cobble together a preface to an imaginary textbook, Ventures in 
Composition, doing so to highlight the shortcomings in how writing and the teaching of writing 
are approached by his contemporaries.  Other than the occasional Amherst-connected quotation 
or allusion, and other than the rare quotation in mockery, the predominant text Coles cites is 
student writing, making it the centerpiece of both his classroom and his scholarship.    
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another, of arranging what he knows in some sort of pattern.  Subsequent 
assignments question this pattern, ask the student to reexamine it from this 
perspective and that.  As the year advances, he makes increasingly complicated 
statements about his own activities as a composer, problem solver, knower, writer.  
Whatever continuity he constructs from one paper to another, from one class 
discussion to the next, is his continuity and his alone.  (112-13, emphasis added) 
In the sole footnote to “The Teaching of Writing as Writing,” Coles acknowledges that he draws 
this material from the Amherst course (113).  Of the five sentences quoted above, the italicized 
three are Coles’; the remaining two Coles lifts from Baird’s English 1-2 course description.15  
This paragraph evidences––at a material level––Coles working within Baird’s pedagogy.  Coles 
inserts himself into that pedagogy, articulating within Baird’s sentences his understanding of the 
uses for, and potentials of, a sequenced writing course.  Coles continues: 
[T]hough I have never repeated an assignment, every assignment I have ever 
worked with, every question I have ever asked, involves the same issues: where 
and how with this problem do you locate yourself?  To what extent and in what 
ways is that self definable in language?  What is this self on the basis of the 
languages shaping it?  What has it got to do with you? 
I wish to make clear that the self I am speaking of here, and the one with 
which I am concerned in the classroom, is a literary self, a persona, the self 
construable from the way words fall on a page.  (113) 
                                                
15 For Baird’s English 1-2 course description, see Varnum (249-52).  Coles reprinted variations 
of Baird’s course description, and his own growing out of it, many times.  See, for instance, 
Composing and Composing II, “English 285: Evolving a Style,” The Plural I, The Plural I––and 
After, Seeing through Writing, “Teaching the Teaching of Composition,” “The Teaching of 
Writing as Writing.” 
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The questions Coles articulates here are similar to those that govern English 1-2, but Coles has 
appropriated its concerns into his own language.  The “self construable from the way the words 
fall on the page” becomes integral to Coles’s teaching; Coles elsewhere clarifies that such a self 
is a “not a mock or false self, but a stylistic self,” this passage one that Coles frequently reuses in 
his publications.16  This stylistic self and the effort to discern the connection between the self and 
the language producing it defines Coles’s teaching, such that when Caesarea Abartis wrote up 
her experience attending one of Coles’s NEH summer seminars in Pittsburgh 1978, she mentions 
the stylistic self as a centerpiece of the seminar, quoting it from a handout Coles distributed there 
(156-57).17 
The course Coles describes in “The Teaching of Writing as Writing” met with resistance.  
John Hendrickson complained in College English that Coles teaches “in defiance of both 
scholarship and logic” because Coles “bases his case on ‘naked assertion’ ” rather than empirical 
evidence (403), that Coles’s lack of attention to grammar and convention is untenable and 
irresponsible, and that the sheer volume of papers to be read and marked when students write one 
for every class meeting of the term (1,750 by Hendrickson’s calculations) render the course too 
labor intensive for “ordinary teachers” (403-04).  Coles wrote a reply.  To Hendrickson’s 
complaint about the work load of Coles’s proposed course, Coles asks how a teacher who “does 
                                                
16 See Composing (2); Composing II (17); The Plural I (12); The Plural I––and After (12); 
Seeing through Writing (8); Teaching Composing (10).  
 
17 Coles taught his NEH summer seminars in Pittsburgh from 1977-80.  For more on the 
seminars, see Abartis’s write-up, as well as Timothy Donovan’s “Writing Teachers and Why 
Write?”, wherein Donovan appropriates an assignment he credits to Coles’s summer seminar.  
See also Coles’s “New Presbyters as Old Priests: A Forewarning,” published out of one of those 
seminars.  In 1981, Coles would teach another summer seminar, though not one sponsored by the 




not read that many papers” could still “call himself a teacher of writing” (405).  To 
Hendrickson’s complaint that Coles offers no proof his proposed course would help students 
improve their writing, Coles responds, “The documentary evidence for my assertions there––
some three hundred pages of student papers, assignments, and samples of classroom dialogue––
is the substance of a book I am now revising for publication” (404).   
That book is The Plural I, and though Coles claims in defense, “I am speaking to a wider 
audience than Mr. Hendrickson seems to imagine” (406), it too met with resistance.  It took ten 
years after the exchange with Hendrickson for The Plural I to be published in 1978.  In 1988, it 
was reissued as The Plural I––and After with two essays appended.  In one of them, Coles 
explains that The Plural I was rejected by five publishers and underwent three rewrites before 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston eventually published it (The Plural I––and After 273).  Jo Keroes, 
reviewing The Plural I––and After, said the book “is rather like a rich cake that has fallen in the 
middle” (n. pag.).  Laurence Walker calls The Plural I––and After “merchandising cynicism” 
because only seven pages of the re-issue are new material (254).18   Those seven pages of new 
material are an apology for the book and its teacher-narrator.  Coles clarifies that the narrator is a 
character, a construct, a device to move the narrative along––he calls it a “persona” (perhaps 
echoing Walker Gibson’s Persona, also of Amherst)––not at all intended to be read as an 
accurate depiction of him in the classroom (The Plural I––and After 273).  Coles responds 
directly to William Irmscher, who had written, “I get a clear notion what the instructor is like and 
how the students react.  All of this is so vivid that I know I don’t want to be like Coles.  I don’t 
want to use his approach, and I don’t want to treat students as he does” (87).  In his apology, 
                                                
18 For reviews of The Plural I, see Keith; and Higgins.  For reviews of The Plural I––and After, 
see Keroes; Flachmann; and L. Walker. 
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Coles quotes Irmscher, using Irmscher to vocalize resistance to the teacher of The Plural I.  This 
is a shame, because Coles misreads and misrepresents Irmscher.  Granted, Irmscher does not 
endorse Coles’s teacherly persona nor even read it as a persona, but Irmscher praises Coles, 
putting up The Plural I as “one of the most readable reports on pedagogy I know” and as an 
model for future scholarship (87).  In his defensiveness, Coles overlooks this praise.19  
 
3.3 THE COURSE AT CASE 
 
From the gloss of English 1-2 I’ve offered, the course at Case will sound familiar.  The 
assignment sequence in The Plural I seeks to bring students to an awareness of how language 
constitutes the self and to how one might use language in light of that awareness.  The 
assignments ask students to reflect on themselves as composers and users of language, as 
definers of key terms, as people who do something with language, whether they know it or not.  
Through the sequence, Coles brings a heightened awareness and sensitivity to the way the words 
fall on the page.  He attunes students to language.  
The subject in the course is writing, but Coles selects a nominal subject he deems fitting 
for his engineering students: professionalism and amateurism.20  In the report “English is a 
                                                
19 Concerning Coles as a model for future scholarship, see Horner, who notes that Coles writes in 
“non-conventional forms” that “discourage teachers from treating [his] works as commodities” 
(Terms 189).  
 
20 Coles’s class is male engineering students, which affords Coles the generic “he” without 
problem.  In his other scholarship, Coles wrestled with his pronouns.  In 1978, Coles wrote a 
response to one of his own articles, “Teaching the Teaching of Composition: Evolving a Style,” 
furious that College Composition and Communication had shortened his sentences, omitted 
phrases, edited away his puns, and changed his generic masculine pronouns to be gender 
inclusive.  Coles goes out of his way in the response to use phrases that call attention to their 
gendered pronouns, such as “fisherperson of persons” (209), and makes many crude sexual jokes 
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Foreign Language,” Coles explains this distinction between the nominal subject and the true 
subject of a course.  Coles has taught a wide range of topics in freshman composition: “I have 
asked what it means to wear a mask.  What correctness is.  How you solve a math problem.  
What a lie is.  What it means to be logical.  How the present can contain the past, or the past the 
future.  How you operate a machine.  Whether there is such a thing as nonlinguistic experience” 
(V).21  Coles never has an answer to his questions, and he asks them because they “do not have 
answers in the conventional sense of the word” and––more so––because “it is only the dead who 
cannot be brought to see them as alive as subjects through which there is a possibility of self-
definition” (V).  That self-definition happens through the use of language.  “What is an 
Amateur?  A Professional?  I ask.  It depends, I am answered.  On what does it depend?  I ask 
again.  And at that point, with that phrase, the various things it can mean, the host of syntaxes 
that can contain it, and the relationship of all of these things I can talk about to the mysterious 
                                                                                                                                                       
along the way.  His response prompted one from Julia Stanley and Susan Wolfe, not at all 
amused by Coles and his handling of the situation.   
 In his subsequent writing, Coles paid close attention to gendered pronouns.  In his 1978 
“New Presbyters as Old Priests: A Forewarning,” Coles includes the footnote: “To avoid the 
awkwardness of style, I am using the masculine pronoun to refer to the individual regardless of 
sex” (5).  His 1981 Composing II has a footnote on masculine pronouns, Coles choosing there to 
oscillate between a generic masculine and a generic feminine (5).  In a 1991 piece in Rhetoric 
Society Quarterly, Coles changes all masculine pronouns to feminine in his passages quoted 
from Wayne Booth and John Jay Chapman (“Writing”).  (I note, a rare occasion when Coles 
quotes someone, and someone outside Amherst at that).  When asked about Coles’s editing of 
those pronouns from masculine to feminine––what prompted it, if an editor might have had a 
hand in it––then-editor of Rhetoric Society Quarterly Eugene Garver responded in an email 
exchange, “i have no idea. wish i could help” (Garver).   
 See also James Catano’s “The Rhetoric of Masculinity: Origins, Institutions, and the 
Myth of the Self-Made Man.”  Catano considers how the myth of the self-made man––an 
identity forged through isolation and manliness––appears in the writing pedagogies of Peter 
Elbow, Ken Macrorie, and Coles.  Coles wrote a response, saying Catano conveniently ignored 
Seeing through Writing, a text Coles claims does not subscribe to the myth, noting that over half 
the characters in Seeing through Writing are women (“A Comment”).  
 
21 See also “The Teaching of Writing as Writing” (113).  
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self I can talk only around – – at that point begins my real subject” (V).  These questions are hard, 
and Coles knows this, and the questions push students to find language to talk about them, talk 
through them, language with which they can address themselves to these linguistic and 
existential problems.  It is through “the host of syntaxes that can contain” the students’ answers 
that Coles is able to access his real subject: the relationship between writing and language and 
the self, the self construable from the way words fall on the page.  And so Coles assigns papers 
on Amateurism and Professionalism, on Logic, on Lies, on Math, all nominal subjects offering a 
means to talk about language.22   
Mary Sue Garay claims all Coles’s assignments have two parts: the stimulus and the 
response, and the “change from stimulus to response is marked by a switch from statement to 
question format” (103-04).  The stimulus and response is evident in the first assignment of the 
course, Coles providing a quotation from Stanley Woodward as a stimulus prompting the 
student’s response:    
Here is a statement: 
A professional, whether paid or unpaid, is the man that counts.  An 
amateur is a clumsy bastard. 
Stanley Woodward, Paper Tiger 
  Where do you stand on this issue? 
Begin your paper by explaining what you understand to be meant by the terms 
“professional” and “amateur.” Do you respect one more than you do the other? 
(16, emphasis Coles’s) 
                                                
22 For Coles’s own description of how he sets up an assignment sequence, see “The Sense of 
Nonsense as a Design for Sequential Writing Assignments.” 
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As Garay reads him, Coles asks three types of questions, “1. those on the passage, 2. those on the 
passage as applied to the student, 3. those on the student’s writing,” and she also notes that “The 
first two types of questions occur in all assignments and the last in approximately one-half of 
them” (104).23  With this first assignment, Coles does not yet ask the student to analyze their 
own writing––he is, after all, working within a sequence.  That work of self-analysis comes soon 
enough, the first instance in Assignment 4, its final direction asking students to turn to their own 
writing as the stimulus for their response: 
  Describe a situation in which you acted as what you would call an amateur. 
   
  Where were you?  Who else was there?  What was said and done? 
 
  On the basis of what you have written, define amateur.  (43, emphasis Coles’s) 
 
Assignments 1-6 are “concerned in various ways with the problem of definition”; with 
Assignments 7-12, Coles seeks “to provide a way of complicating the students’ understanding of 
the role of a definer depending on whether he was the subject of an action, the object of an action, 
or both” (69).  He does so in Assignments 13-16 by asking the students about times they have 
given or received advice.   
Assignments 17-20 bring in outside writers (Charles Darwin, J. D. Salinger, Nicola 
Sacco).  Aside from Assignment 18, which is a mid-term response essay, these assignments ask 
the student to discern a voice and its audience from an excerpted passage.  The next set of 
assignments, 21-24, deal with nonsense, “a way of inviting the students to see the importance of 
                                                
23 See also Joseph Harris’s “The Plural Text/The Plural Self: Roland Barthes and William Coles,” 
which offers an analysis (not unlike Garay’s) of Coles’s sequences.  See also Ross Winterowd’s 
“I. A. Richards, Literary Theory, and Romantic Composition,” which argues “Richards’ and 
Coles’ concepts of sequencing are virtually identical––and, in my view, liberating, the opposite 
of behavioral objectives, assignments arranged according to some abstract scale of difficulty, or 
a composition program designed on the basis of modes or genres” (75).  
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their becoming aware of [the resources available to them as language users], the importance of 
knowing as much about as many ways of putting symbols together as one can learn” (181, 
emphasis Coles’s).  With the final set of assignments, 25-29, Coles turns to the sciences.  
Assignment 25 asks students to explain a scientific principle to a nonscientist and to make an 
argument as to why the nonscientist should know the principle (212); Assignment 27 asks the 
student why he must take a humanities course at an institute of technology (230).  From 
Assignment 30, the final one of the course:  
Look back over the Assignments given you this term, the papers you have written 
addressing yourself to them, and the papers mimeographed for discussion in class.  
Recall any conversations you may have had about the course, either in class or 
out of it. 
Where did you start this term?  Where do you seem to come out?  (258, emphasis 
Coles’s) 
Throughout the 30 assignments, Coles returns again and again to variations of the same 
questions.  There is the problem of description:  “Describe a situation in which you gave 
someone else what you consider to be very good advice” (77, emphasis Coles’s).  There is the 
problem of definition: “On the basis of what you have written in your last five papers, define 
advice” (113, emphasis Coles’s).  There is the problem of metacognition: “Write a paper in 
which you try to explain what it is you think you have been doing in your humanities course this 
semester” (156, emphasis Coles’s).  But over and above these questions, the governing question 
of the course is how the self is constituted by language––that is, how a stylistic self is 
construable from the way words fall on the page––and how language locates this self.  This is the 
 119 
question of location, and it is evident in Assignments 18 and 30, the student needing to discern 
where he began and where he finished the term. 
 
3.4 READING COLES READING SENTENCES 
 
Horner reads Coles’s “pedagogies, teaching materials, and statements of philosophy not as 
‘constative’ statements but as practices, as ‘performative’ ” (Terms 199), and here I want do the 
same, looking now to Coles’s own epideictic display of a teacher at work within the classroom.  
Coles’s entire pedagogy rests upon deliberate, sustained, careful attention to the work of the 
sentence, but it is a unique reading Coles practices: though he works intently at the sentence-
level of student writing, he offers no grammar lessons, he uses no grammar terms, he does not 
speak to the conventions of the writing he teaches.  Rather, he attends to the sentence as a display 
of a particular discourse.  Coles is a collector of sentences––not unlike Tufte, not unlike Fish, not 
unlike Williams––though Coles collects sentences by collecting an entire semester’s worth of 
writing.  Coles presents his sentences much more contextualized than his fellow sentence 
collectors do, The Plural I offering assignment sheets, entire student essays, and dramatized 
classroom discussion.  
Assignment 1 asks for a definition of professional and amateur, and Coles offers the 
following assessment of the students’ first work of the term:    
Triumphs of self-obliteration the papers were, put-up jobs every one of them, and 
as much of a bore to read as they must have been to write.  I found myself being 
talked to as though I were a rube (“Now it may, perhaps, be thought by my reader 
…”), unoffendable (“It has probably never been a matter of concern to the 
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reader”) or a confederate, someone in on the joke of why none of it mattered (“of 
course, we, in a college classroom, can hardly hope to settle the question of …”).  
No observation was too trivial to escape oratorical pronouncement (“It is unfair to 
call the amateur a ‘clumsy bastard!’”); no moral stance too obvious to assume 
(“After all, professionals are not necessarily good people”).  (The Plural I 18) 
Coles calls such writing Themewriting written by Themewriters on a Themetopic, noting that at 
the beginning of a writing course, “students have a tendency to sound the way they think they 
ought to sound, the way they think English teachers want them to sound, the way they think they 
have been taught to sound” (17).  Coles anticipates Themewriting at the start of the term, but to 
call the papers “Triumphs of self-obliteration” is not a generous enough reading.  They are 
practicing epideictic rhetoric.  Coles seems to have a tacit awareness of this, as the above 
quotation suggests: the students have assessed a rhetorical situation and in response repeat (and 
reify) what they presume to be the shared values of this community, this classroom, and this 
teacher.  Yes, the papers are put-up jobs, but so too they are tapping into the archival and 
ancestral resources of the epideictic, into a reservoir of commonplace arguments, of 
commonplace phrases and clichés, of commonplace ways of thinking and addressing a topic.  
Trite and banal discourse, a lack of critical inquiry, a tendency toward crass 
showmanship––these shortcomings of some epideictic rhetoric are Coles’s concern when he 
writes, “There wasn’t one student who convinced me that he had a modicum of interest in 
anything he was saying” (18).  This is a rhetoric of empty show, the discourse of a student who, 
“in the midst of the threatening unfamiliarity of his freshman year … will shape whatever he can 
of his academic environment into patterns that he is familiar with” (Coles “Freshman 
Composition” 138).  That is what the Theme does: shape discourse into familiar patterns.  
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Walker notes the hypnotic qualities of (classical) epideictic rhetoric, how its metered, crafted, 
beautiful language lulls the audience into compliance with the values upholds (Rhetoric 12).  
Though it is not crafted, metered, beautiful language the way poetic, classical epideictic rhetoric 
was, the Theme has its own hypnotic qualities coming from its familiarity, its comfort, its 
convenience, how easily it puts prefabricated ideas into prefabricated forms.   
And so, the students write essays in service of, and practicing, the epideictic, their essays 
upholding particular shared values concerning writing.  Those shared values are evident in the 
first class discussion of the term.  I quoted from this paper briefly earlier; here is its full first 
paragraph, this the first paper Coles and his students address: 
The question of the amateur’s place in a society of professionals is one that has 
greatly been changed by the scientific and cultural revolutions of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.  The amateur, who was formerly criticized as a bungling 
idiot, today has gained the status of a person who is capable of advancing by 
improvement of his own primitive institution, without the glorified educational 
and financial backgrounds which have made the professional man a symbol of 
intellectual and vocational superiority.  Although the amateur may sometimes 
lack the spit and polish which distinguish the professional, it is somewhat 
irrational for him to be referred to as a “clumsy bastard.”  The amateur is 
definitely entitled to more respect than he is obviously receiving from such people 
as Stanley Woodward, who apparently does not realize the contributions which 
amateurs have made to society.  (19-20) 
The paper continues like this for five more paragraphs.  After reading the full essay, Coles asks 
the class what they think of it.  One student remarks that the writer “proves his point pretty well 
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here,” to which Coles responds, “Yep … No Question.  It’s well-organized.  It’s Clear, Logical, 
and Coherent.  It’s neat” (21).  Already, in Coles’s capital letters, his suspicion of these shared 
values is evident.  Coles asks the students who they think is speaking in the paper.  They don’t 
understand his question.  So he asks a student to read the final two sentences of the essay–– 
By assuming that most professionals were at one time or another actually 
amateurs in their fields, it would be possible to reason by transitivity that at one 
time even the professional was a “clumsy bastard”!  The efforts of the amateurs 
with respect to both contribution to society and to future professionals are not to 
be disparaged, due to the fact that the clumsy amateur, through his own efforts, 
could easily become the man that counts.  (20) 
––and Coles asks, “Look, how old do you think the writer of those two sentences is pretending to 
be?”  The student is confused: “How old?”  Coles tries another approach: “Well how big then?  
Do you think he’s really the size of the Jolly Green Giant?” (21).  One of the students smiles, and 
Coles continues: “What would you say to Jim here, if he slid up to you in the snack bar and said: 
‘You know, Sam, the question of the amateur’s place in a society of professionals is one that has 
been greatly changed by the scientific and cultural revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries’?” (21).  The students snicker.  I read their laughter as an acknowledgment that no one 
talks how this paper sounds, an acknowledgment that they are playing a game, and an 
uncomfortable realization that Coles is calling them on it.     
This conversation captures the clash of conflicting values.  The students prize Clarity, 
Logic, Coherence; they want a writer to Prove his Point.  Coles values something else, something 
he doesn’t and won’t articulate explicitly.  When pressed by Coles, one of the students, Jim, 
cannot recall what point the paper is trying to make.  Coles says the paper’s lack of memorability 
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is a problem not limited to that single paper: “I had the same trouble with the whole damned set.  
… I couldn’t tell one from another––particularly after about the fifteenth time I was handed talk 
like ‘most professional athletes began their careers as amateur athletes.’  As though I was being 
given the Hope Diamond” (22).  Coles pushes against their writing, and the students resist.  One 
asks, “But isn’t a writer entitled to his own opinion?” to which Coles thinks, “Smart and 
seasoned.  They also knew the game” (22), game referring to the set of premade arguments in 
defense of the Theme, arguments the students deploy effortlessly.  This is epideictic rhetoric in 
its worst form, trite and banal discourse that precludes any critical inquiry, a crass showmanship 
of the student’s ability to write Clear, Logical, Coherent prose.   
The students “continued to play it safe with what for years had not only gotten them by, 
but on” (26), unwilling (or unable) to set aside the writing that has served them well in school, 
the writing they believe to be the appropriate one for this setting, the writing that––by the very 
act of writing it––affirms the values it displays.  At this point Coles asks the students to play the 
Themewriting game.  This game has two purposes.  The first I discussed at the opening of this 
chapter: Coles uses the game to make explicit the trite and banal discourse the students perform 
in their writing.  The second purpose of the game goes back to Coles’s course description for 
Humanities 1, to a passage I quoted earlier: the course is “a fresh progression in thought and 
expression, a gradual building up of a common vocabulary, a more precise definition of terms” 
(The Plural I 12; see also “The Teaching of Writing as Writing” 113).  Coles uses the 
Themewriting game to build up that common vocabulary, Coles working with his students to 
find more precise terms to discuss writing, terms that move away from the abstractions of Clarity, 
Coherence, and Logic, terms that are a fresh progression in thought and expression.  And so, 
when writing his commentary on student papers a mere two assignments later, Coles is able to 
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draw upon the Themewriting game and the critical terms it introduced: “Most of the papers 
addressed to Assignment 5 I could take care of with one variation or another of a standard 
comment: ‘Man.  Black.  TNT.  Remember the game?  What do you lose when you win it?’ ” 
(51).   
The students catch on to this language and the way of reading it represents, and new 
terms are added to their critical vocabulary each class period.  For Assignment 5, Coles asks the 
students to “describe a situation in which you acted as what you would call a professional” (The 
Plural I 51, emphasis Coles’s).  One student writes a paper telling of a time he played pool with 
his friends.  The game moves along slowly until the writer takes charge: “Abruptly, I declared 
that I would clear the table and I did” (52).  The friends are amazed, and they challenge the 
writer to do it a second time. “I accepted the challenge and was successful” (52).   Coles singles 
these out as the only two sentences in the paper that have potential: “The rest is Themetalk (‘an 
immediate interest in participating,’ ‘they watched in amazement,’ and so on)” (52).  Because the 
paper relies on so much telling––“We’re told not shown that the writer was neither ‘boastful 
[nor] pretentious,’ and that he was ‘looked up to’ ”––Coles says the reader must “accept the 
writer’s solemn word” (52).  And therein is the problem.  The writer’s solemn word hinges upon 
the self of the writer as construed by the way the words fall on the page: the value of the paper 
lies in how the writer presents himself through language, and this writer uses a lot of Themetalk.  
One student doubts the story ever happened, and it is precisely because of this issue of 
the writer’s presentation of himself through language.  The student says, “I play a lot of pool.  
When you clear the table you run the rack.  Anybody who played pool the way this guy says he 
does would know that.  I don’t believe he wiped out those guys this way” (52).  The classroom 
discussion turns to this question of running the rack versus clearing the table, of how a 
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professional and amateur speak, of how the way each uses language reflects their relationship to 
their specialty.  Coles is pleased: “It was the first direct connection anyone had made between 
professionalism and the use of language, between professionalism and behavior” (53).  In this 
discussion Coles sees the students’ burgeoning awareness that language use––how they put 
together their sentences––shapes the self.  The students are learning that Themetalk comes from 
how the writer employs a stock of common phrases and prefabricated ideas, piecing them 
together without actually saying anything. 
“Run the rack” becomes one of the critical terms used in the classroom, a shorthand 
representing the discussion of how one’s use of language creates a stylistic self.  Two 
assignments later, “Steve” becomes another critical term.  Steve initially appears in a paper 
written for Assignment 7 as a character giving advice to the writer.  The class agrees that Steve is 
flat and unbelievable, a product of Themewriting.  In his written comments to the batch of essays 
for Assignment 8, Coles resorts to Steve:  
I’d read a Theme no further than was obvious that that was all the paper was 
going to amount to; at that point I’d draw a slash line, write “read to here” in the 
margin, and, at the end of the paper, following the appropriate title (Steve as Miss 
Lonelyhearts, Steve Saves Lab Partner from Electrocution, Steve for Coach of the 
Year), I addressed each writer directly.  (78)    
Discussing Assignment 8, Coles laments yet another character with “no center, [who] fails to 
suggest anything recognizably human,” a character who “isn’t a character at all” as she is 
composed solely of clichés (80).  A student articulates what Coles is trying to say: “What you get 
is a Suzie for Steve” (80).  In this comment, the student draws upon previous discussions of 
Steve, recognizes that the problem Coles is describing with the paper at hand is the same 
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problem as was in previous papers mimeographed for class, and recalls the vocabulary used to 
name that problem.  The student pieces all that together and applies it to the discussion at hand, 
adding Steve’s counterpart, Suzie, to the course lexicon.  In this work of vocabulary building, the 
epideictic is evident in at least three ways: Coles’s reading against the Theme is reified by the 
vocabulary the class adopts; the community-building function of the epideictic is manifested as 
the class comes together around a shared use of language and vocabulary; and the potential of the 
epideictic to upend and refine previously held beliefs is realized as the class, through the acts of 
praise and blame, presses against their prior values concerning writing.24  
But in Assignment 10, this way of reading and its relatively quick appropriation creates 
problems for Coles.  He opens class with a paper he believes has great potential, “one of the best 
papers we’d had to work with so far that term, and one I particularly looked forward to doing 
with the class” (100).  The assignment concerns giving good advice to yourself that you then 
took, and the students’ immediate response to the paper was not what Coles had expected, or 
wanted.  The first student to speak remarks, “Well, here’s another goody-goody.  Steve gives up 
fraternities” (102).  The student employs the class’s critical vocabulary––goody-goody and 
Steve––but Coles is not pleased.  A third of the way through the term, his students have 
appropriated his language, his criticism, his snark, but they’ve employed it at the wrong time.  It 
                                                
24 In “The Teaching of Writing as Writing,” Coles speaks to this work of vocabulary building: “I 
mark the student papers not with standard correction symbols but with metaphors evolved from 
our class discussions.  After four or five examples, no student is in any doubt as to what is meant 
by such terms as ‘bulletproof,’ ‘cocoa-marsh,’ ‘sky writing,’ or ‘mayonnaise’” (112).  
Hendrickson, in his response to Coles, doubts the usefulness of such metaphors, arguing that 
struggling students would be “incapable of spelling ‘mayonnaise’ let alone understanding the 
metaphorical intent of the word as a corrective device” (403).  Coles’s response: “If as a class we 
come up with the metaphor of ‘mayonnaise’ as the correlative to a half-hour’s conversation 
about what the student has written, we have a great deal with which to make the term mean 
something, and we can use it from that point on in the course, together with other metaphors 
which we evolve as a community, with more than common understanding” (“Reply” 404-05). 
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has become a knee-jerk reaction to a text, to any text.  In this moment, it is clear that the students 
do not, in fact, understand Coles’s way of reading.  They’ve got the language down, but they 
aren’t yet sure what it means or how to use it.  Coles explains:  
I’ve experienced that sort of derailment enough in the classroom not to be 
surprised when it happens, but when it does my initial reaction still is one of fury 
with the seemingly uncanny knack of the students to turn insensitive only when I 
am least prepared for it––and only, it seems, when we as a class have the most to 
lose.  (102) 
Coles trusts his students’ ability to employ the criticism he teaches them.  He believes they will 
read as he does, that they will see the merit in the paper he presents and as such forestall any 
snide comments.  Yet, the class has a “seemingly uncanny knack … to turn insensitive.”  The 
students can deploy the Jolly Green Giant, or Steve and Suzie, or Cop-out, or Phoney at ease, but 
they lack the critical acumen to use these critical terms well.   
 With Assignment 18, Coles asks the students, “What have you been doing in this course 
so far?” (156).  The assignment is a letter to a friend back home who will be attending Case the 
following fall.  “Be as clear as you can in explaining to him just what it is you think you’ve been 
up to” (156, emphasis Coles’s).  A number of the students “buried their nervousness in 
patronization, smugly suggesting to Art and Harry and Jim, who were all still wallowing around 
back there in the protozoic slime of high school English, that they’d just have to wait and boy oh 
boy the pain, man, the pain!” (157, emphasis Coles’s).  Given their tone, Coles remarks, “Not 
many of the student’s letters would have needed a return address” (157).  There is a moment in a 
paper, though, that draws Coles’s attention, “such a nice expression of frustration that it was too 
bad the writer hadn’t gone on to develop the implications of it”: 
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All you’re required to do is turn in a piece of writing on a particular subject every 
time the class meets––three times a week––which often seems like three times too 
many.  You’ll find yourself up until three in the morning staring at a blank piece 
of paper; you’ll find yourself jotting down ideas in the cafeteria; you’ll put it all 
off till tomorrow; you’ll let physics go to get it done today; you’ll dust it off in 
calculus just before class; you’ll waste paper; you’ll break pencils; you’ll swear; 
you’ll quit––but when you walk into class, you’ll put that paper in the pile with all 
the others.  (159) 
Coles asks the class “what could be inferred from the sentences about the writer’s relationship to 
the course” (159). The first student responds that the writer doesn’t like the course, and Coles 
counters by asking why the writer devotes so much time to the class if he hates it.  It’s not fear of 
failing; everyone cares about grades, the class decides.  One student remarks that someone who 
only cared about a grade wouldn’t put this amount of work into the course, “always sweating it” 
(159).  Coles agrees, and offers that a student who didn’t care about the course not only wouldn’t 
work this way, but wouldn’t “talk this way, at any rate.  Getting it all into one sentence so that 
the suggestion seems to be that it’s some sort of process he’s immersed in, a process that seems 
to have produced a state of mind” (160).  Coles sees the writer’s relationship to the course 
manifest through the syntax of that long sentence stitched together by semicolons.  The writer 
crams his experience of the course into a syntax that can barely contain it, just as the student can 
barely handle the course.  (The sentence could be included in Tufte’s chapter on syntactic 
symbolism.)   
Late in the term, the students change in their quick deployment of the class’s critical 
terms.  Coles gives the following for assignment 27:  
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You are a student at an institute of technology.  Although no major is offered by 
the humanities division of the institute, you are required to take certain 
humanities courses.  Why is this, do you suppose?  Is such a requirement 
desirable so far as you are concerned? 
Before you make up your mind just how you are going to address this Assignment, 
consider carefully whether you are sure that you want to talk about A Balanced 
Education, or being The Well-Rounded Man in just these terms.  (Have you ever 
wondered what happened to The Well-Rounded Man?  What’s he doing these 
days?)  What sort of rhetoric is this, by the way: a balanced education?  How far 
do you think it will take you with the problem of this Assignment? 
  Is there another way of talking? (230, emphasis Coles’) 
 
Coles believes this to be a good assignment but one much more difficult than he had originally 
thought.  His class “had little difficulty of seeing that the problem of the Assignment involved 
avoiding the rhetoric of cant, but, to develop ‘another way of talking,’ turned out, as it always 
does, to be another thing again” (231).  That is, of course, the intellectual problem of the entire 
course.  With only a few assignments remaining, students are realizing the difficulty of finding 
that other way of talking, of avoiding the sort of canned Themetalk that produces The Well-
Rounded Man.    
Coles begins class with a paper full of clichés, unsure whether the writer is using the 
clichés knowingly.  Coles reads the paper aloud, and the first student to speak, Bill, “wasn’t quite 
sullen, but he was annoyed and he wanted me [Coles] to know it” (232).  Bill’s frustration lies in 
his inability to do anything with the assignment.  Bill says the writer wrote “The usual,” and 
when pressed by Coles, Bill elaborates: “I mean it’s the same damn thing I said.  What the hell 
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else could you say?  This is a hooker assignment.  It’s like the paper where we had to explain the 
course, or the one on the scientific principle.  You knew right away what you’d be stupid to do, 
but you ended up doing it anyway” (232).  Bill’s response displays his awareness that these 
assignments all deal with similar issues regardless of their nominal subject.  He characterizes 
these assignments as baiting him, getting him hook, line, and sinker when he resorts––
begrudgingly––to Themewriting.  Bill has come to an awareness of the problems with 
Themewriting, and he is aware, too, of the difficulties inherent in trying to avoid such discourse.  
And when he can’t avoid the rhetoric of cant, he gets mad.   
The discussion of the second paper has a similar tenor.  The students are slow to criticize 
it.  The conversation is marked by hedges––“I’m not really sure that’s what he’s doing” says one 
student; “Maybe he’s trying to …” begins another; “You can’t really tell which he means.  
Maybe that’s his point …” posits a third (236, emphasis Coles’s).  Absent in this discussion is 
the quick dismissal of student writing as a Cop-out, or Phoney, or the writer as the Jolly Green 
Giant.  The students realize the difficulty of Coles’s assignments, and there is a sense of 
community, of camaraderie in the classroom as they all struggle to constitute some self from the 
way words fall on the page.  Their comments display carefulness absent in the bravado they had 
earlier in the course.  Their confidence in the Theme is shaken, but so too is their confidence in 
their ability to deploy Coles’s critical terms.  They are floundering.  
The final assignment asks students to review all their work, the mimeographed 
assignments, and any discussions they’ve had regarding the class in order to answer the 
following: “Where did you start this term?  Where do you seem to come out?” (258, emphasis 
Coles’s).  Coles selects six essays to compare with essays from the first day of the term to show 
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how far the students and their writing have come.  The students, though, derail his lesson plan, 
presenting a mock assignment of their own: 
 ASSIGNMENT 69 
“What good are Christmas carols, anyway?  Besides, I’m going to the Bahamas 
for the vacation.” 
Have you ever heard somebody say anything like that?  Maybe you know 
somebody who heard somebody say it.  Then again, maybe you don’t. 
Have you ever said anything like that? 
Have you ever said “Bah”? 
Have you ever said “Humbug”? 
Who was your audience?  Did they stay for the next show? 
Who were you? (260, emphasis Coles’s) 
The students frame their assignment within the same stimulus-response structure as Coles, using 
language from outside the classroom as a provocation for a writing problem.  They ask questions 
of audience, and they ask the question governing much of Coles’s teaching––“Who were you?”–
–that, is, when you said Bah and Humbug, how did that stylistic performance constitute the self?  
The assignment sheet continues, offering a Christmas carol to the tune of “Jingle Bells”: 
  Dusting off a Theme, keeping words just right, 
  Down the page I go, writing through the night. 
  Write the intro. first; turn the body too, 
  Exeunt with a flourish and it’s off to bed I’m through. Oh–– 
  …  
  “Bulletproof, bulletproof,” that’s my teacher’s cry; 
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  He’s not seen the likes of this––not since junior high. 
  This is slop, throwing rocks, a weak and bloody dodge; 
  Without an ear you’ll hear no voice, you need some good advice.  (260-61) 
The mock assignment showcases the student’s ability to speak (and parody) Coles, and their 
carol employs (and parodies) a selection of the course’s critical terms: Theme, bulletproof, slop, 
dodge, voice (other parts of the song reference Steve and Suzie, weaving a rug, and adding 
magic to a draft).  
The assignment and carol mark a bittersweet moment in the course.  Although there are 
considerable gains made by the students with regard to the values Coles’s epideictic rhetoric 
upholds––evident when, on the final day of class, Coles showcases first- and last-day student 
writing––the students seem to have learned, above all else, that they cannot write.  The students 
begin the course holding fast to the Theme, Themewriters all of them.  That first day, Coles 
displays an alternative mode of criticism, one that values complexity over tidiness, one that 
values a stylistic self rather than Suzie and Steve, one that addresses difficulty rather than 
dodging a problem, one that knows it matters whether a writer says “run the rack” or “clear the 
table.”  As the course progresses, the students take on Coles’s way of reading.  They appropriate, 
and add to, his critical terms.  And yet, the students cannot set aside Themewriting.  When Coles 
introduces a new nominal topic, the students revert back to Themewriting (Assignments 7 and 
25), and the Theme is present, in some degree, in almost every set of papers mimeographed for 
class discussion.  By the end of the course, the students become aware of, and are frustrated by, 
their inability to move past the Theme.  The mock assignment speaks to this inability, the 
students displaying their knowledge of the questions Coles asks, questions that call attention to 
the Themewriting of everyday life, questions that ask the students to set aside trite and banal 
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discourse and find another way of speaking.  The students know what ails their writing but they 
cannot do anything about it.  Hence, the Christmas carol, where they employ the terms of the 
course while admitting they will continue to write Themes, not only because they are necessary, 
but so too because the students do not know how to escape them.   
 
3.5 A STYLISTIC RESPONSE 
 
Coles taught during the Golden Age of Style, and his course is, as I read it, one concerned with 
reading sentences.  But Coles reads sentences differently than his 1970s contemporaries Tufte 
and Fish.  Tufte and Fish do not look outside the sentence for its value.  The performativity of 
the sentence, its delivery, reside entirely within the syntax of the prose, such that Tufte and Fish 
need only present an author’s name when curating sentences.  Tufte and Fish find value in 
elegant; Coles finds value in how a sentence locates its writer within a discourse.  He moves 
sentences into a critical context.  He presents his class with large pieces of text but often focuses 
the discussion on a single sentence or a single phrase (like “run the rack”).  Sentences become 
signs of character, the syntax representative of the student’s relationship to the world, to the 
course, to the subject at hand, to himself.   In Assignment 18, one student writes, “… I got a 
letter from Gwen a couple of weeks ago in which she said ‘cause I love you loads’ and it 
annoyed me.  And then I got annoyed that I got annoyed” (161).  Here the student demonstrates 
what Coles has been teaching: an awareness that language constitutes the self, that syntax 
enables a person to exist within the discursive world such that the student is annoyed when his 
girlfriend writes him in clichés.  The sentence, then, becomes the avenue into these discussions 
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of the relationship between the self and writerly practice.  This is the true subject of the course, 
professionalism and amateurism aside.  
 But have the students learned this lesson?  On the final day of class, though interrupted 
by the Christmas carol, Coles shares six pieces of writing.  He reads them aloud and shares his 
thoughts on what he sees working in each.  The final piece is written by the writer of the first 
essay discussed in the term, the one that began with the Themetalk of “The question of the 
amateur’s place in a society of professionals is one that has greatly been changed by the 
scientific and cultural revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries” (19).  That student 
admits that, at the end of the term, he is lost:  
“Where do you seem to come out?”  I am still mixed up by the assignments.  For 
some reason, I have had a kind of faith that whenever we came to the end of this 
course everything would fall together, and it would be possible to turn and see the 
road by which I had come.  We were told Monday that this is the end; so, I’m 
turning.  At first all seems dark, but then I think I can recognize a little light.  My 
main hope is that this light is the beginning of dawn and not just moonlight.  (268) 
This comes in the middle of a paper full of hedging, full of second-guessing, full of moments 
like the following: “I think I am coming close to saying something in this paper.  I don’t know 
whether ‘close’ is as far as I can get or whether I could go all the way and describe ‘close to 
knowing’; but ‘close to knowing’ is where I want to come out, where I think I am coming out, in 
this course” (269).   
Coles values this kind of writing.  “That paper,” he writes, “no one had any trouble 
understanding why I reproduced in its entirety or why I used it to conclude the class” (270).  He 
sees the paper “suggest[ing] how the end of the course is but its real beginning” (270).  Coles 
 135 
effuses praise: he values how “the writer refuses to disown completely his first-day-of-class 
naiveté, the way he speaks of making a ‘partner’ of his confusion, his seeing that ‘readiness with’ 
a certain kind of language is the same thing as a ‘loss of words’ ” (270).  Coles is particularly 
drawn to a passage where the student analyzes his own syntax: 
What has the course been all about––writing, learning, seeing, thinking, 
understanding?  I looked at these words after writing them and wondered why I 
had written them in the –ing form.  I could just as easily have said “how to write, 
learn,” etc.; but I didn’t.  I guess this would have made it sound as though I had 
definitely learned something; for instance, you can “learn” how to ride a bicycle.  
I haven’t learned anything in this manner.  I guess I would have to say that I have 
learned enough to automatically put these examples (writing, learning, etc.) in the 
–ing form rather than some other way.  I have only begun to learn things.  (268-
69). 
In this moment, as Coles reads him, the student understands “his consciousness of the activity of 
writing as an action (‘the –ing form’) undivorceable from the actions of seeing, thinking, and 
learning”  (270).  The student has an understanding of how syntax represents actions in the world, 
and how the choice of using an infinitive or a gerund is not merely a choice of grammar but one 
of consequence where sentence craft betrays a stylistic self existing both on the page and within 
Coles’s curriculum.  This has been the topic of the course, and this student gets it.  
 This student is not alone.  The other five papers Coles showcases on the final day of class 
all say the same, all express the same awareness of their uncertainty about writing.  From the 
same paper, its final paragraph:  
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This is the path that we have taken to learn about writing.  We were told at the 
beginning of the year that this set of assignments represented a “fresh progression 
in thought and expression.”  I am sure that this is so, but I am equally sure that 
students who have taken this course in previous years have come out at 
approximately the same place I am now.  They might not have had to struggle 
with help, advice, amateurs, and professionals; but whatever their “progression in 
thought and expression,” I am sure that through it they saw the complexity of 
writing, and that in writing they had a key that could open––at least part way––
any door that it was set to.  (269-70) 
Coles sees this paper as a triumph of the course, but for me it raises significant questions as to 
whether Coles’s teaching has accomplished what it set out to do.  That all six papers of the final 
day express this same sentiment of confusion, and that all six do so in a similar style of hedging 
and second-guessing, and that this student comes to the realization that he is perhaps not alone in 
feeling this way after a semester with Coles, suggests that what the students have learned is not 
to disavow the Theme, but to replace one Theme with another.  They’ve cast aside Themewriting 
and the Jolly Green Giant for what I might call Coleswriting.  And this student knows it, 
recognizing that all Coles’s previous students have likely reached the same place he has. 
 Though Coles claims his is a course on writing––and indeed, they do talk a lot about 
writing during the semester, and the students produce a lot of it as well––it is perhaps more apt to 
describe the course as one in criticism.  The papers are only discussed within the framework of 
praise and blame; there is never opportunity for revision, never the opportunity to return to an 
idea and continue working on it.  Though the occasional assignment glances back to previous 
work for its starting point, thereby revising ideas previously addressed, Coles never includes 
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revision as part of the assignment sequence; that is, they revisit ideas, but they don’t revisit their 
own sentences.  The students have ample opportunities to practice criticism, to hone their ability 
to recognize and declaim the Theme––even to the point where they see it in love letters from a 
girlfriend––but they lack the opportunity to refine a single piece of writing.  There is no space 
within the course design to linger over a draft.  Each assignment is an exercise in analysis, and at 
no point is the question asked, “How could this writer, in light of our discussion today, revise his 
paper to address these concerns?”  This is perhaps the greatest fault of the course; it offers no 
theory or practice of revision.  
The Amherst pedagogy does not include revision because of its faith in the sequence: 
through daily assignments revisiting the same writerly problems repeatedly, the student 
essentially “revises” each time he writes a new essay; each continues a trajectory set by the 
previous.  But this does not play out as intended in Coles’s classroom.  Coles’s students approach 
the same problems day after day and they fall into the same traps day after day, such that by the 
end of the term, they admit (both in the carol and in the final six essays) that they are lost, that 
they will continue to resort to the Theme even though they know it is problematic and even 
though they know, as the student Bill says, “right away what you’d be stupid to do, but you [end] 
up doing it anyway” (232).  Rather than writing toward something, they start each assignment 
from square one, blamed for the same repeated problems in their writing ad nauseam.  
The epideictic is the rhetoric of praise and blame, and Coles’s course, through its 
cultivation of a shared critical vocabulary to describe the work of student writing, is a course in 
praise and blame.  It is a course in criticism, one of communal judgment, the class reading and 
writing together, displaying and demonstrating together, their writing showing forth the values of 
their community.  The class discussions themselves focus not on organization or on thesis or on 
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argumentation, but rather on sentences, on style, on the stylistic self construable from the way 
the words fall on the page.  Coles valorizes a certain public identity, one that is not phony, one 
that is not the Jolly Green Giant, and through a communal enactment of praise and blame, his 
students learn what such writing might look like.    
Coles sets up his classroom this way because he knows––as I read him––that student 
writing is not persuasive and––because it is epideictic rhetoric––cannot be.  At no point in The 
Plural I does he attempt to read it as pragmatic.  Coles does not engage student writing as an 
argument; he is not looking for persuasion; he does not expect the writing to affect any sort of 
practical, tangible change.  Rather, Coles reads as an observer––as a theôros––neither inclined 
nor disposed nor wanting to read as a kritês, reading as witness to the students’ performance of 
their ability to display the values Coles’s classroom works to uphold.  Coles reads knowing he is 
an audience to epideictic discourse, and in this sense, Coles’s way of reading is wise.  It is the 
rare occasion when a teacher finds herself persuaded by a piece of student writing.  I do not want 
that claim to belittle, or sound dismissive of, student writing.  Rather, there is another set of 
criteria governing how it is read.  More often than not, teachers are interested in how well the 
student engages sources, or follows generic conventions, or applies a certain method to a given 
text, or organizes an argument, etc.  These are not criteria of pragmatic discourse but of 
epideictic discourse––of a discourse predicated on the display of the shared values of a 
community, in this case, the shared values of particular ways of reading and writing.  A teacher 
does not read student work expecting to be persuaded; a teacher reads student work to assess it 
against some set of values.  This assessment is a matter of praise and blame, and it is an 
epideictic rhetoric that feeds into pragmatic rhetoric.  The pragmatic comes not in terms of 
persuasion, but in terms of where a given piece of student work sits in relation to the shared 
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values propagated by the classroom––that is, the praise and blame of the epideictic informs the 
judicial act of grading papers.  
Readers are left, then, with the question of what to do with The Plural I.  The book wants, 
at times, to be read as a memoir, as Coles’s first attempt to teach writing without Baird’s 
oversight.  But so too, the book wants to be read as a novel, the story carried along by the 
sequenced assignments, a narrative of the students’ development over the term.  The Plural I can 
be read as an ethnography as well, Coles with his 300-plus pages of documentation.  But there is 
one reading Coles guards against: he does not want a teacher to imitate this sequence.  Or at least 
so he says.  The reprinting of The Plural I assignment sequence in various forms, Coles’s reuse 
of Baird’s pedagogy and course materials, and the weight of Coles’s scholarship (so much of it 
describing his classroom practice) suggest he values imitation and that he invites others to 
imitate him.  Against that, though, Coles decries the sequence in The Plural I (his first attempt at 
writing one) as “really not very good (and really it is not very good)” (The Plural I––and After 
272-73; see also Composing II 1).   
But it is not for the sequence’s shortcomings––shortcomings Coles is well aware of––or 
even for its multiple failed assignments that Coles claims imitation of The Plural I is an 
inappropriate response.25  Coles, on his intent for The Plural I:  
Beyond wanting to say that a course in writing ought to focus on the writing of 
the members of it (rather than on something else), and that teachers of writing 
ought to develop a methodology with the subject that is an extension of 
                                                
25 Assignments 6, 12, 16, 24, and 29 each fall flat.  Coles rewrites each, sometimes showing 
these revisions to students, but often not.  (Curious that Coles revises his own writing but gives 
students no space to do so.)  Keroes, in her review of The Plural I, notes that the many failed 
assignments call Coles’s teaching into question.  I would say the opposite; through the inclusion 
of the failed assignments, Coles pushes against the hero-narratives so common in teaching 
scholarship.    
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themselves, I had no desire with that book to tell anyone else how he or she ought 
to go about handling the subject.  My purpose, rather, was to dramatize, with my 
mistakes and failures as much as with my successes, what is involved in the 
teaching (and learning) of writing, however one approaches it, in hopes that this 
would enable other teachers to take a fresh hold on whatever they might choose to 
do.  (Composing II 2) 
There certainly is an argument made concerning writing both within The Plural I and the 
opening sentence of this quoted passage, but Coles’s purpose is to dramatize his own experiences 
such that teachers would gain insight into their own.  It is in this sense that Coles would later call 
The Plural I a “teacher’s manual” (Composing II 2, 10).  The Plural I offers neither lesson plans 
nor pedagogical theory but a display of teaching.26  It is not unlike Tufte’s Artful Sentences, in 
that Coles models a method, performs a particular way of reading student work.  Just as Tufte 
offers not conclusions but observations (Grammar iii), Coles offers not pedagogical conclusions 
but a demonstration of a stylistic self in the classroom.  There is a tension here regarding 
imitation of Coles: he is aware of the dangers of a mechanical imitation of a pedagogy.  That is 
why, I believe, he inserts himself into Baird’s course description, revising the course Baird so 
carefully pieced together.  Coles is independent, yes, but he still works within the Amherst 
framework.  But Coles does not want teachers to imitate his teaching as Fish imitates the Updike 
sentence: such teaching would become rote, lifeless, habitual.  And yet, he still gives readers his 
sequences, baiting the reader to try some of these assignments.  
                                                
26 While Coles does not wish for the assignment sequence in The Plural I to be used, in 1981 
Hayden published a revision of it as Composing II, a textbook for first-year writing courses.  It 
was not Coles’s first published textbook.  In 1974, he published Composing: Writing as a Self-
Creating Process and its companion piece Teaching Composing; both received a glowing review 
from Philip Keith.  Composing II, however, did not garner a single review.    
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If not imitation, then what is an appropriate response to The Plural I?  Coles believes, 
“[W]hen it comes to someone’s helping someone else to write or to teach writing, the most that 
would seem possible is for the someone to enact his notion of what is involved in the activity in 
such a way as to demand that others respond with an enactment of what for them is involved in it” 
(The Plural I 1, emphasis Coles’s).  All that a teacher can do in the classroom is perform, and 
that performance provokes response.  Coles continues: “Which is to say that when it comes to 
the teaching of art, what teaches finally is style.  Learning, the other end of the activity, would 
seem to be connected with a stylistic response to style” (1).  This enactment becomes one’s style, 
style “a metaphor of the self, a way of performing one’s understanding of experience” (“An 
Unpetty Pace” 380).  Elsewhere, Coles describes this pedagogical, performative style as “a way 
to enable others to make for themselves, or to make better, styles of their own” (Composing II 2).  
This stylistic performance teaches, for it demands a stylistic response from its audience.  Perhaps 
William Irmscher offers the best published response to the book, Irmscher developing a stylistic 
response in his own pedagogy after reading Coles, coming to the conclusion “I know I don’t 
want to be like Coles” (87), that response possible only after sustained stylistic engagement with 
Coles.  In this regard, Coles’s own teaching can be read as a stylistic response to Baird’s, Coles 
developing his pedagogy within and against his mentor’s, modeling what he hopes his readers 
will do upon finishing The Plural I. 
Coles takes performance seriously, a teacher who attends to sentences and their style as 
dramatic displays of a writer’s sense of the self and its constitution through and by language.  For 
Coles, style becomes manifest through criticism, through the demonstration of a way of reading, 
through the showing forth of the shared values (or, rather, values that come to be shared) of the 
classroom, through praise and blame.  I read Coles within a progression of stylistics begun in the 
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first chapter, where I brought together style and delivery to push against the pejorative 
associations between style and current-traditional rhetorics.  Syntactic delivery offers readers and 
writers, teachers and students a means to invigorate the work of the sentence, reclaiming it as a 
site of consequential pedagogical instruction.  From there, I turned to Austin, Fish, and Tufte, 
who through their own performances as readers put aside concerns with what sentences mean 
and attend instead to what sentences do on the page.  To this discussion, Coles brings the 
contextualized display of the sentence, his praise and blame necessarily couched within the 
community’s values concerning writing.  The final assignment Coles gives his students concerns 
location––“Where did you start this term?  Where do you seem to come out?” (258, emphasis 
Coles’s) and in the next chapter, “A Located, Habituated Ethos,” I take up this question of 
location with an eye toward grammar, considering how the syntactic delivery of the performative, 
displayed sentence locates a writer within a text, within a conversation.  
 
3.6 INTERCHAPTER: THE SENTENCE, DISPLAYED 
 
In “The ‘Banking’ Concept of Education,” Paulo Freire contends there are two models of 
education.  In the banking model, the teacher’s “task is to ‘fill’ the students with the contents of 
his narration––contents which are detached from reality, disconnected from the totality that 
engendered them and could give them significance” (71).  The other model is based upon 
“problem-posing,” where “students––no longer docile listeners––are now critical co-
investigators in dialogue with the teacher.  The teacher presents the material to the students for 
their consideration, and re-considers her earlier considerations as the students express their own” 
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(81).  I asked my class to write in response to Freire and what seemed to me a fitting question: 
What would the ideal classroom look like? 
From the first paper I read: “The ideal class should be a combination of both banking and 
problem-posing.”  From the second: “I think the ideal classroom should combine both of Freire’s 
concepts.”  From the third: “I think the ideal classroom would be a combination of a lecture like 
classroom and discussion.”  There is a pattern here.  Not only are these responses akin to the 
Themes Coles’s students write, avoiding the difficult moments of Freire’s argument concerning 
hegemony, oppression, narrative, and epistemology in favor of a stock response, but so too is 
their syntax remarkably similar. 27  Here are those three responses again, set alongside eight 
others from the class:  
The ideal class should be a combination of both banking and problem-posing. 
I think the ideal classroom should combine both of Freire’s concepts.  
I think the ideal classroom would be a combination of a lecture like classroom and 
discussion. 
Personally, I believe that the ideal class is a combination of these two concepts 
that were presented.  
Personally, I think the ideal classroom is a combination of both the banking 
concept and the problem-posing method. 
I think it would be a healthy mixture of the two, banking and problem-posing. 
I think that the ideal class should be a mixture between banking and problem 
posing. 
The ideal classroom scenario is a mix of both of these concepts.  
                                                
27 I take “stock response” from I. A. Richards (228).  
 144 
I believe that there needs to be a mixture of both of Freire’s concepts in a 
classroom.  
I think the ideal classroom should be a mix of the banking and problem-posing 
concepts.  
The ideal class should be a class with balance.  
Nothing in excess, everything in moderation is the trope governing these responses.  All follow a 
This-is-That structure, saying This (the ideal classroom) is That (balanced, a mixture, a 
combination).  Just as Freire’s work revolves around metaphor, so too do these responses, the 
This-is-That structure setting up the vehicle-tenor relationship between the classroom and 
mixture, balance, and combination.  Modal verbs––“should be” appears five times, “would be” 
twice, and “needs to be” once––make the tacit argument that this ideal classroom does not yet 
exist.  Eight students preface their statements with an “I believe” or “I think.”  Two open their 
sentences almost identically––“Personally, I believe” and “Personally, I think”––and those 
sentences continue in liked-minded syntax––“the ideal class is a combination of these two 
concepts” and “the ideal classroom is a combination of both.”  That the classroom should be a 
combination appears five times, that it should be a mixture five times also, and that it should be 
balanced once.  Such similarities led one student to remark during class discussion, “I don’t even 
know which one I wrote!”  
To some extent, these stock responses are not surprising. The prevalence of “ideal 
classroom,” “banking,” and “problem-posing” can be traced to my writing prompt and Freire’s 
text.  These words were given to the students, and students were asked to do something with 
them.  My assignment was an unintentional, and unfortunate, iteration of Coles’s Themewriting 
game.  Despite my hopes that the question would move students away from papers that do little 
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more than give examples of Freire’s banking and problem-posing models and into the difficult 
moments of his text, instead I got one commonplace in place of another.  Students swapped the 
“I’ve been in a banking classroom” response with the “A classroom needs to have balance” 
response.  
These sentences are stock responses, but they are also epideictic rhetoric, sentences 
showing forth the shared values of a community.  I see two displays here.  The first is the 
response to Freire, this impulse toward balance, mixture, combination.  The second display I find 
more compelling: the students’ syntax.  Surely there are other ways to express the belief that the 
ideal classroom is a mixture of the banking and problem-posing models.  From another paper in 
the class: 
Students must build up the ability to challenge by starting off with a “banking” 
overview of the subject to learn what they will be learning and once that is 
accomplished, then they can pose questions.  
This student expresses the same vision of the ideal classroom as balanced, though she does so 
through a different syntax and diction than her peers; balance, mixture, and combination do not 
appear here, neither does the This-is-That formation.  Still a stock response, but shown forth 
differently.  This sentence and how it displays the potential for other ways of responding to 
Freire prompts me to call the eleven “volunteer sentences,” a term I take from Verlyn 
Klinkenborg to describe a sentence that offers itself up too easily for a writer’s use: 
  You may notice, as you write, that sentences often volunteer a shape of their own 
  And supply their own words as if they anticipated your thinking. 
  Those sentences are nearly always unacceptable, 
  Dull and unvarying, yielding only a small number of possible structures 
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  And only the most predictable phrases, the inevitable clichés.  (44-45)  
Klinkenborg sees volunteer sentences as volunteering not only their syntax (“a shape of their 
own”) but their ideas too (“their own words”).  Because these sentences appear “as if they 
anticipated your thinking,” they are not unlike the Theme, not unlike the stock response, and not 
unlike epideictic discourse, all of which are welcome, familiar, easy, comfortable, so ingrained in 
our shared cultural values that they anticipate our thinking. 
Klinkenborg claims volunteer sentences offer “only a small number of possible 
structures,” which seems to be the case when looking at these eleven responses from my students.  
Mina Shaughnessy elaborates:  
Before a practiced writer begins a sentence, he has––or feels that he has––almost 
an infinite number of ways of saying what he has to say.  But with each word he 
writes down, the field of choices narrows.  The sentence seems to take its head 
and move with increasing predictability in the directions that idiom, syntax, and 
semantics leave open.  (44)28 
My students’ responses to Freire demonstrate this tendency of volunteer sentences to move with 
increasing predictability as the field of choices narrows.  Each sentence starts from a similar 
place––“I believe” or “I think”––and progresses to language offered by the prompt––“the ideal 
classroom.”  This is not surprising, given that from elementary school onward, teachers require 
that students repeat the question in their answer; the students in my class are showing forth their 
knowledge of such school-talk.  The sentence then must move to a modal and linking verb, 
because this is, after all, an exercise in imagination and metaphor, the modal setting up the 
                                                
28 See also Stanley Fish, “Literature in the Reader: Affective Stylistics.”  In describing how each 
successive word of a sentence shapes the possibilities for how that sentence might end, Fish 
employs the same metaphor as Shaughnessy, arguing that the “range of options” available for 
completing a sentence “narrows considerably” as words are added (24, emphasis mine).  
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subjunctive and the linking verb setting up the metaphor.  The field of choices has narrowed, and 
in this syntactic place, the student draws upon her reservoir of cultural commonplaces.  Knowing 
that moderation is good and that extremes are bad, and recognizing that the problem-posing and 
banking models are extremes, she completes the sentence: “I believe the ideal classroom should 
be a balance between banking and problem-posing.”  And so it goes, with little variance, for 
eleven writers delivering eleven volunteer sentences.   
But even within these volunteer sentences, there are moments of distinction, moments 
where the writer makes a claim that begins breaking away from, even reshaping, the stock 
response.  Consider the following:   
  I think the ideal classroom should combine both of Freire’s concepts. 
I think the ideal classroom would be a combination of a lecture like classroom and 
discussion.   
The only difference between these two sentences is that the first assumes a readerly familiarity 
with Freire’s argument––“both of Freire’s concepts” glossing the text––whereas the second 
explicates Freire––“a lecture like classroom and discussion,” Freire and his terms absent.  This 
second sentence, in using “lecture like classroom and discussion” to represent the banking and 
problem-posing models respectively, offers a bit of commentary on Freire’s work not present in 
the first sentence.  That commentary, though, is subtle––how did the writer leap from banking 
and problem-posing to lecture and discussion?––so subtle that it is subsumed under the power of 
the stock response, of the volunteer sentence, of the epideictic.  Yet in that sentence, the writer 
begins applying Freire to her own experience, equating lecture with the banking model and 
discussion with problem-posing education.  This association is still a stock response, but so too it 
could be read as the instance where the student has put Freire into her own terms, transferring 
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him from the Brazilian to the American classroom.  Her sentence is one of the few that avoid 
“banking” and “problem-posing,” replacing them with terms of her own.  I read this sentence as 
a step away from Freire toward the writer’s agenda as she redefines Freire’s key concepts for her 
own purposes.  A small step, yes, one that is fairly predictable, yes, but a step nonetheless.  I see 
space for revision here, a space to interrogate the leaps made by the student from Freire’s key 
terms to her own.  
In the first sentence, I see a similar subtle work.  “I think the ideal classroom should 
combine both of Freire’s concepts” is the only sentence among the eleven that does not revolve 
around a linking verb.  This sentence gives the classroom agency; it does something; it “should 
combine” two concepts.  I am not sure how this student uses the term “classroom”––whether it 
means the physical classroom, those in the classroom, teacher and students, a curriculum––but 
whatever its semantic range, the classroom here is something that has the potential to act, to do, 
to transform.  It is a performative classroom.  This student has an understanding of the epideictic 
potential of a classroom to refine and reform ideas, as evident by her attributing grammatical 
agency to the classroom.  The classroom is not a passive construct made by the actions of others; 
it is not a classroom that merely exists; rather, it does things on its own accord.  
These eleven responses suggest that just as there are commonplaces concerning content, 
so too are there commonplaces concerning the rhetorical practices of style and delivery.  The 
epideictic, then, might work not only to uphold the shared beliefs of a community, but also to 
uphold the shared practices of that community, its customs––in this case, its way of delivering an 
idea.  Klinkenborg, on the origin of volunteer sentences: 
  Volunteer sentences are the relics of your education   
And the desire to emulate the grown-up, workaday prose that surrounds you, 
 149 
Which is made overwhelmingly of sentences that are banal and structurally 
thoughtless.  (46) 
The relics of your education, the desire to emulate the speech of others––these are the trappings 
of the disparaged epideictic, a discourse handed down through ancestors and archives, a 
discourse emulating the discourses of others.  Klinkenborg calls volunteer sentences “banal and 
structurally thoughtless,” which certainly can be the case, but so too these epideictic sentences 
are the relics of an education, showing forth the desire to emulate the prose of others. 
Recognizing these sentences as epideictic rhetoric does not absolve them of being bad 
sentences.  They don’t say much and they need revision.  And it might be that these eleven 
students are frustrated with their responses, resorting to the stock response knowingly but 
begrudgingly, feeling stymied.  The place to begin pushing students’ reading of Freire past the 
stock response is to attend to delivery.  The eleven sentences rush forward, progressing from “I” 
to the “ideal classroom” to the metaphor of balance.  There is no “however” or “since” or 
“although” or “because” or “even though” to qualify the assertion; no parenthetical asides to 
open up a dual-voiced discourse; no dashes or semicolons or ellipses or colons to offer space to 
nuance a claim.  If these eleven students are to do something more with their readings of Freire, 
if they are to write sentences that show forth the shared values of the community while also 
working to reshape those values, if these students are to realize the full potential of the epideictic, 
then I suggest they turn to the sentence.  Perhaps they start by rewriting the sentence using a 
comma, the lesson not one on comma splices or how to subordinate ideas, but on how 
punctuation complicates meaning.  This is an instance where grammar becomes a generative 
space of productive inquiry into the relationship between style, delivery, and ideas, a relationship 













But, in fact, sentences promise more.  They promise nothing less 
than lessons and practice in the organization of the world.  That is 
what language does: organize the world into manageable, and in 





How to Write a Sentence 





The Coles of Chapter Three offers one way to talk about the self in relation to the sentence, 
Coles teaching that a writer’s use or disavowal of the canned discourse available to him 
construes a stylistic self on the page.  There is another way, though, to think about how the self 
can be present in writing, and that is through how a writer (knowingly or not) adheres to or 
works against sentence-level conventions.1  In The Sense of Style: The Thinking Person’s Guide 
to Writing in the 21st Century, Steven Pinker claims, “If readers can see that a writer cares about 
consistency and accuracy in her prose, they will be reassured that the writer cares about those 
                                                
1 In “Mistaking Subject Matter for Style,” Gary Sloan offers a third way to think about style and 
the self, arguing that what readers recognize as style and, therefore, as a writerly presence, is 
actually characteristic subject matter.  Sloan goes so far as to say there is no such thing as 
individual style; rather, subject matter betrays the self in writing.  
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virtues in conduct they cannot see as easily” (9).  Because of this link between style and trust, 
Pinker argues, conventional correctness is important.  This argument is no different than 
Aristotle’s: “[There is persuasion] through character whenever the speech is spoken in such a 
way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater 
extent and more quickly [than we do others], on all subjects in general and completely so in 
cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt” (Rhetoric 1.2.4).  Aristotle teaches 
that if a speaker handles discourse well, the audience will be more inclined to trust her with the 
larger matters under dispute.  So too of style, says Pinker.  If the writer knows how to handle a 
conjunction, how to use an appositive, how to conjugate verbs––if the writer puts together her 
sentences with care––then readers will trust her.  
It is not a far leap from the argument Pinker makes to the pedagogies from the Golden 
Age of Style based upon internalizing sentence forms.2  What connects the two is Aristotle’s 
teaching on virtue formation: practice internalizes actions that, when the occasion demands, we 
then perform out of habit; virtue is a product of habit habituated by repetition (Nicomachean 
Ethics 2.1).  And so, a student combines sentences, imitates them, copies them into a 
commonplace book, spending time inside the prose of others and internalizing forms such that 
when the student needs to write, sentences are ready and available.  The student writes as if these 
                                                
2 See, for instance, Edward P. J. Corbett’s, “The Theory and Practice of Imitation in Classical 
Rhetoric;” Frank D’Angelo’s “Imitation and Style;” and Ross Winterowd’s “Style: A Matter of 
Manner.”  Pinker, on why internalization works to teach the sentence: “The words and structures 
lie waiting in memory, bearing little tags like ‘here’s a way to delay mentioning a modifier’…  
Accomplished wordsmiths identify a need while writing, or spot a problem in a sentence while 
revising, and when all goes well the suitable word or construction pops into mind” (Sense 137). 
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forms were second nature, writing with the “consistency and accuracy” Pinker and readers both 
value, these stylistic virtues products of habit. 3   
In Chapters Two and Three, habit emerged as a key theme of this project.  The Virginia 
Tufte of 1971 based her entire pedagogy on habit, her students imitating so as to internalize the 
hundreds of sentences gathered in Grammar as Style.  The Tufte of 2006 casts it aside, 
distancing herself from Chomsky and the transformational grammar and the new linguistics 
underlying that pedagogy.  Coles, too, resists habit and the Themewriting it produces.  He does 
not want his students to write, out of mindless habit, the rhetoric of cant.  Coles and Tufte point 
to the limits of habit as a pedagogy; here, I further that discussion, considering the sentence not 
through habit, but through habitation––that is, the sentence as a place a writer inhabits.  The 
inhabited sentence offers a different conception of the sentence-level self than what Pinker 
describes, basing his on habit and its accord with convention, on the little details a writer must 
attend to in order to be credible.  The self I address in this chapter falls in line with Coles’s 
understanding of the self located in relation to a text, an idea, a way of speaking, a sentence.  
Coles calls this the stylistic self.  I might call it a syntactic self, one situated by the grammar of 
the locative sentence, and for this chapter, in an effort to draw attention to the work of the 
sentence in locating writers, I will use syntactic self instead of ethos when referring to a writerly 
self.  
In what follows, I bring style to bear upon ethos and delivery so as to interrogate the 
relationship among the three.  Within classical rhetoric, delivery and ethos go hand in hand; it is 
no coincidence that Quintilian (11.3) and the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium (3.11) both 
                                                
3 For more on the connection between virtue formation and writing instruction, see Eugene 
Garver’s “Teaching Writing and Teaching Virtue.”  See also James Murphy, “The Key Role of 
Habit in Roman Writing Instruction.”  
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hold delivery as of utmost importance in rhetorical practice and that Aristotle (Rhetoric 1.2.4) 
does the same for ethos.  Within the classical tradition audiences trust a speaker not only based 
on what he says, but also how he says it, how he presents himself on the stage, in the courtroom, 
in the senate, behind the pulpit.  Delivery and habit, too, have a long relationship; I think of the 
prescriptions from Quintilian and Cicero and other classical rhetoricians as well as 18th-century 
elocutionary guides for what constitutes effective delivery, prescriptions ingrained through 
repetitious practice––a mode of teaching not unlike sentence-level instruction.  The missing 
piece here is how style can enrich this relationship between ethos and delivery: I claim syntax 
locates a writer, the writer inhabiting a sentence, this self a product of the textual and discursive 
relationships governed by grammar.   
To make this claim, I begin with scholarship recuperating the etymology of ethos and 
connecting it to location and inhabitation.  This work redefines ethos, moving away from 
character and habit and toward a theory of the self set in relation to others.  After looking to how 
Composition has taken up this notion of the locative ethos, I suggest the locative sentence is the 
foundation for two books of writing instruction.  One sits at the center of Composition: Gerald 
Graff and Cathy Birkenstein’s They Say / I Say: The Moves that Matter in Academic Writing, a 
book assigned at over half the colleges and universities in America (xiii).  The other is an anti-
textbook of sorts (in the spirit of Lanham’s) located at the margins of Composition: Verlyn 
Klinkenborg’s Several Short Sentences about Writing, a book that––aside from my own 
publications––has not received a single mention in Composition and Rhetoric’s journals.  Put 
together, They Say / I Say and Several Short Sentences about Writing provide a rich conception 
of how the syntactic self is located in the delivered sentence.  Each pedagogy presents markedly 
 154 
different assumptions concerning the relationship between reader and writer––assumptions that 
dramatically shape writing instruction.4 
 
4.1 A LOCATIVE, HABITUATED ETHOS 
 
In the previous chapter, Coles offered a way of reading sentences predicated upon their display.  
Through the performance enacted at the sentence level, students display certain values 
concerning writing.  That display, in turn, reifies or challenges those values.  Coles often uses the 
metaphor of location to describe this work, asking his students where they locate themselves in 
relation to a problem or an idea, where they started the term and where they finished the term.  
Coles is often read as an Expressivist because of his concern with voice, but I see something else 
in his reading of student sentences based upon location: Coles’s pedagogy resonates with 
scholarship begun in the mid-1970s working to complicate Composition and Rhetoric’s 
understanding of ethos.  
In  “Aristotle on Habit (εθος) and Character (ηθος): Implications for the Rhetoric,” 
Arthur Miller explains that the Greek for habit, εθος, and the Greek for character, ηθος, differ by 
a single letter.  The latter derives from the former, and Miller notes the “basic consubstantiality 
between the two words” and the “good sense observation that a man’s habits are indicative of his 
character” (309).  Miller then points to the wide range of meanings for ηθος in addition to 
character: “Significantly, the basic denotation is not character, but ‘an accustomed place’ and in 
the plural may refer to the ‘haunts or abodes of animals’; it may also refer to ‘the abodes of 
men’ ” (310, emphasis Miller’s).  S. Michael Halloran offers a similar recuperation of ethos 
                                                
4 I’ve written elsewhere on style and ethos.  See “Of Chiasms and Composition, or, The Whale, 
Part II.”  
 155 
(though not citing Miller), setting it against prevailing definitions of the term: “In contrast to 
modern notions of the person or the self, ethos emphasizes the conventional rather than the 
idiosyncratic, the public rather than the private”––Halloran, here, gestures toward a social 
definition of ethos, one predicated upon a situated rhetorical act; he continues––“The most 
concrete meaning given for the term in the Greek lexicon is ‘a habitual gathering place,’ and I 
suspect that it is upon this image of people gathering together in a public place, sharing 
experiences and ideas, that its meaning as character rests” (60).  Miller’s “the abodes of men” 
hints at a communal aspect of ethos, and though Miller does not address it at length, Halloran 
does, arguing ethos is not a matter of the self but instead fundamentally public and social, 
situated in the gathering places of a community.  There are obvious resonances between this 
understanding of ethos and Coles’s stylistic self predicated not upon some individualistic voice 
but rather the sentence set within the context of a discourse community. 
I pause to note the discussions happening in Composition when Miller and Halloran 
retrieve this etymological sense of the locative ethos.  Miller writes in 1974, Halloran in 1982, 
both in the Golden Age of Style (and the Rhetoric Revival).  The sentence is yet to fall from its 
place of prominence in the composition classroom, though by the time Halloran writes its 
influence is dwindling; Expressivism is gaining traction as the field shifts its focus from product 
to process; Voice has emerged as a metaphor for a writerly self, though Composition would soon 
become skeptical of the term; post-structuralism has begun its critique of the author’s presence in 
a text––it is in this moment that Miller and Halloran recuperate an etymological sense of ethos as 
a place someone inhabits.  And it is because they write in such a moment, I suggest, that their 
work has been taken up.  The locative ethos addresses many of the tensions within Composition 
at the time, particularly its unease with an uncritical, naïve view of the self, this unease seen in 
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Composition’s eventual setting aside of Expressivism and move toward what James Berlin calls 
the “New Rhetoric” wherein “Truth is dynamic and dialectical, the result of a process involving 
the interaction of opposing elements” (774).  As Miller and Halloran write, Composition was 
moving toward social constructivist theories of writing and rhetoric, and this growing concern 
with a dialectical truth is mirrored in the field’s embrace of an ethos redefined as a matter, too, of 
social construction.   
At a time when Voice and the relatively simple version of ethos it represents found itself 
unable to account for post-structuralist shifts in Composition theory, ethos emerges anew.  With 
overtones of the New Rhetoric, in 1993 Nedra Reynolds claims, “Considering the social 
construction of ethos … shifts its implications of responsibility from the individual to a 
negotiation or mediation between the rhetor and community” (328).  This social understanding of 
ethos enables Reynolds to nuance Aristotle’s view on virtue formation.  Reynolds agrees that 
“Character is formed by habit, not engendered by nature” but she then makes that character not a 
matter of the self, but of the social: “and those habits come from the community or culture.  One 
identifies an individual’s character, then, by looking to the community” (329).  Rather than take 
sides in a reductive binary between the individual and the community, Reynolds argues the two 
inform each other: “An individual’s ethos cannot be determined outside of the space in which it 
was created or without a sense of the cultural context” (329).  Reynolds uses Miller and Halloran 
to reframe ethos as socially constructed: it is not something the individual creates in isolation but 
a product of that individual’s position within a community.  By claiming habits are not removed 
from the places and communities in which they are located, Reynolds brings together the 
locative and the habituated senses of ethos.  
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Reynolds is one of the first in Composition to make use of the locative ethos, and her 
work with Miller and Halloran is foundational to two other scholars rethinking ethos.  The first is 
Julie Nelson Christoph, a Fulbright scholar whose research largely concerns literacy sponsorship 
and the role of the personal in writing, particularly for students writing in and for the academy.  I 
turn to Christoph because she, like Walker and Jost, looks to the classical tradition with a critical 
eye, not appropriating it entirely but nuancing its rhetorical theory.  In her 2002 College English 
article “Reconceiving Ethos in Relation to the Personal: Strategies of Placement in Pioneer 
Women’s Writing,” Christoph uses the locative ethos to critique the Aristotelian model of ethos 
that depends upon the choices a rhetor makes. 5   Christoph argues that “For Aristotle, 
constructing ethos is a matter of clear and deliberate choice––which is problematic in light of 
more recent understandings of constraints on individual agency” (664).  Christoph identifies two 
problems with Aristotle’s view of ethos.  First, it “offers no guidance for how a rhetor might sort 
out contradictions in the composition of an audience,” assuming “individual character types are 
relatively straightforward and consistent” (664).6  Second, it assumes the rhetor can “deliberately 
control all aspects of his ethos” (664).  Christoph challenges Aristotle, asserting that an ethos 
dependent upon personal choice and a homogenous, consistent audience “is impossible when 
cultural, linguistic, and psychic forces that are beyond a rhetor’s conscious control affect what he 
or she is able to say” (665).  “Able to say” is key here––it points to the affordances and 
constraints the social places upon the rhetorical, something Christoph argues Aristotle’s account 
of ethos wherein the rhetor simply decides how to present himself to a homogenous audience 
fails to account for. 
                                                
5 The article comes from her dissertation, written at the University of Wisconsin-Madison under 
the advisement of Deborah Brandt.  
 
6 See also Reynolds on the problem of assuming a homogenous audience (329).  
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In response to this shortcoming in Aristotle’s rhetorical theory, Christoph turns, as do 
many, to post-structuralism and its understanding of the situated self.  Because identity is neither 
as “stable” nor as “under the control of the individual” as Aristotle presents it, post-structuralism 
offers Composition a theory of identity that accounts for “the shifting dynamics of social and 
cultural conditions” (665).  Christoph claims a writer is “limited by political, social, and 
psychological constraints that restrict his or her ability to choose any option for self-
representation” (665).  And yet, while post-structuralism accounts for such constraints upon the 
individual, Christoph points to its own shortcoming: an emphasis on the subject position of the 
writer risks essentializing those traits that come to define the writer.  The “particularities” of each 
writer’s situation tend to be erased in post-structuralist analyses, Christoph claims, such that it is 
difficult, for example, “to distinguish between Audre Lorde and, say, Gloria Anzaldúa––both 
lesbian women of color who write feminist theory and literature” (667).  While post-
structuralism brings race, class, sex, gender, etc. to the fore, the nuances of the individual can be 
lost amid the ideological forces shaping the self.   
Christoph’s solution is to look to a locative ethos, and it allows her to navigate the 
problems of both Aristotelian and poststructuralist accounts of the self.  Whereas “Aristotle’s 
advice on constructing ethos depends too strongly on the complete control of the rhetor,” and 
whereas post-structuralism “gives due consideration to the forces beyond the rhetor’s conscious 
control” yet “gives insufficient attention to the rich particularities that are at the heart of what 
makes an individual writer’s work compelling,” a locative ethos is able to account for both (667).  
A locative ethos considers how the writer locates herself within a particular discourse 
community (thereby accounting for the agency of the writer) while also attending to how that 
community acts upon the writer (thereby accounting for the social).  A located writer exercises 
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agency in the choices made in the text yet also is subject to the social, cultural, political, and 
rhetorical forces acting upon her.   
Seeking to “look closely at the particular ways in which writers establish authority for 
themselves through defining and redefining their evolving positions in particular communities,” 
Christoph offers a case study pulled from autobiographies of nineteenth-century American 
pioneer women (668).  In these autobiographies, Christoph identifies three “strategies of 
placement,” ways the writers locate themselves and, consequently, locate an ethos.  The first are 
“identity statements in which a writer explicitly refers to some facet of her self-identity as a 
person affiliated with a particular place or community, saying in effect, I am a _____” (670).  
Identity statements are a rich source for ethical appeal because they are often contradictory––a 
writer may, in Christoph’s example, identify with her friends on the East Coast while speaking of 
her job on her western farm––such that “different affiliations approach and recede from the 
foreground depending on the circumstances” (671).  Identity statements situate the speaker in 
multiple locations at once, challenging the notion of a speaker with a monolithic ethos.  The 
second strategy of placement is the “moral display,” wherein the writer “connect[s] with the 
moral standards of the community and … establish[es] trust through demonstrating similar 
values” (671).  The third strategy of placement is “material associations,” wherein a writer 
locates herself within particularities of her lived experience in a given locale “through the 
references they make to particular possessions, the maxims and regional terms they use, and the 
kinds of education they imply having experienced” (671).  I note that these three strategies are 
largely content-based: in Christoph’s analysis, it is what the pioneer woman says through identity 
statements, moral displays, and material associations that locates her in the American west.  
 160 
A decade later, Risa Applegarth furthered this understanding of ethos by turning to genre 
theory.  In “Genre, Location, and Mary Austin’s Ethos,” Applegarth argues that “location, a 
richly layered term that includes one’s material environment as well as the social and symbolic 
processes that imbue environments with meaning, shapes who one becomes and how one 
communicates with others” (43, emphasis Applegarth’s).  This understanding of a situated ethos 
draws upon the rhetor’s “participation in particular communities and their habituation, within 
places” (43, emphasis Applegarth’s).  Applegarth places Halloran, Reynolds, and Christoph 
alongside Charles Bazerman and Anis Bawarshi to argue genre is one of these situated places 
from which a rhetor speaks: “Ethos traces a boundary between individual, strategic performance 
and the constraints of social norms; this same tension between strategy and convention is 
emphasized in contemporary theories that conceptualize genres as locations” (45).  Genre theory 
allows Applegarth not only to theorize ethos as a matter of engaging the conventions and values 
of a particular discourse and a community, but also to emphasize the dynamic and responsive 
capacities of both genre and ethos.  
As a case study, Applegarth reads acclaimed nature writer Mary Austin.  Austin, in 
Applegarth’s analysis, uses three strategies to “[foreground] her location in the U.S. west and 
[exploit] this location for ethos, positioning her narrator as a desert insider, enjoying intimacy 
with and access to spaces that her readers lack” (53).  The first strategy is “attestation” whereby 
Austin witnesses the land first-hand.  For example, Austin attests, “I have seen badgers drinking 
about the hour when the light takes on the yellow tinge it has from coming slantwise through the 
hills” (Austin 14 qtd. in Applegarth 55).  With such statements, Austin distances herself from 
“secondhand knowledge of the desert,” her observations ones that only someone in the desert 
could make (55).  Second, Austin describes the desert in vivid detail.  Applegarth provides a 
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number of examples from Austin’s prose: hills “blunt, burned, squeezed up out of chaos,” 
valleys “drowned” in haze, evaporated pools “dark and bitter, rimmed about with the 
efflorescence of alkaline deposits” (Austin 1 qtd. in Applegarth 56-57).  With each, Austin 
presents the “violence and danger of the desert” and consequently “affirm[s] her narrator as anti-
sentimental, capable of seeing and recounting frankly a land where death and danger are 
ubiquitous” (57).  And third, Austin compares the desert to the world her east coast readers know.  
As an example, Applegarth points to Austin’s frequent acknowledgments of the vastness of the 
desert, a vastness unknown by Austin’s east coast readers, a vastness suggested when Austin 
speaks of a nearby town as “three days from anywhere in particular” (Austin 39 qtd. in 
Applegarth 57).  Such statements, Applegarth argues, show that “the desert exists on a larger 
scale than that experienced by [Austin’s] readers” (57).  Comparison abounds in Land of Little 
Rain, Austin “emphasizing her reader’s distance from the desert” (58, emphasis Applegarth’s).  
Just as Christoph’s strategies of placement are content-based, so too are the strategies 
Applegarth identifies in Austin’s writing.  When Austin attests to what she has seen, when she 
describes her first-hand observations of the desert, when she compares that desert to the world of 
her readers, Austin relies upon the starkness, the danger, the beauty of the desert––the content of 
her sentences––to locate her ethos.  Yet, within both Applegarth and Christoph’s triads, there are 
avenues into considering the work of style in locating a writer.  Consider, for instance, how 
Applegarth’s strategies are rhetorical figures of thought.  Attesting to the desert, offering first-
hand observations of it, is the rhetorical figure enargia, which Lanham defines as “a generic term 
for visually powerful, vivid description which recreates something or someone, as several 
theorists say, ‘before your very eyes’” (Handlist 64).  Austin’s descriptions of the desert fall 
under the rhetorical figures of thought topographia or geographia––descriptions of the earth––
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both of which Lanham notes are variants of the aforementioned enargia (Handlist 81; see also 
Applegarth 56).  And Austin’s comparisons of the east coast to the American west are 
comparatio, “comparison in the general sense” (38).  Austin’s use of rhetorical figures of thought 
evidence how language use can be a locative device, one that situates its writer in a particular 
place.   
So too, in Christoph’s strategies of placement, there is an opening to consider the work of 
the sentence.  Christoph notes that material associations can include “linguistic tools, such as 
uses of maxims, intertextual references, and regional language,” each of which locating an 
individual within a community within a location (672).  She gives a few examples: a writer who 
adopts a colloquialism––“my husband’s better judgment gave way to his sand, (as the old 
Colorado settlers say)”––and a writer who adopts the regional “word ‘vamos’ in narrating her 
experiences during the California Gold Rush” (673, emphasis Christoph’s).  With each, the 
writer appropriates the regional language of the American West, this appropriation a matter of 
the social that touches upon class and race issues.  This work happens through a revision of the 
sentence, in the shift from an east coast way of saying something to how someone in the desert 
might say it, and this sentence-level revision suggests delivery can be a means of locating a 
writer.  The pioneer women adopt the phrasings of a particular region; they adopt the culturally 
sanctioned ways to deliver discourse, and by so doing, they locate themselves within that 
community.  The language comes from within the scene––just as it does for students writing for 
the academy. 7 
                                                
7 For others thinking about the locative ethos, see Michael Hyde’s introduction to The Ethos of 
Rhetoric, which traces ethos from Isocrates to Aristotle to Heidegger’s notion of dwelling.  See 
also LeFevre, who uses Halloran’s definition of ethos as a gathering place to argue the text itself 
is one such place where reader and writer gather (45-46). 
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I’ve been working with etymology this chapter, and I offer two more.  I am well aware of 
the etymological fallacy––the mistaken notion that words ought to retain their original 
meanings––yet these etymologies are instructive when thinking about how language use might 
situate its writer within a text.  Composition derives from the Latin prefix com– meaning 
“together” and the verb ponere meaning “to place.”  Composition is the act of placing things 
together.  Elocutio, the Latin for the rhetorical canon of style, has a similar etymology, deriving 
from the prefix e– meaning “out of” and a variation of locus, meaning “place.”  Style is language 
coming “out of a place.”  Carl Holmberg looks to this etymology and suggests the place in 
question is the stage, hence the overlap between elocutio and our modern word elocution (137).  
That may be––but there is more here.  Ethos, componere, and elocutio all rest upon a theory of 
language bound up in situated discourse.  It is a theory of language evident in the pioneer woman 
who adopts the language of the American west, or of Coles’s student who knows to say “run the 
rack” when shooting pool.  It is a theory of language wherein the text is a gathering place, a 
haunt, an abode (ethos) wherein ideas are placed together (componere) by a writer operating out 
of a particular place (elocutio).  
I recall the Fish of my epigraph, who argues that sentences are more than mere 
performances of a writer’s virtuosity.  Sentences, according to Fish, “organize the world into 
manageable, and in some sense, artificial, units”––that is, they place together (compose) the 
elements of a writer’s world, such that they “can then be inhabited and manipulated” (How to 
Write 7).  In this claim, I see both notions of ethos I’ve been discussing.  A habituated ethos 
appears in Fish’s assertion that sentences offer “nothing less than lessons and practice in the 
organization of the world”: students learn though the repeated––and repetitious––act of placing 
subject, verb, and object together, time and time again, how to piece together the world using 
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language.  A locative ethos appears in Fish’s assertion that those sentences––those worlds 
composed, placed together, by syntax––can then be “inhabited.”  This inhabitation is possible 
only by the habits ingrained by writing sentences.   
In Chapter Two, I discussed how Tufte’s reading of the sentence brings forth its 
performativity, the ways in which the sentence moves on the page and the reader’s role in 
activating that performance.  In Chapter Three, I considered how the display of a sentence 
locates the writer within a particular discourse.  But Coles does not attend to matters of grammar; 
his discussions hinge on the use of “run the rack” or the presence of Steve.  Here, in Chapter 
Four, I turn now to the role of syntax in locating the writer within that discourse.  This syntactic 
self is both the product of habit (as the Fish of my epigraph suggests) but so too of location, 
bringing together these two conceptions of ethos, revisiting again Coles and Tufte’s unease with 
the role of habit in writing instruction.  It is a syntactic self inhabiting the sentence.   
 
4.2 READING GRAFF AND BIRKENSTEIN READING SENTENCES 
 
Reynolds asks that teachers move ethos to a central position within their classroom and “[attend] 
to the rhetorical strategies writers use to locate themselves, their texts, and the particular 
discursive communities they are mediating within and between” (333).  Though not written in 
response to Reynolds, Gerald Graff and Cathy Birkenstein’s bestselling textbook They Say / I 
Say: The Moves that Matter in Academic Writing strongly answers her call.8  The book, now in 
                                                
8 Another way to trace the influence of the locative ethos would be through the emergence of 
ecocomposition.  I would begin with Marilyn Cooper’s 1986 “The Ecology of Writing” and 
move to Weisser and Dobrin’s 2001 edited collection Ecocomposition: Theoretical and 
Pedagogical Approaches followed by Vandenberg, Hum, and Clary-Lemon’s 2006 edited 
collection Relations, Locations, Positions: Composition Theory for Writing Teachers, all of 
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its third edition, does not use any Greek or Latin rhetorical terms; the word ethos does not appear 
once in the text; Graff and Birkenstein are not at all concerned with its etymological recuperation.  
But the book is, in my reading of it, first and foremost a book about a syntactic self, a self set in 
relation to others by way of internalized linguistic forms. 
Graff and Birkenstein claim, “all writers rely on certain stock formulas that they 
themselves didn’t invent” (xviii).  They Say / I Say teaches those formulas, formulas “so 
commonly used that they can be represented in model templates that students can use to structure 
and even generate what they want to say” (xviii).9  The student learns the valued forms of 
argumentation within a community, and by learning these moves, the student gains entry into 
that community’s way of talking, its way of thinking, its way of being.  The first part of the book, 
“They Say,” has three chapters (“They Say,” “Her Point Is,” and “As He Himself Puts It”) that 
teach templates of summary, paraphrase, and quotation.  The second part, “I Say,” has four 
chapters (“Yes / No / Okay, But,” “And Yet,” “Skeptics May Object,” and “So What? Who 
Cares?”) that teach the templates that facilitate response to the They of part one.10  Early in the 
book, Graff and Birkenstein offer an example paragraph composed of templates:  
                                                                                                                                                       
which address the relationship between writer and place.  I would also look to two special issues 
in College Composition and Communication devoted to “Locations of Writing” (66.1 and 66.2).  
Editor Kathleen Yancey introduces the issues’ central questions: “Where do we write?  And what 
difference, if any, does the location of our writing make?  How does our location influence what 
we write and how we share our writing?  And what about our own located-ness?” (5).  The 
special issues of CCC do not frame themselves as ecocomposition, nor do they frame themselves 
as addressing ethos, but the central issue addressed––how places of writing affect the writing 
itself––draw upon both ethos and ecocomposition.  
 
9 In his 2003 Clueless in Academe, Graff offers a similar pedagogy for writing instruction 
predicated upon templates.  See, in particular, chapter 8, “Why Johnny Can’t Argue.”  
 
10 There are two other parts to They Say / I Say addressing revision, writing in the disciplines, the 
moves of classroom discussion, and other sundry topics.  They are beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
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In recent discussions of _____, a controversial issue has been whether _____.  On 
the one hand, some argue that _____.  From this perspective, _____.  On the other 
hand, however, others argue that _____.  In the words of _____, one of this 
view’s main proponents, “_____.”  According to this view, _____.  In sum, then, 
the issue is whether _____ or _____. 
My own view is that _____.  Though I concede that _____, I still maintain 
that _____.  For example, _____.  Although some might object that _____, I 
would reply that _____.  The issue is important because _____.  (9) 
At first glance, this template-paragraph seems cutesy, gimmicky even, an academic Mad Libs.  
And it may look somewhat familiar, an academic version of the Themewriting game, where the 
students learn how to put pieces together to create discourse (see Coles The Plural I 34-42; see 
also Chapter Three of this dissertation).  But Graff and Birkenstein do not present this particular 
paragraph as a model for imitation.  The paragraph shows how these templates can structure 
sentences, paragraphs, pages, essays, chapters, even entire books.  The paragraph also illustrates 
how common these templates are in writing (and speaking too), the phrases part of the workaday 
language of academic prose.  In highlighting this metatext for students, Graff and Birkenstein 
demystify academic prose, showing that it is a matter of learning simple moves, moves that can 
then become generative for the student’s own writing.  The student may not feel especially smart, 
but if he can learn these moves, he can fill the templates with his own ideas, deliver them in 
ways the academy approves of, and thereby gain access into academic discourse.11   
                                                
11 Peter Elbow offers an alternative route into academic discourse, advocating students write first 
in their “mother tongue” and then revise into Standard Written English.  See “Inviting the 
Mother Tongue: Beyond ‘Mistakes,’ ‘Bad English,’ and ‘Wrong Language.’ ”  See also his 2012 
Vernacular Eloquence.  Space and time constrain me from following this line of inquiry, but in 
revision of this project Elbow’s work will likely become a point of reference.  
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  They Say / I Say teaches students to speak as we do, to move on the page as we do; the 
book invites students into the academic community by teaching the delivery it values.  The 
delivery is based on habit, on internalizing these moves: “Once you get used to using [the 
templates], you can even dispense with them altogether, for the rhetorical moves they model will 
be at your fingertips in an unconscious, instinctive way” (11).  And these moves create a self 
situated in location to others.  Graff and Birkenstein claim the most distinctive characteristic of 
academic writing is how it sets ideas in relation to one another (xvi).  In some regards, their 
pedagogy is no different than Coles’s: both concern themselves with how the student is located 
within the text: each teaches a particular way of speaking within a particular community.  Yet 
theirs is a significant step in a different direction.  Coles strays from grammar and syntax while 
Graff and Birkenstein base their project on it.  Theirs is a stylistics harkening back to the Golden 
Age of Style in its valuing of the sentence, though very much grounded in post-structuralist 
understandings of how the self is construed by its social, cultural, and political––and, as their 
textbook teaches, grammatical––relationships.   
This valuing of relationships is evident in Graff and Birkenstein’s claim that the “They 
say / I say” move “represents the deep, underlying structure, the internal DNA as it were, of all 
effective argument”––hence its use as the book’s title (xix).  This pedagogy implies that the 
marker of a good argument is not necessarily logic, or a parade of evidence, or the status of the 
writer, but instead the writer’s use of sources––how the writer situates her argument in relation to 
others.  (In this sense, the book teaches an Austin-esque performative writing where the 
constative statements themselves do not matter as much as how the writer performs them on the 
page.)  Graff and Birkenstein elaborate: “Effective persuasive writers do more than make well-
supported claims (‘I say’); they also map those claims relative to the claims of others (‘they say’)” 
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(xix).  Note the metaphors of place; these writers map their claims relative to others.  This is a 
syntactic self set in relation to others, a product of learning templates through repetition, through 
habit.   
While the templates situate the writer in relation to texts and ideas, a concern late in the 
book is how the writer situates herself in relation to the reader.  Because “it is your job as a 
writer to do the hard work of making connections rather than … leaving this work to your 
readers,” Graff and Birkenstein recommend students utilize metatext, particularly transitions 
(108).12  Transitions, according to Graff and Birkenstein, help readers connect paragraphs and 
ideas.  “More specifically, transitions tell readers whether your text is echoing a previous 
sentence or paragraph (‘in other words’), adding something to it (‘in addition’), offering an 
example of it (‘for example’), generalizing from it (‘as a result’), or modifying it (‘and yet’)” 
(109).  Graff and Birkenstein list a number of transitions under the headings of particular moves.  
Under Addition, they include “also, and, besides, furthermore, in addition, indeed, moreover, so 
too” (109).  Under Elaboration, they include “actually, by extension, in other words, in short, that 
is, to put it another way, to put it bluntly, to put it succinctly, ultimately” (109).  Graff and 
Birkenstein continue, listing 51 more transition words under the headings of Example, Cause and 
Effect, Comparison, Contrast, Concession, Conclusion.13  Framing metatext as a gesture of 
                                                
12 Graff and Birkenstein offer additional means to guide the reader, such as “pointing words” that 
“point or refer backward to some concept in the previous sentence,” words like this, these, that, 
those, their, and such (112-13).  Graff and Birkenstein also recommend repeating key words, 
phrases, and ideas throughout a text (114-18).  Pointing words and repetition establish coherence 
in a text, orienting the reader to the moves a writer makes within that text.  
 
13 There is a resonance between the list of transitions Graff and Birkenstein provide and the five 
“classes of utterance, classified according to their illocutionary force” Austin provides in Lecture 
XII of How to Do Things with Words (151).  Austin groups his illocutionary acts under the 
headings of Verdictives, Exercitives, Commissives, Behabitives, and Expositives.  For example, 
the Verdictive, wherein a “jury, arbitrator, or umpire” gives a verdict (151), includes such actions, 
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goodwill toward the reader, Graff and Birkenstein teach that transitions “guide readers through 
the twists and turns of your argument,” lending a hand to the reader, ushering him through the 
prose, standing as signposts to the main movements of a piece of writing (111).14    
Transitions have an additional purpose: ensuring the writer has an argument in the first 
place.  Graff and Birkenstein claim “it’s hard to use [transitions] without making some kind of 
argument” (111).  They point to how a “therefore” pushes the writer toward a conclusion, how a 
“for example” necessitates an illustration.  Such transitions not only signal to readers how and 
where an argument progresses, but also force the writer into following that path as well.  Graff 
and Birkenstein’s lesson in transitions can be read as both a lesson in writing and in reading.  
Reading for transition words can help the student follow an academic text more easily, using 
transition words to guide herself through the text, to orient herself to the moves the argument 
makes.  So too, those transitions can then help the student in writing her own text, the terms 
themselves ensuring she makes an argument and locates herself in relation to the work and words 
of others.  
                                                                                                                                                       
among others, as “acquit, hold (as a matter of law), read it as, reckon, place, put it at, grade, 
assess, characterize” (153).  Although Graff and Birkenstein list adverbs and Austin lists verbs, 
both provide taxonomic treatments of things one might do with words.  That is, both list 
performative moves in language––the performances of various verbs and the performances of 
various adverbs.  In this sense of taxonomizing the possible performances of language, Graff and 
Birkenstein’s transitions and Austin’s classes of utterance are not unlike Aristotle’s 28 common 
topics for argumentation––the topoi––listed in the Rhetoric (2.23).  Aristotle’s topoi, Austin’s 
illocutionary acts, and Graff and Birkenstein’s transitions all catalogue rhetorical uses of 
language, each with an eye toward invention.  
 
14 It is not uncommon to frame metatext as a matter of goodwill.  In their textbook Rhetorical 
Grammar: Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects, Martha Kolln and Loretta Gray claim, 
“[M]etadiscourse markers send messages to the reader from and about the writer.  They say, in 
effect, ‘I’m helping you out here, trying to make your job of reading and understanding easier’ ” 
(132).  Joseph Harris, in his textbook Rewriting: How to Do Things with Texts: “Metatext lets 
you speak directly to your readers, to say to them, in effect, Here’s why I’m approaching this 
subject this way. … [Metatext] help[s] your readers understand your text from your point of view” 
(90-91, emphasis Harris’s).   
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That a writer can locate herself in a piece of writing by transitions is not surprising.  
Transitions are adverbs.  Adverbs denote, among other things, place and time––that is, the Where 
and the When.  These are clues to the context governing a rhetorical situation, and they point to 
the classical notion of kairos, the sense of timing, of context, essential to rhetorical practice.  
Kairos concerns context; context concerns when and where; when and where are the 
grammatical province of the adverb.  Yes, there are other parts of writing that point to the 
rhetorical situation––the formality of the prose, its diction, its formatting, its generic demands, its 
medium, etc., etc.––but in terms of syntax, the adverb most readily tells readers when and where 
something occurs.  In this sense of providing temporal and spatial information, the adverb orients 
a reader and writer to each other and to the text, the adverb the metatext of kairos.15 
Adverbs, in Graff and Birkenstein’s teaching, are essential to academic writing whose 
defining characteristic is the way it sets itself in relation to other ideas.16  Theirs is not a critical 
project of praise and blame (as Coles’s is), but instead one of function, of utility.  Theirs is the 
pragmatic to Coles’s epideictic.  It is perhaps an answer to a pedagogy like Coles’s that claims to 
be about writing but is about criticism; Graff and Birkenstein’s is very much about writing, their 
                                                
15 I can also see pursing the question of a locative syntax through the conjunctions “and” and 
“but.”  Consider Stanley Fish, who argues transitions do little for a piece of writing; it is the 
conjunction, that propels prose: “Rather than indicating the logical progression of thought, 
connectives such as ‘thus’ and ‘so’ are just place markers; ‘but’ and ‘and’ are the words that 
carry the experience forward, the first signaling a thought going in a new direction, the second 
saying ‘and, oh, this has just occurred to me” (How to Write 62).  Punctuation, too, can be read 
as a means of orientation, as can paragraph breaks; each signals the large movements of a piece 
of writing.  Another line of inquiry could consider the preposition as a locative, kairotic device, 
as it sets nouns in relation one to another––above, below, in, out, beside, with, under, etc.  Or 
consider the parenthetical citation, which tells readers where and when a writer found the words 
of others, thereby locating the writer both within the text she cites while also locating the reader 
in relation to that ongoing conversation.  The locative possibilities of conjunctions, punctuation, 
paragraph breaks, prepositions, and parenthetical citation are beyond the scope of this chapter.  
 
16 See also Joseph Harris, Rewriting: How to Do Things with Words (2).   
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students looking to their sentences and rewriting them, experimenting with sentence forms and 
templates, attending to their prose and how it locates them within the academy and within the 
discussions they enter.  
They Say / I Say is popular not only for the practicality of its templates, but more so, I 
argue, for the novelty and effectiveness of this pedagogy of the adverb.  Graff and Birkenstein 
offer a pedagogy of kairos bound with a locative and habituated ethos.  In its implicit reliance 
upon theories gleaned from classical rhetoric, They Say / I Say pulls from a rich rhetorical 
tradition, appropriating it without the heavy-handedness of, say, Corbett’s Classical Rhetoric for 
the Modern Student.  In its reliance upon internalizing templates, They Say / I Say draws upon 
Composition’s long-since set aside work with the sentence during the 1960s-80s.  The insistence 
in They Say / I Say on the work of the sentence has a nostalgia about it: the templates are forms a 
student can internalize, forms that can be manipulated, worked with, revised, rewritten.  They 
Say / I Say is not billed as a book on sentence-level instruction, yet its avenue into teaching what 
it means to write for the academy and how a student learns to do so is through the sentence, the 
sentence very much the centerpiece of a pedagogy that seems to be addressing issues much 
larger than the lowly sentence––how to engage sources, how to respond to those sources, the art 
of summary, organization, etc.  And so too, in its reliance upon an understanding of rhetoric as a 
necessarily socially and textually situated practice, one wherein the writer always works in 
relation to others and always sets her words in relation to the words of others, They Say / I Say 
utilizes recent rhetorical theory––well-articulated by Christoph and her critique of both Aristotle 
and post-structuralism––that emphasizes the role of the social in writing while still retaining a 
sense of the agency of the individual writer.  They Say / I Say pulls all this together––kairos, 
ethos, and classical rhetoric; the work of the sentence; current understandings of the social 
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construction of writing––to present a theory of writing wherein the moves made at the sentence 
level are the means by which a writer engages a community by setting ideas together 
(composition), speaking from a place (elocutio), and inhabiting that place (ethos).17  
 
4.3  READING KLINKENBORG READING SENTENCES 
 
And yet, this pedagogy of the adverb is problematic.  Graff and Birkenstein briefly acknowledge 
this, cautioning that writers must not “insert transitions without really thinking through their 
meanings” (112), but I want to push the point further.  They Say / I Say offers the moves that 
matter in academic writing––that is, they develop a limited system that offers guidance for 
writing within the particularities of the academy––and I won’t fault them for the narrow scope of 
their project.  I do, however, want to think through how this locative metatext might hinder the 
writer’s ability to perform, to display, to deliver the sentence, and what this locative metatext 
assumes about the reader-writer relationship.  To do so, I turn to another figure located at the 
fringes of Composition, Verlyn Klinkenborg.   
Klinkenborg took his Ph.D. from Princeton in 1982.  He wrote a dissertation titled 
“Canon and Literary Criticism” that used Matthew Arnold, Northrop Frye, and Harold Bloom to 
examine canonicity in both the Biblical and the secular sense.18  Though Klinkenborg has this 
                                                
17 For two textbooks teaching metatext along similar lines as Graff and Birkenstein, see Martha 
Kolln and Loretta Gray’s Rhetorical Grammar: Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects, and 
also Joseph Harris’s Rewriting: How to Do Things with Texts.   
 
18 Klinkenborg’s dissertation was co-chaired by Charles Ryskamp and Arthur Walton Litz, Jr.  
“Canon and Literary Criticism” grew out of an earlier archival project where Klinkenborg sorted 
through some 20,000 to 25,000 British literary manuscripts and selected 260 to catalogue for the 
Pierpont Morgan Library in New York.  The project also required “providing a rational for 
including those manuscripts whose inclusion was not immediately assumed” (“Canon” x).  The 
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literary training, he has taught creative writing for over 30 years––at Harvard, St. Olaf, Fordham, 
and Yale, among others––while sitting on the editorial board for the New York Times.19  In 2012, 
Knopf published Klinkenborg’s Several Short Sentences about Writing.  The product of “years 
and years and years of teaching,” Several Short Sentences about Writing attempts to distill a 
semester’s worth of writing instruction into a book that is “encouraging to the reader and yet at 
the same time is still honest with the reader about what writing really means” (Klinkenborg 
“Book Nook”).  
In its prologue, Klinkenborg characterizes his project: “The premise of this book is that 
most of the received wisdom about how writing works is not only wrong but harmful.  This is 
not an assumption.  It’s a conclusion” (1).  This is a book of resistance.  Klinkenborg 
immediately positions himself in relation to the shared values of the writing community––both 
its teachers and its practitioners––and rather than parrot conventional wisdom, Klinkenborg 
unravels it.  (He is not unlike Coles pushing against the Theme, or Tufte, late in her career, 
pushing against Habit.)  Klinkenborg speaks of his own struggle to “overcome my academic 
training, which taught me to write in a way that was useless to me (and almost everyone else)”; 
                                                                                                                                                       
process prompted questions of canonicity, and it lead to both Klinkenborg’s dissertation and his 
editing of British Literary Manuscripts: Series I and II.  
 
19 His NYT pieces blend occasional short editorials on sentence craft and the teaching of writing 
with more regular essays on farming and rural life.  Klinkenborg’s column, “The Rural Life,” ran 
16 years in the NYT.  Its final piece was published Christmas 2013.  (Klinkenborg’s regular 
column ended the same week as Stanley Fish’s; both were casualties of a five percent cut at the 
Times [Kassel]).  The column produced two collections, The Rural Life and More Scenes from 
The Rural Life.  The former devotes a chapter to each month of the year; the latter devotes a 
chapter to a full year, the book covering 11 years on the farm.  His editorials often drew the ire of 
Gawker columnist Hamilton Nolan, who reads Klinkenborg as a navel-gazer: “The very worst 
part of Verlyn Klinkenborg’s shtick is the pose that he is writing about something more 
grounded and timeless and real than the average columnist who is mired in the day-to-day 
vagaries of city life, when in fact his form of nature fetishization is the most pretentious content 
in the entire NYT op-ed section” (n. pag., emphasis Nolan’s).   
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this was a process of “unlearning,” Klinkenborg acting as an autodidactic “teaching myself to 
write well” (1-2).20   Klinkenborg signals that his readers are not to give his teaching too much 
authority: “This book isn’t meant to replace received wisdom.  ‘Received’ means untested, 
untried, repeated out of habit.  Everything in this book is meant to be tested all over again, by 
you” (2).   I note Klinkenborg’s use of “received wisdom” and “habit”: habit forms the self into a 
particular writer, one who writes––for better and for worse––in accord with the discursive values 
of the community.  This is the trite and banal discourse critics of the epideictic warn against.   
 To resist how writing is most often taught, Klinkenborg turns to the short sentence by 
writing short sentences himself.  The opening paragraph of his book:  
  Here, in short, is what I want to tell you. 
  Know what each sentence says, 
  What it doesn’t say, 
  And what it implies. 
  Of these, the hardest is knowing what each sentence actually says.  (3) 
This initial assertion does not seem to buck the system as Klinkenborg promised, in the prologue, 
that he would.  Yes, a writer should know what her sentences say.  But in the presentation of this 
claim, Klinkenborg is already working against the received wisdom of the writing classroom.  
Notice the way Klinkenborg presents his sentences on the page.  Later in Several Short Sentences 
                                                
20 Klinkenborg says the best writing lesson he ever received was from Robert Gottlieb, editor of 
The New Yorker.  Gottlieb asked Klinkenborg to cut his book The Last Fine Time from 90,000 to 
20,000 words, because the text was “too tightly woven to excerpt” for The New Yorker (Wolper, 
n. pag.).  Gottlieb also asked Klinkenborg to “detumesce” the writing.  “It wasn’t a piece of 
writing advice,” Klinkenborg says, “but an instruction in refinement.  What I learned about my 
own excesses and what’s necessary for narrative––it was just a fabulous exercise, to force me to 
go back and reexamine a book I’d just written” (qtd. in Gassó, n. pag.).  The experience was not 
only formative for Klinkenborg as a writer, but also it “changed my ability as a teacher 
dramatically” (qtd. in Wolper, n. pag.).  
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about Writing, he explains his rationale, his formatting a means “to make your prose look less 
familiar”:  
  Turn every sentence into its own paragraph. 
(Hit Return after every period.  If writing by hand, begin each new 
sentence at the left margin.) 
  What happens? 
  A sudden, graphic display of the length of your sentences 
And, better yet, their relative length––how it varies, or doesn’t vary, from one to 
the next. 
Variation is the life of prose, in length and in structure.  
Having all your sentences in a column, one above the other, makes them easier to 
examine. 
Suddenly you see similarities in shape. 
You notice, for instance, how your sentences cling to each other 
Instead of accepting their separateness. 
And you can begin to ask questions––simple ones––that will help you understand 
how to revise 
And make better sentences.  (55-56) 
Klinkenborg strives to make prose look less familiar because only then can a writer begin to see 
what the sentences actually say. It is too easy, Klinkenborg argues, to be lulled into writing 
“volunteer sentences,” sentences that offer up a shape and a meaning readily, sentences that 
hijack a writer’s ability to say something with nuance, with precision (44-47).21  These are the 
                                                
21 I address volunteer sentences in the Interchapter, “The Sentence, Displayed.”  
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sentences of the Theme, the sentences written out of the Habit that Tufte resists, sentences like 
Fish inside of Updike’s syntax, sentences Fish could keep on writing “forever” (How to Write 
10).  Klinkenborg’s formatting allows the writer to address meaning while working against the 
pressures of conventional language and the volunteer sentences that so easily take over prose. 
Not only modeling how presentation leads to an interrogation of sentence craft, so too 
Klinkenborg taps into delivery-as-display––the very act of showing forth his prose an act of 
resistance, his delivery working against uniformity and ever toward variety.22 
This unconventional presentation facilitates the writer’s ability to ask questions of her 
prose, as the prose and its craft are more visible.  By his own admission, the questions 
Klinkenborg wants a writer to ask are “basic” (57)–– 
 How many sentences begin with the subject? 
 How many begin with an opening phrase before the subject? 
  Or with a word like “When” or “Since” or “While” or “Because”? 
  How many begin with “There” or “It”?  (56) 
––and he offers two dozen questions along these lines.  Klinkenborg does not advocate a 
sentence-level pedagogy founded upon strict adherence to the rules of grammar.  Rather, he 
wants his students to observe their prose and what it does on the page, attentive to what those 
sentences actually say.  This is a pedagogy of noticing (36-44), wherein “The most valuable 
thoughts may begin ‘I don’t know if this is important, but …’ or ‘This will sound like 
                                                
22 In a radio interview with Vick Mickunas of WYSO-FM, Klinkenborg gives another reason for 
his formatting: “It allows me to put emphasis on the things I want to put emphasis on in a way 
that’s a little simpler than the ways you’d normally do it in prose with italics or exclamation 
marks or that sort of thing” (“Book Nook”). 
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nitpicking’ ” (150-51).  The formatting of Klinkenborg’s prose teaches how to read sentences 
with the question “Why is this sentence this way and not another way?” guiding the way (34).  
To help his readers write with that question in mind, Klinkenborg turns to the short 
sentence. 
 At first, it will help to make short sentences, 
  Short enough to feel the variations in length. 
  Leave space between them for the things that words can’t really say.  (3) 23 
Klinkenborg knows this idea is unwelcome.  Again setting himself askance from conventional 
wisdom, Klinkenborg writes, “You’ve been taught to believe that short sentences are childish, / 
Merely a first step toward writing longer sentences” (5).  But short sentences have value, able to 
“[C]arry you back to a prose you can control,” able to “make it easier to examine the properties 
of the sentence” (9).  In contrast, the long sentence puts writers in “a wilderness of false 
assumptions and bad habits, / A desert of jargon and weak constructions, a land of linguistic 
barbarism” (5).  Klinkenborg claims “Clarity and directness” suffer from the onslaught of 
“clichés and meaningless phrases” that take over the prose (5).  Bloated, long sentences “can 
sound quite grown up, quite authoritative, in the manner of college professors and journalists and 
experts in every field” (5).  That authority comes from the clichés and the meaningless phrases, 
from the received language that the writer parrots.  But Klinkenborg asks, “How well do they 
                                                
23 An easy critique of Klinkenborg: some of his sentences are long, and he himself does not stick 
to the six- or seven-word sentence that he recommends his students write (“Some Suggestions”).  
This critique misses the point of the lesson Klinkenborg is teaching; he nevertheless offers a 
response: “You’ll make long sentences again, but they’ll be short sentences at heart. / Sentences 
listening for the silence around them.  Listening for their own pulse” (5).  That is, after practice 
writing short sentences, the writer’s long sentences will retain the compact punch, efficiency, and 
tautness of the six-word sentence.   
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write? / How much do you enjoy reading them?” (5).24  Klinkenborg’s concern is not with an 
authority gained from the posturing that comes with using the language passed down from 
others; rather, he is concerned with the reader’s experience.  
 And the reader’s experience, according to Klinkenborg, is one of searching for the writer, 
for some sense of a writerly presence within the text:  
  You’ve been told again and again that you have to seduce the reader, 
  Sell the story in the first paragraph. 
   (Nonsense, but it explains a lot of bad writing.)  
  The reader isn’t looking for the tease of a single paragraph, 
  Or numbingly clever prose, or sentences full of self-exhibition. 
  The reader is in love with continuity, with extent, with duration, 
Above all with presence––the feeling that each sentence isn’t merely a static 
construction but inhabited by the writer.  (128, emphasis Klinkenborg’s) 
Klinkenborg believes a writer’s authority comes not from whomever the writer cites or even 
from the writer herself, but from the reader.  Because the reader can stop at any time, any shred 
of authority the writer has is granted by the reader’s goodwill to continue reading.  What keeps a 
reader reading, and consequently what contributes to the writer’s authority, is not flashy and 
seductive prose but prose “inhabited by the writer.”   
Klinkenborg’s use of “static” alludes to how such inhabitation might happen.  Static 
suggests stiffness, rigidity––the opposite of movement, vivacity, life, dynamic.  To move away 
                                                
24 Some readers do, in fact, enjoy reading the prose of a “college professor, a journalist, or an 
expert in some field” (Klinkenborg 5).  See, for instance, Eric Hayot’s “Academic Writing, I 
Love You. Really, I Do” for a rousing defense of academese.  Hayot argues that the metatext, 
footnotes, and obfuscation so characteristic of academic prose serve a rhetorical purpose and 
enable a particular type of thinking.  His essay is a smart defense of difficulty.  See also Hayot’s 
The Elements of Academic Style: Writing for the Humanities.  
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from lifeless writing, Klinkenborg turns to rhythm as a writer’s means to inhabit prose, to make 
it more than a static construction. 
 Rhythm comes to the reader as a precursor of many things. 
 It anticipates the intelligibility of the sentence. 
 It grounds the tongue and the mind. 
 It creates balance and propulsion. 
 It’s deeply assuring and worth getting right.  (129) 
In linking rhythm––something bodily, the product of delivery––to intelligibility, Klinkenborg 
builds upon the argument made through the formatting of his prose: the delivery of a sentence is 
directly connected to its meaning.  He argues rhythm is “worth getting right” because rhythm is 
created through choices––this word instead of that word, this adverb here instead of there, this 
word repeated but that one not.   
Writing is always a gesture requiring your dramatic presence, no matter how 
subtle––  
A presence made up of rhetorical choices: 
Choices about how you are in relation to your subject and reader, 
Choices about your presence in the piece, about diction, structure, and the rigor or 
casualness with which your sentences are constructed or linked.  (82) 
Klinkenborg claims, “You’re always building a habitation in your prose, / A place from which 
you speak to the reader” (83).  That habitation is built through those choices that affect a writer’s 
presence within the prose, the writer able to inhabit the prose only when it has the continuity, 
extent, duration, and presence that makes it more than a static construct. 
 180 
 Several Short Sentences about Writing is a project of resistance, and here, in 
Klinkenborg’s sense of how a writer might be located within the text, is where resistance comes 
to a head.  It is not so much Klinkenborg’s assertion that rhythm is the means through which a 
writer can inhabit prose.  More so, it is Klinkenborg’s disavowal of metatext as a possible means 
to accomplish that same work.  Klinkenborg presses against the adverb as an agent of kairos, as a 
means of syntactic location.  His reason: metatext foists a false logic upon a text, an obsession 
with argument and rationality that serves no useful purpose to the writer and is an affront to the 
reader.   
  In school you learned to write as if the reader 
  Were in constant danger of getting lost, 
  A problem you were taught to solve not by writing clearly 
  But by shackling your sentences and paragraphs together. 
  Think about transitions. 
  Remember how it goes? 
  Late in the paragraph you prepare for the transition to the next paragraph–– 
  The great leap over the void, across that yawning indentation. 
  You were taught the art of the flying trapeze, 
  But not how to write.  (24) 
When I read this passage, I recall Francis Christensen’s desire for his students: “I want them to 
become sentence acrobats, to dazzle by their syntactic dexterity” (“Generative” 32).25  For 
                                                
25 Christensen’s pedagogy of the generative sentence is not unlike Graff and Birkenstein’s 
templates in that each understands the sentence as a generative space.  For a similar argument 
that form can generate content, see Ross W. Winterowd’s “Style: A Matter of Manner.”   
 Robert Connors, in his account of the demise of sentence-level instruction, notes the 
scrutiny Christensen’s generative sentence faced.  Connors quotes Sabina Thorne Johnson’s 
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Christensen, syntactic dexterity means the ability, and ease, of a student to perform within prose, 
the acrobatics metaphor speaking to that performance.  But for Klinkenborg, acrobatics mean 
something markedly different: flashy performances that mask the poor writing in the paragraphs 
proper.  Such acrobatics necessitate transitions for two reasons: first, because the writing is 
hobbled together and can’t stand as a coherent whole without metatextual jerry-rigging, and 
second, because the writer has a pejorative view of the reader:  
  Nearly everything you’ve been taught about writing   
Assumes that the reader is plodding at best, 
  Always distracted and needing a surfeit of superficial cleverness 
  To keep his head pointed toward the text. 
  You’ll find this assumption all around you. 
  We remove the unfamiliar words for him 
  So he’ll never have the chance to learn them.  
  We over-reason for him, filing our prose with approximations of logic, 
  So he’ll feel he’s had a good think.  (138) 
Transitions are nothing more than “the scatting of rhetorical tics––overused, nearly meaningless 
words and phrases,” according to Klinkenborg (118).26  He lists eleven of them, a list remarkably 
similar to that provided by Graff and Birkenstein: in fact, indeed, on the one hand, on the other 
                                                                                                                                                       
critique of Christensen’s belief that “form can generate content” and her response that “I don’t 
believe it can, especially if the content is of an analytical or critical nature” (159, qtd. in Connors 
“Erasure” 464).  Mocking Christensen’s metaphors of the syntactic acrobatics of his students, A. 
M. Tibbets adds that a focus on forms alone will yield “dexterous rhetorical acrobats who 
dexterously tell untruths” (143, qtd. in Connors “Erasure” 465).  Graff and Birkenstein’s 
pedagogy provides a response to Johnson and Tibbets, especially the mistaken notion that 
attention to form cannot generate critical or analytical content.   
 
26 See also Roger Sale, who notes that adverbs can often be meaningless, the result of “careless” 
use (61). 
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hand, therefore, moreover, however, in one respect, of course, whereas, thus (118).  The 
catalogue is not exhaustive; Klinkenborg gathers the adverbs to make his point:  
  They insist upon logic whether it exists or not. 
  They often come first in the sentence, 
  Trying to steer the reader’s understanding from the front, 
As if the reader were incapable of following a logical shift in the middle of a 
sentence,  
… 
These words take the reader’s head between their hands and force her to look 
where they want her to.  (118) 
There is a tension here between Graff and Birkenstein and Klinkenborg.  The three agree that 
metatext guides the reader, yet Graff and Birkenstein see it as an act of goodwill, one of concern 
for the reader, whereas Klinkenborg sees it as an act of violence, one of force, one that over-
determines how the reader will engage the piece.  Because Klinkenborg believes authority rests 
with the reader (127-28), heavy-handed adverbs overstep the writer’s bounds, violently 
encroaching on the reader’s territory.  
 Klinkenborg will have none of it.  “If a piece is truly assured in its order, no matter how 
connected or oblique, / It needs no logical indicators. / It will be obvious when one sentence 
negates or affirms another” (119).  Clear writing does not need metatext.  Though Graff and 
Birkenstein would argue that it is metatext, in fact, that makes writing clear, Klinkenborg argues 
such words “betray the writer’s anxiety” (119).  In a handout to his students, Klinkenborg writes: 
“If your point is clear and your sentence is clear, its logic will be clear too.  ‘Thus’ is usually an 
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act of utter desperation” (“Some Suggestions”).27  Klinkenborg’s response is characteristic of his 
project as a whole: write short sentences––or, as is often said, “omit needless words.”28  
  A simple experiment: 
  Try removing “but” wherever you can, 
  And see if the sense of negation or contradiction–– 
  The feel of a reversal taking place––isn’t still present.  (119) 
Yet, Klinkenborg does not recommend removing each and every piece of metatext; he teaches its 
judicious use.  Metatext, well placed and well used, “recall[s] the moment, as children, when we 
came upon the phrase / ‘And then one day’ ” (27).  The magic of such phrases resides in “the 
possibilities they contain”: 
  To rise above the level of the prose and look around, 
                                                
27 In On Writing, Stephen King agrees, seeing the adverb as a mark of insecurity: “I’ve spilled 
out my share of adverbs in my time … When I do it, it’s usually for the same reason any writer 
does it because I’m afraid the reader won’t understand me if I don’t” (127).  One response to 
King’s and Klinkenborg’s aversion to adverbs would be to say that both are “creative writers” 
whose narrative prose does not need the metatextual markers academic discourse does.  I 
disagree: King and Klinkenborg speak to the insecurities any writer has, insecurities that 
transcend genre and manifest themselves in an onslaught of metatext. 
 
28 Klinkenborg, of course, is not the first to recommend writers “Omit needless words.”  See 
Strunk and White for that famous dictum (23).  Nor is he the first to repeat the advice; see 
Stephen King, in On Writing, for example (282), or William Zinsser, in On Writing Well (6-16), 
or virtually any text on writing.  
Steven Pinker suggests the “major justification” for “omit needless words” comes from 
the cognitive demands each word in a sentence places upon its reader: first, the reader must 
interpret the word, and second, the reader must understand its syntactical relationship to other 
words.  Too many words in a sentence results in confusion at the syntactic level; hence the 
directive to omit needless words (104-06).  But Pinker continues, noting that what is “needless” 
is often hard to define, and too much deletion of supposedly “needless” words can also result in 
confusion (122-24).  Often, “needless” words shape the rhythm of a sentence, or designate 
important syntactic relationships within a sentence––such as the way “the” signals the following 
word will be a noun or part of a noun phrase––the word needless grammatically but necessary 
for readability.   
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  As if you were standing in a crow’s nest 
  Looking out over a sea of words, 
  Detecting a shift in the wind, 
  A change in the current, 
  A new impetus in your expectations, 
  And pointing it out to the reader.  (27) 
The transition is a means of orientation––a view of the adverb not unlike Graff and 
Birkenstein’s––such orientation evident in the sailing metaphor: rising above the prose, looking 
around, and seeing the sea of words, the shift in the wind, and the change in the current.  The 
writer points all this out to the reader.   
The sailing metaphor––its soothing, comfortable voyage––is a far cry from 
Klinkenborg’s other characterization of metatext as a violent act, one where textual cues “take 
the reader’s head between their hands and force her to look where they want her to” (118).  I 
account for this difference with the relationship each implies between the reader and the writer.  
The issue here is trust.  Trust governs the reader’s ability to make sense of the text without the 
aid of metatext.  Trust governs, too, the writer’s own insecurities, the fear of whether what has 
been written will be legible, accessible.  The writer trusts what has been written and trusts the 
reader to make sense of it.  This is, of course, not easy to do, which is why the gentle direction of 
the writer in the crow’s nest so easily becomes the violence of the writer clutching the reader’s 
head, forcing him to look a particular direction.   And it is perhaps this issue of trust that prompts 
Graff and Birkenstein to recommend “not to forgo explicit transition terms until you’ve first 
mastered their use” (112), implying that only the established, proven, skilled, “good” writers can 
finesse a piece of writing without relying on metatext to guide readers.  Again, Klinkenborg 
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disagrees: “Imagine a reader you can trust” (139).   (And this is, I note, what most students lack: 
a reader they can trust.)  Such trust will free prose from “all the grappling hooks of transition and 
false logic,” creating prose that “move[s] briskly and freely” (139).  When the writer trusts the 
reader, “All the devices of distrust fall away / The pretense of logic, the obsession with transition” 
(140).  And the way to do this, to write with trust?  According to Klinkenborg, write short 
sentences.  Sentences with rhythm, sentences with continuity, duration, extent, and presence, 
sentences short enough to feel the variation between them––sentences inhabited by the writer.   
 
4.4  WRITING AND TEACHING INSIDE AND OUTSIDE COMPOSITION 
 
In its resistance against how writing is taught, Several Short Sentences about Writing also resists 
traditional framings of ethos.  Whereas Aristotle understands ethos as a matter of the audience 
placing their trust in the speaker, Klinkenborg inverts that relationship, the writer placing trust in 
the reader, the reader the one with authority, the writer’s moves predicated upon a particular 
understanding of who that reader is.  Klinkenborg asks that the writer trust this reader, not pander 
to her, not dumb down discourse nor litter it with metatextual signposts insulting her intelligence 
and goodwill and good faith.  Klinkenborg imagines a reader who works while reading, one 
willing to devote care and attention to the act of engaging sentences.   
 And this is the same reader Klinkenborg writes for in Several Short Sentences about 
Writing.  It is not meant to be read from its first to its last page.  There are no chapter headings, 
no thesis statements, no topic sentences.  Rather, Several Short Sentences about Writing asks to 
be read in––and teaches a reading practice of––a scatter shot fashion.  Klinkenborg gives his 
reader plenty of room to maneuver through the book, believing his unconventional formatting 
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creates “very small units that you can lift out of the book and think about on your own without 
feeling like you’re in the middle of an argument” (“Book Nook”).  His project invites readers to 
sample, to jump around, to move selectively through the text.  
 This is a markedly different reading and writing practice than the one Graff and 
Birkenstein teach, and a more compelling and demanding pedagogy.  Students come to the first-
year writing course well trained at picking out Thesis Statements, Topic Sentences, and Key 
Words.  They are used to reading textbooks that present clearly laid-out arguments that move 
logically from one point to the next.  They are used to reading for the Main Point of a text.  They 
are used to having Key Words in bold font corresponding to a glossary in the back of the book.  
This is not necessarily a bad thing.  As Coles’s students say, you’ve got to know how to do it; it 
gets you by (The Plural I 37).  But it is not the type of reading students will encounter outside 
the academy, when they sit down to read a piece in The New Yorker, or a novel, or a memoir, or 
any genre of writing not governed by the thesis.  By working against the set way of reading 
students are so familiar with, so accustomed to, Klinkenborg prepares students to engage a wider 
range of discourse than Graff and Birkenstein’s pedagogy allows.  Graff and Birkenstein teach 
the moves that matter for academic discourse; Klinkenborg wants to move outside academic 
discourse, and to do so he writes a text that asks more of its readers than the prose Graff and 
Birkenstein both write and teach others to write.  
 Klinkenborg is useful, then, for how he disorients students.  When I have taught Several 
Short Sentences about Writing, students stumble when Klinkenborg recommends one practice 
only to then qualify that claim such that it is not unilateral.29  Students approach Klinkenborg 
                                                
29 There are many such moments in the book; see, for instance, the aforementioned discussion of 
metatext, where Klinkenborg lambasts it after initially recommending its judicious use (119; 27).  
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wanting his argument to be tidy and consistent.  Klinkenborg works against such tidiness largely 
because writing––and life––is not orderly30.  Several Short Sentences about Writing is full of 
what students call Contradictions and what I reframe as a writer working through subject matter 
that does not allow for reductive claims.   
By eschewing thesis-driven argument in his own writing, Klinkenborg disorients his 
readers, and he carries this disorientation into his own teaching.  His classroom sits 
fundamentally opposed to that of Graff and Birkenstein.  Klinkenborg wants “to put students in a 
state of constant creative turmoil” (“RE: Teaching the Sentence”).  In fall 2014, he taught a 
writing course at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies.  In that class, 
Klinkenborg distributed a handout asking that students “Choose a word limit for your sentences, 
say 6 or 7 words a sentence, no more.  Let the sentences expand or shrink as needed, but return 
again and again to that limit” (“Some Suggestions”).  This six- or seven-word sentence becomes 
the focal point of a semester’s worth of writing instruction, the challenge of writing them 
creating that “constant creative turmoil.”  Klinkenborg’s students write an essay every week––
“usually we start at about 2 pages in length and increase only as the prose improves”––
Klinkenborg urging his class “to make the shortest sentences they can force themselves to write, 
which always turn out to be half again too long.” 
I pause on his use of “force.”  Writing in the Klinkenborg classroom is a struggle, a place 
of “creative turmoil.”  This is a classroom working against Volunteer Sentences, a classroom 
working against Habit, against the Theme.  Klinkenborg reminds his readers, several times over, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Or consider Klinkenborg’s own writing of long sentences within a book praising the short 
sentence.   
   
30 On the tidiness of life, or lack thereof, see Klinkenborg on resisting chronology in writing 
(120-22).   
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“Your job as a writer is making sentences” (13, see also 47, 56, 67, 78).  Several Short Sentences 
about Writing is a book of writing instruction, yes, but so too it is a book concerning the 
formation of the self, a claim implied in the present progressive “is making.”  The process of 
making sentences, again and again, is what shapes an individual into a writer (an Aristotelian 
view of the formation of the self).  Klinkenborg admits that “Short sentences aren’t hard to make” 
but he clarifies: “The difficulty is forcing yourself to keep them short” (4).  The present 
progressive appears again (“is forcing”) and it reiterates a writer’s continual fight against habit, 




And yet, Klinkenborg has not been taken up by Composition, despite the provocative ways he 
teaches writing, despite how he works against tired pedagogies, despite his presence on a range 
of college-level writing course syllabi.31  The field has not engaged Klinkenborg––neither his 
nonfiction nor in particular Several Short Sentences about Writing––as evident by the dearth of 
citations in the field’s flagship journals.  The book has been reviewed once (by me) and cited 
twice (both times by me [“Of Chiasms” and “Grammar”]).  This lack of uptake is, in part, 
because Klinkenborg has written an anti-textbook, in the same spirit as Coles and Tufte, a project 
that works against the received wisdom about how to teach reading and writing.  Just as the field 
was unsure how to read Coles and Tufte, so too Composition does not know how to read 
                                                
31 A cursory Google search of “Klinkenborg syllabus” shows his work appearing on composition, 
creative writing, nonfiction, and journalism course syllabi in university, college, and community 
college classrooms.  
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Klinkenborg, Several Short Sentences about Writing not easily situated into Composition’s 
disciplinary discussions. 
Compounding this lack of uptake is that Klinkenborg sits outside Composition.  He wrote 
16 years for the New York Times.  His non-fiction sells well.  And so, when he offers a bit of 
theory––either Several Short Sentences about Writing or the occasional editorial on the teaching 
of writing––he becomes the “public intellectual” lamented by Paul Butler.  Butler points to three 
as examples: literary and cultural critics Stanley Fish, Louis Menand, and Heather Mac Donald, 
each of whom respectively has published pieces in the New York Times, The New Yorker, and 
Public Interest addressing writing instruction in American colleges and universities.  All three 
make a back-to-basics call, decrying the loss of current-traditional approaches to grammar 
instruction.  Butler argues Composition has “ceded the discussion” of the teaching of writing to 
public intellectuals such as these––all of whom are outside Composition––because of 
Composition’s own “neglect of style as a topic of serious scholarly inquiry” (Out of Style 122).  
Butler observes, “the areas that seem to be of chief concern outside the field are literacy, style, 
and grammar and usage,” and these are the issues Fish, Menand, and Mac Donald address in 
their op-ed pieces for the public (121). 32  Yet these are the issues Composition is less interested 
in, Butler argues, to the field’s own detriment: “In failing to articulate ideas about those language 
topics in which the public seems most invested, the discipline is left without sufficient credibility 
to bring up other concerns it considers pressing” (123).  There are hints of territorialism in 
                                                
32 Steven Pinker could be added to the list, his 2014 The Sense of Style reaching the general 
public, the dust jacket of that book labeling Pinker as a “public intellectual.”  See also Pinker’s 
Why Academic Writing Stinks and How to Fix It, a pamphlet co-authored with a philosopher 
(Michael Munger), a literary critic (Helen Sword), a creative writer (Rachel Toor), and a medical 
anthropologist (Theresa MacPhail).  Why Academic Writing Stinks collects short essays 
published on the Chronicle of Higher Education’s website.  Such pieces on academic writing are 
regular features at the Chronicle, and they are rarely written by those in Composition.   
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Butler’s argument, though Butler does not suggest that Composition ought to be the sole 
discipline teaching writing.  Far from it.  But it is Composition’s lack of recent work with style, 
Butler contends, that opens the door for Fish, Menand, Mac Donald, and their ilk to be the most 
prominent figures in public discussions on the teaching of writing.  The consequence: advances 
in composition theory are disregarded, the field a straw man for the current-traditional rhetorics 
these public intellectuals promote.  
Sean Zwagerman has argued in a recent issue of College Composition and 
Communication that for the sake of its own health, the field needs to find a way to engage public 
intellectuals and the conversations they provoke concerning the teaching of writing.  (He singles 
out the comment sections appended to Fish’s New York Times pieces as one such discussion in 
which Composition is regrettably silent.)  Zwagerman and Butler call Composition to enter those 
discussions.  Note the metaphor of place: enter those discussions.  Zwagerman and Butler ask the 
field to locate itself in relation to the public, to situate itself in the public square, to orient itself in 
relation to the arguments advanced by public intellectuals regarding the teaching of writing.  In 
making their calls, Zwagerman and Butler ask the field to do the work Graff and Birkenstein and 
Klinkenborg describe, create a syntactic self set in relation to the ideas of others.  Composition 
has failed to engage the public on the teaching of writing.  The field now needs to locate itself in 
that space.  
I echo that call, and take it further.  The field needs not only to engage public discussions 
on the teaching of writing; Composition needs to learn to read teachers on the margins of and 
outside the field––teachers like Austin, Fish, and Tufte, teachers like Coles, teachers like 
Klinkenborg.  I do not place these five alongside the public intellectuals Butler faults for 
resorting to a current-traditional approach to style.  The Outsiders I’ve addressed in this project 
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have ways of reading that deliberately resist reductive engagement with the sentence, and I’ve 
attempted to teach the field how it might read these teachers and what we might learn from them 
about reading, writing, teaching, and studying the sentence within a framework of rhetorical 
delivery.  
Through this project, I’ve attempted to deliver the sentence.  In turning to Performance, 
Display, and Location, I’ve expanded delivery to the written word, offering terminology to 
account for what happens when sentences are read and written within the framework of 
rhetorical delivery.  These terms deliver the sentence in that they aid in its rhetorical delivery––
but so too, they deliver the sentence in a second sense of the word.  Performance, Display, and 
Location deliver the sentence: they redeem the sentence from the pedagogical and curricular 
dregs of the writing classroom.  They revive the sentence, resurrect it, reclaim it as a site of 
valuable and consequential instruction.  They deliver the sentence from its pejorative 
associations with current-traditional rhetorics that offer little more than skill-and-drill instruction.   
Yet despite this re-theorizing of style and delivery, the question remains why a teacher 
would want to return to the sentence at all, why a teacher would bother with sentences when 
there are so many other curricular and social and political concerns weighing on the college-level 
writing instructor.  In Chapter Five, I offer an apology of the sentence. 
 
4.5  INTERCHAPTER: THE SENTENCE, INHABITED 
 
Kathleen Jamie’s “The Hvalsalen” records her visit to the Great Whale Hall in Bergen, Norway’s 
Natural History Museum.  The Hall houses 22 complete skeletons from 18 different species of 
whale, the majority suspended from the ceiling, swimming in the air above the Hall’s visitors.  It 
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is the largest collection of whale skeletons in the world.  The Hvalsalen has countless artifacts of 
natural history, but it is Jamie’s commentary on a killer whale’s heart bathed in chemicals, stored 
in a glass case, that catches my student’s attention.  The opening paragraph from his essay on 
Jamie and her whales:  
When visiting the Hvalsalen Museum in Bergen, Norway, Kathleen Jamie 
observes a “spherical object, two feet across, dense and mean, like a huge swollen 
black eye” (Jamie 100).  The object is the heart of a killer whale.  After realizing 
what she is looking at, Jamie describes the heart as “a deep red and black 
biological engine” (Jamie 100).  Since the components of the cardiovascular 
system, including the heart, are vital to the function of the whale and human body, 
it is not surprising that they are written about extensively.  I was surprised, 
however, to read such a functional definition of the heart in a work of literature.  
In most literature I’m familiar with, the heart and cardiovascular system are 
incorrectly associated with the complex emotions and emotional connections of 
the brain.  This abstract perspective is very different from the technical details of 
the cardiovascular system I’ve been learning about as a bioengineering major.  To 
graduate with a bioengineering degree, at least 35 science, mathematics, and 
engineering courses must be completed.  This curriculum may leave me ill-
prepared to analyze literature, but the concepts covered in these classes can be 
used to explain whale anatomy and physiology.  My biomechanics professor, Dr. 
David Vorp, emphasizes that in the body, “form follows function.”  Dr. Vorp 
stressed that the molecular, cellular, and tissue structures of an organism reflect 
the environment the organism lives in.  This suggests to me that a scientific 
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investigation can be used to describe how the cardiovascular system of whales is 
specialized to allow these massive animals to live in their harsh ocean 
environment. 
The student begins with Jamie’s words, quoting her description of the killer whale’s heart.  He 
then gives his own description of that heart, and his nouns are telling––components, 
cardiovascular system, heart, function.  They have a medical tone, a precision about them.  The 
student assembles these nouns into his first claim, a claim set against (and prompted by) Jamie’s 
description of the whale’s heart: “it is not surprising they are written about extensively.”  His I 
then appears––“I was surprised, however, to read such a functional definition of the heart in a 
work of literature”––this the first of three I statements.  This I is taken back that a “functional 
definition of the heart” would appear in something written by a poet, an idea continued in the 
student’s next sentence: “In most literature I’m familiar with, the heart and cardiovascular 
system are incorrectly associated with the complex emotions and emotional connections of the 
brain.”  The paragraph begins with Jamie, and midway through introduces a tension between the 
“functional definition of the heart” and the student’s experiences with how literature “incorrectly” 
handles the heart.   
These opening sentences of the paragraph serve two purposes: introduce Jamie and 
express the student’s surprise.  With another I statement, the student situates Literature’s 
characteristic handling of the heart against his own work in the sciences: “This abstract 
perspective is very different from the technical details of the cardiovascular system I’ve been 
learning about as a bioengineering major.”  This sentence leads into the central problem of the 
student’s project: how to reconcile the work of a scientist with that of the poet.  That is, how to 
situate one’s self within a discourse community.  The student is on his way to becoming an 
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expert in one field––he will take “at least 35 science, mathematics, and engineering courses”––
but he undercuts his burgeoning knowledge: “This curriculum may leave me ill-prepared to 
analyze literature.”  I read this as a subtle critique of the divide between the Humanities and the 
Sciences, and the student tries to bridge that gap: “but the concepts covered in these classes can 
be used to explain whale anatomy and physiology.”  That “but” signals a change of direction, 
and it is what makes this student’s project possible.  The student, discounting his ability to 
engage the literary arts, finds a way in through science, “but” acting as a turning point in his 
project.  
The remainder of the paragraph explains how a student of the sciences could locate 
himself, even make a place for himself, within the poetic.  He points to the teaching of his 
biomechanics professor, a teaching that shapes the rest of the student’s essay: “form follows 
function.”  The final sentence puts a capstone on the student’s finding a place to inhabit within 
this English course, within Jamie’s text, within bioengineering:  “This suggests to me that a 
scientific investigation can be used to describe how the cardiovascular system of whales is 
specialized to allow these massive animals to live in their harsh ocean environment.”  The “This” 
opening the sentence is loaded.  It could refer to Dr. Vorp’s teaching regarding the adaptive 
mechanisms of an organism to the environment around it, as that is the closest antecedent to the 
pronoun.  But I read “This” as referring not to Dr. Vorp’s teaching alone, but to the progression 
of thought outlined in the entire opening paragraph of the student’s essay.  “This”––the student’s 
initial interest about Jamie’s characterization of the heart, his naming of it as “a functional 
definition,” its divergence from “[incorrect associations] with the complex emotions and 
emotional connections of the brain,” its alignment with his studies as a bioengineering student, 
the tension between that curriculum and the analysis of literature, Dr. Vorp’s teaching that “form 
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follows function”––all these things, the progression from an initial interest to the student’s 
expertise in bioengineering, all this propels the student to bring bioengineering to bear upon 
Jamie’s work.   
What is remarkable about this paragraph is the student’s movement from his own 
disorientation in the poetic to a place of familiarity within the sciences.  The question is how.  At 
first glace, the student appears to locate himself in the poetic by way of what Christoph calls 
“identity statements” (670).  The student simply says, more or less, “I am a scientist,” and that 
declaration––perhaps a revelation in itself for the student––allows him to begin working his way 
into the literary and its treatment of the heart.  But I also see this locative work happening in the 
student’s very sentences, in particular, in his predicates. 
In Style: Toward Clarity and Grace, Joseph Williams offers “two complementary 
principles of cohesion”: 
Put at the beginning of a sentence those ideas that you have already mentioned, 
referred to, or implied, or concepts that you can reasonably assume your reader is 
already familiar with, and will readily recognize.   
The other principle is this: 
Put at the end of your sentence the newest, the most surprising, the most 
significant information: information that you want to stress––perhaps the 
information that you will expand on in your next sentence.  (48)33 
                                                
33 Virginia Tufte recognizes this same pattern: “The opening words of a sentence glance both 
backward and forward, establishing a relationship with what precedes and then brining into view 
the new information.  Perhaps two-thirds of English sentences open with the subject, and then 
move from what is known to what is unknown” (Artful Sentences 155).  See also Steven Pinker, 
with another version of the known-new contract: “Topic, then comment.  Given, then new” (131-
37).  Paul Butler, in Out of Style, also speaks to the known-new contract, claiming it was a key 
component of sentence-level pedagogy during the Golden Age of Style (8-9).  Louise Wetherbee 
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Each sentence draws upon the previous; the new information ending one sentence becomes the 
known information opening the next, and so on, and so on.  In Rhetorical Grammar: 
Grammatical Choices, Rhetorical Effects, Kolln and Gray call this the known-new contract; it is 
a tacit agreement between readers and writers (86-90).  Because this progression from known to 
new makes for readable prose, readers expect and prefer writing to be delivered in this way, and 
writers ought to oblige, as Kolln and Gray and Williams teach.   
Framing the known-new contract as a matter of concern for the wellbeing of the reader is 
not unlike how Graff and Birkenstein frame metatext––a locative device for readers, ushering 
them through prose while simultaneously locating the writer within the prose––and the known-
new contract governs this student’s paragraph.  The first sentence opens with Jamie, something 
known to readers of this paper as we––his classroom of peers and I––have all also read Jamie.  
The student puts Jamie as his subject, and then gives readers the new information that he will be 
focusing on her reading of the whale’s heart.  The opening move of the paper, then, is one of 
narrowing.   
KNOWN     NEW 
When visiting the Hvalsalen Museum in observes a “spherical object, two feet across, dense 
Bergen, Norway, Kathleen Jamie and mean, like a huge swollen black eye” (Jamie 
100). 
 
The next sentence points back to that “huge swollen black eye” and then provides new 
information that clarifies what it is. 
KNOWN     NEW 
The object     is the heart of a killer whale.  
 
Again, the student’s next sentence points back to the heart and to Jamie’s observation of it before 
giving readers a description of that heart. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Phelps links the known-new contract to work in linguistics and developmental pragmatics (52-
53).  
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KNOWN     NEW 
After realizing what she is looking at, Jamie describes the heart as “a deep red and black 
biological engine” (Jamie 100). 
 
After these opening sentences, the student pauses for a moment to offer some common 
knowledge: “Since the components of the cardiovascular system, including the heart, are vital to 
the function of the whale and human body”––this is all information readers already know––“it is 
not surprising that they are written about extensively.”  That, too, is known information; it is 
common sense.  This sentence provides nothing new; rather, it is laying groundwork for the 
student’s project.  He continues: “I was surprised, however, to read such a functional definition 
of the heart in a work of literature.”  These two sentences together follow the known-new 
contract: the student states a commonplace that the heart is written about often, and then gives 
readers the new information concerning his reaction to Jamie’s use of it.   
The known-new contract now kicks in full force.  The student points back to how 
literature handles the heart, known information coming from his previous sentences. 
KNOWN     NEW 
In most literature I’m familiar with, the heart  are incorrectly associated with the complex emotions 
and cardiovascular system    and emotional connections of the brain. 
 
Literature’s misuse of the heart becomes the known information for his next sentence. 
KNOWN     NEW 
This abstract perspective is very different from the technical details of the 
cardiovascular system I’ve been learning about as a 
bioengineering major.  
 
He then clarifies what it means to be a bioengineering major. 
KNOWN     NEW 
To graduate with a bioengineering degree, at  must be completed. 
least 35 science, mathematics, and engineering 
courses 
 
But there is a consequence to this course of study, the student explains, “This curriculum” 
pointing back to his coursework described in the previous sentence. 
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KNOWN     NEW 
This curriculum may leave me ill-prepared to analyze literature, but 
the concepts covered in these classes can be used to 
explain whale anatomy and physiology. 
 
A curriculum and the concepts covered in this student’s 35 courses in the sciences suggest that 
there would be a teacher involved, which becomes the known information of the next sentence. 
KNOWN     NEW 
My biomechanics professor, Dr. David Vorp, emphasizes that in the body, “form follows function.” 
 
In the next sentence, the student explains what “form follows function” means.  Dr. Vorp again 
appears as known information, but this time, his name becomes shorthand for his teaching 
articulated in the previous sentence. 
KNOWN     NEW 
Dr. Vorp stressed that the molecular, cellular, and tissue 
structures of an organism reflect the environment the 
organism lives in. 
 
The final sentence of the paragraph begins with the aforementioned loaded “This,” a this 
pointing back not only to Dr. Vorp’s teaching, but more so to the progression of thought that 
enabled the student to reach this point. 
KNOWN     NEW 
This suggests to me that a scientific investigation can be 
used to describe how the cardiovascular system of 
whales is specialized to allow these massive 
mammals to live in their harsh ocean environment. 
 
If measured by its use of the known-new contract, this last sentence is a syntactic feat.  There are 
multiple known-new relationships in the many clauses of its predicate, each one building upon 
the previous so as to end with a declaration of what the student will attempt in his paper: using 
his scientific expertise to make sense of Jamie, literature, and the hearts of whales.  
 From the student’s opening sentence quoting Jamie to the final sentence articulating his 
project, there is a progression from something shared with the class––something common, 
something known, that is, Jamie’s essay on whales––to something novel: the student’s work with 
that essay in light of his coursework as a student of the sciences.  It is a progression, for the 
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reader, from the known to the new.  Yet at the same time, for the writer the movement is the 
inverse.  The student begins in unfamiliar territory.  When reading Jamie’s essay, the student––a 
scientist––is out of sorts.  He admits as much, saying he is “ill-prepared to analyze literature.”  
Disoriented, he tries to find something to grasp on to, some way to steady himself.  That 
something is the comfort, the familiarity of science.  From the perspective of the writer, the 
paragraph moves not from the known to the new, but from the new to the known.  And by this 
movement the student locates himself in relation to Jamie, his other coursework, the literary arts, 
Dr. Vorp, and the whale’s heart.  
 This act of positioning is made possible by sentences, by the contract enacted and upheld 
by the very syntax of the student’s prose.  The subject of each provides known information for 
the reader yet new to the writer, and the predicate transforms that information into something 
new for the reader and something known for the writer.  The movement from subject to predicate, 
repeated sentence after sentence, is a metamorphosis, one whereby the writer manipulates the 
words and ideas of others into something familiar for him and something novel for his readers.  
This is the magic of syntax.  It transforms Jamie from something unfamiliar and inaccessible into 
a text the writer can work with.   
William Robinson claims, “[W]riters must make their most important decisions before 
they get to the verb, when they decide what to put in the topic portion of the sentence, which is 
where the subject is, and, by implication, what they will reserve for the comment part, which is 
where the verb is” (442).  Robinson’s characterization of the verb––which I read as the predicate, 
that is, as the “new” part of the sentence––is apt; it is in that syntactic space that the writer 
comments upon, and thereby transforms, the subject.  That is how this student’s paragraph 
operates.  Each predicate comments upon its attendant subject, that predicate then becoming the 
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subject of the next sentence, the pattern repeating itself roughly a dozen times in the paragraph.  
With each enactment of the known-new contract, sentences locate the writer in his text, each 
syntactic transformation of the known into the new building a habitation for the writer.  
This is all well and good, but I pause to think about what this writer could learn through 
revising his paper.  This student has not written a stock response in the sense of resorting to 
commonplace phrasings, the trite and banal, to find an avenue into Jamie’s text.  He has, though, 
written a schooled response, one that is tidy, exemplary in its use of the known-new contract, a 
model essay of academic argumentation.  And as I think about my role as a writing teacher, I 
wonder what I have to offer this student who has already learned the trappings of academic 
discourse.  One approach would recommend the student reinforce those lessons, return to Graff 
and Birkenstein, find more ways to engage in the dialogic reading and writing practice taught by 
the moves that matter in academic writing.  But this is the student Graff and Birkenstein write 
about when they say, “Once you get used to using [the templates], you can even dispense with 
them altogether, for the rhetorical moves they model will be at your fingertips in an unconscious, 
instinctive way” (11).  This student makes the “they say / I say” move by using Jamie as a 
starting point for his project before speaking himself; he makes the “yes, but” move when he 
writes that it is no surprise to find the heart addressed in literature but that he is shocked to find a 
“functional definition of the heart” in Jamie’s essay; he makes the “yes, and” move when he 
builds upon Dr. Vorp’s teaching; and so on through the course of his essay.  This student already 
knows the moves that matter in academic writing, and to ask him to revise along those lines 
would be treading trodden trails.  
Another response would rely on Klinkenborg’s desire to have his students in a “constant 
state of creative turmoil” (“RE: Teaching the Sentence”).   What if the student revised this paper 
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away from clarity, away from the thesis statement, away from the topic sentence, and toward 
implicit argumentation?  Asking this student to lessen the presence of his thesis-driven argument, 
to perhaps not rely as heavily on the known-new contract, to build an argument by implication,  
would ask the student to rethink his relationship with the reader.  This student writes prose that 
holds the reader’s hand and ushers the reader through its analysis.  There is certainly a use for 
such writing, but it also has its limits, making certain assumptions about what it means to teach 
the reader, what can be taught to the reader, how linguistic performance plays a role in that 
teaching, and what the writer’s responsibility is to the reader.  The student has settled into a 
value system concerning writing that does not trust the reader; it is a value system taught by 
Williams, by Graff and Birkenstein, by Kolln and Gray, a value system very much at the center 
of writing instruction in most college-level composition classrooms.   
I am not suggesting clarity is necessarily a bad thing, nor am I suggesting a well-
organized piece of writing is necessarily problematic.  I do claim, though, that it assumes a 
particular relationship between reader and writer, one that this student has perhaps never 
questioned, and one that a revision predicated on the idea of trusting the reader to follow an 
implicit thought––a revision that valued nuance and subtlety and muted argumentation––could 
challenge.  Klinkenborg asks that his students revise “toward brevity … directness … simplicity 
… clarity … rhythm … [and] literalness” (148).  But so too, he pushes his students toward 
“implication––the silent utterance of your sentences” and “silence––leave some” as well as 
“presence––the quiet authority of your prose” (148-49).  Through implication, through silence, 
through presence, through a quiet authority, this student could still locate himself within his 
sentences but do so while crafting a stylistic self that stands in tension with the directness of his 
first draft.  The student already knows how to make the moves that matter in academic writing; I 
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want him to think through what those moves assume about his relationship to the reader, how 















For me, nothing happens, or could happen, until I imagine myself 
within a discourse––a kind of textual conversation / confrontation 
with people whose work matters to me and whose work, then, 
makes my own possible.  
 
David Bartholomae 






The sentence is out of style, rarely part of most college-level writing courses, and it sits at the 
margins of the curriculum for a number of reasons: There is the disdain for current-traditional 
rhetorics and the sentence’s assumed connection to those pedagogies (see Butler Out of Style; 
Connors “Erasure”).  There are the memories of failed attempts to teach the sentence 30 years 
ago and its subsequent demise, leaving the field with the sense that we’ve exhausted the 
pedagogical potential of the sentence.  There is the inadequacy of previous theories of teaching, 
reading, and writing sentences.  There is the association of the sentence with elementary 
instruction, the notion that it is the job of the grammar schools, of the primary and secondary 
schools––surely not the job of a university professor––to teach the sentence.  There is the notion 
that the sentence is child’s play in comparison to the weight of Marxism or Feminism or Post-
Structuralism, etc.  There is, too, the intimidation of the sentence, the pressure to get it right, the 
unease students (and their teachers) feel toward questions of usage and convention.  There are 
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the pressing concerns of content-driven courses, such that the sentence is viewed as extraneous 
or tangential to the intellectual work of the curriculum.  And there is a tension between the 
sentence and thesis-driven discourse, a tension between sentences and invention, the sentence 
seen as window dressing against the higher-order concerns of thesis, organization, evidence, 
rebuttal, introductions and conclusions, transitions, and the litany of matters addressed in the 
composition classroom.   
Such concerns push the sentence aside, and they are what prompt the continual calls for 
Composition to take up the sentence once again.  The calls are regular: Daiker et al. in 1985, 
Rankin also in 1985, Kolln in 1991, Horner in 1992, Lu in 1994, Johnson in 2003, Micciche in 
2004, Johnson and Pace in 2005, Butler in 2008, Fish in 2011, Klinkenborg in 2012, Elbow too 
in 2012––and these are just the writers I find compelling in the past 30 years; there are dozens 
more calling the field back to the sentence.  These scholars value the sentence for its ability to 
teach critical thinking, its enactment of rhetorical practice, its manifestation of political and 
social and cultural tensions, its importance to the public, its vital connection to Composition’s 
reputation as a field.  
In calling Composition back to the sentence, Paul Butler writes that he is “not suggesting 
that the discipline simply return to looking at style in the way scholars did in the 1970s and 
1980s, or thoughtlessly adopt, for instance, the use of classical tropes and schemes in the 
classroom” (Out of Style 157).  Butler has no use for such nostalgia or for the rote memorization 
of classical figures.  Instead, he desires for “Compositionists [to] redefine style in a way that is 
meaningful to the field and that makes the study of style consonant with our disciplinary vision” 
(157).  In the teachers I’ve cited above I see efforts along these lines.  And in what I’ve written, I 
hope to have offered not a nostalgic return to the pedagogies of the Golden Age of Style but a 
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redefinition of style that is meaningful in its appropriation of and conflation with delivery.  In 
working toward a rhetoric of syntactic delivery, I’ve attempted to frame the sentence in light of 
Composition’s interdisciplinary identity, drawing upon Classical Rhetoric, Speech-Act Theory, 
Literary Criticism, Composition Theory, and Linguistics to enrich Composition’s teaching and 
reading and writing of the sentence.  I’ve attempted to make the sentence meaningful for a field 
that has set it aside for the past 30 years.  I’ve attempted to show that the sentence can be 
theorized, and taught, and read, and written in ways informed by the performativity of prose.  
I’ve attempted to reframe sentence-level instruction as inventive, as generative, as a site of 
possibility and one that has consequence for the classroom.  I’ve done so with the hope of 
reframing the teaching of the sentence as an inquiry into the relationship between language and 
Performance, between language and Displays of the shared values of a community, between 




And yet, I find myself returning, often, to a question Richard Miller asks in Writing at the End of 
the World: “Aside from gathering and organizing information, aside from generating critiques 
and analyses that forever fall on deaf ears, what might the literate arts be said to be good for?  
How––and in what limited ways––might reading and writing be made to matter in the new world 
that is evolving before our eyes?” (6).  Miller ends his book with the story of Dwight 
Conquergood.  Conquergood worked with the relief agency International Rescue Committee in 
the Thai refugee camp Ban Vinai.  Conquergood was to deal with a rabies outbreak.  The camp 
staff had tried a “mass dog-vaccination campaign,” but, Miller tells readers, “this had been a 
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complete failure, because not one refugee responded and no dogs received inoculations” (197).  
Conquergood––“who had an abiding interest in shamanism and performance art and who, unlike 
the other volunteers, actually lived in the camp with the refugees” (197)––tried another approach.  
He organized a “Rabies Parade” where Hmong folktale characters marched through the streets 
telling of the causes and dangers of rabies.  The response was overwhelming; “the vaccination 
stations were … besieged by dogs” (Fadiman 36, qtd. in Miller 197).  In response to the story, 
Miller writes, “If the goal is healing, what is the solution?  In this case, the answer is found in art 
and performance, in learning how to speak in ways that others can hear, in finding a way to move 
and be in more than one world at once” (197-98).  Miller sees Conquergood’s efforts as 
representative of the “primary function of the humanities” which “is not about admiration or 
greatness or appreciation or depth of knowledge or scholarly achievement; it’s about the 
movement between worlds, arms out, balancing; it’s about making connections” (198).   
 I pause over Miller’s reading of Conquergood for three reasons.  First, Miller uses 
Conquergood as exemplary of what the humanities can accomplish; indeed, it is through 
performance and art that Conquergood is able to address the medical needs of the village.  
Performance becomes a means of medicine, such that this view of the humanities is a big one, 
one that encompasses the Arts and the Sciences.  Second, Miller distinguishes admiration, 
greatness, appreciation, and depth of knowledge and scholarly achievement from what he sees as 
the purpose of the humanities.  This is a humanities set against the pedagogy of Fish, who argues, 
“Sentence craft equals sentence comprehension equals sentence appreciation” (How to Write 11, 
emphasis Fish’s).  The humanities Fish promotes is one of aesthetic appreciation; the humanities 
Miller promotes is one of healing, of action in the world.  Miller searches for, and imagines, a 
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humanities that has something to offer, something more than museum pieces.  Miller seeks a 
humanities that does something.  
 And third, I pause for how Miller uses Conquergood’s story.  It comes in the final pages 
of Writing at the End of the World.  Miller frames Conquergood’s story as an example of the 
“making connections” he believes the humanities can do, but the story is not offered as the 
definitive answer to the initial question Miller asked concerning the value of the literate arts.  
Miller is too careful a writer to leave a tidy answer to a complicated question.  I see the story as 
provocative.  In its demonstration of a humanities of action, it poses the question of what it 
means to make connections, what it means to move, as Miller writes, between worlds, arms out, 
balancing.  Set within the village community, the story again asks what good the literate arts are, 
literate arts so often housed within the classroom.   
I think of Miller’s question in early May 2015, as I stand in a newsstand in the Seattle 
airport, beneath a television, neck tilted upward, watching intently.  The State’s Attorney for 
Baltimore, Maryland has just announced six officers will be charged in the death of Freddie Gray.  
The newsstand is empty save for three employees and me.  A woman in a hijab cries as she stares 
at the television.  Two African American employees stand near me.  We glance at each other and 
up at the television as all four of us, silent, take in the press conference.  A month prior, I sat in 
the pews of a multi-racial church in downtown Pittsburgh for a panel titled “Race, Police, and the 
Community.”  There were five speakers: an active duty white cop, a retired African American 
cop, an African American University of Pittsburgh student who grew up in Ferguson, Missouri, 
an African American pastor, and a white pastor.  As I read the headlines, as I watch the news, as 
I attend these community forums, I return again and again to a version of Miller’s question: why 
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A teacher once told me the way toward good writing was to gather a few things––books, 
passages, artifacts––place them on my desk, and find a way to put them together.  In bringing 
those ideas together, something new emerges, something worth writing (and reading) about.  I 
noted in Chapter Four the etymology of composition––a “placing together”––and my teacher’s 
advice turns that definition of writing into a material and textual practice.  The writer places 
together the ideas that she can’t get away from, the ideas that linger, the ideas that need to be 
reconciled.  I see this sense of composing when Miller writes of his father’s love of John Donne, 
that his father “was infinitely amused and deeply moved by the way Donne violently yoked 
together the most heterogeneous of ideas” (180).  Miller then quotes from T. S. Eliot’s “The 
Metaphysical Poets”:  
When a poet’s mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly 
amalgamating disparate experience; the ordinary man’s experience is chaotic, 
irregular, fragmentary.  The latter falls in love, or reads Spinoza, and these two 
experiences have nothing to do with each other, or with the noise of the typewriter 
or the smell of cooking; in the mind of the poet these experiences are always 
forming new wholes.  (Eliot 64, qtd. in Miller 180-81) 
This composing practice describes not only Donne’s violent yoking of the flea and the bed, but 
also Miller’s own writing practice.  Within the first chapter of Writing at the End of the World, 
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for example, Miller composes Christ McCandless alongside René Descartes alongside Eric 
Harris and Dylan Klebold, looking at the reading practice of each––Miller’s project a 
demonstration of composition predicated upon the placing together of disparate experience, his 
writing forming new wholes.  
James Seitz offers another perspective, suggesting placing items together is the province 
of metaphor: “While literalism responds to difference by putting things in their ‘proper’ places, 
metaphor responds to difference by putting things together, not by merely juxtaposing them but 
by equating them despite, or even because of, their disparities” (194, emphasis Seitz’s).  Seitz 
describes this “metaphorical impulse” as “dialogic, novelistic, carnivalesque,” claiming that by 
putting items together, the writer enters into a “fictive space generated by the metaphor, where 
dialogue about equivalence and difference can begin” (194-95).  Seitz, like Miller, like Donne, 
like Eliot, understands composition to be a generative space, one wherein ideas, institutions, 
ideologies are placed among, amidst, and against each other. 
The yoking, the amalgamation, the dialogic, the novelistic, the carnivalesque happens at 
the level of the sentence, where the writer wrestles with this act of composition in a real, tangible, 
material, textual way.  The writer has a topic, which determines the subject of the sentence, and 
then the writer starts to worry about where this sentence is going and what it is saying, about 
where it is coming from and what the speaker is beginning to sound like.  The selection of a verb 
colors the subject, describing it by what it does.  Once the writer has a sense of what this subject 
does, then questions of objects, of prepositional phrases, of appositives, of absolutes, of 
subordinated and coordinated clauses, of adjectives and adverbs, arise.  With each, ideas are set 
in relation to each other, complicating, adding to, nuancing that initial relationship of subject and 
verb.  Walter Beale points out that “Function words such as ‘a,’ ‘an,’ ‘the,’ ‘this,’ ‘that,’ ‘some,’ 
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‘any,’ ‘in,’ and ‘to’ never occur alone” (Learning 178).  He claims they “can never stand alone,” 
and I add that neither does any word.  All words occur in relation to others, held in relation by 
grammar.  In the midst of composing a sentence, a writer feels the weight of this action. 
Composing, this placing together of ideas into a grammatical sentence, manifests, at the 
most basic level, a writer’s attempts to bring ideas into relation with each other.  And so Stanley 
Fish can claim sentences “promise nothing more than lessons and practice in the organization of 
the world.  That is what language does: organize the world into manageable, and in some sense 
artificial, units that can then be inhabited and manipulated” (How to Write 7).  But while Fish 
sees this act of composing as one of organization, inhabitation, and manipulation––and I agree 
that it is––I suggest too that the act of composing is one of reconciliation.  Granted, the ideas a 
student writes about may be far removed from the crises in the day’s headlines, but the subject is 
inconsequential.  What the student is enacting––regardless of the topic––is reconciliation through 
composition, through placing things together in hopes of creating something new.  Because of 
the requirements of a grammar that necessarily places ideas into relation one to another––verbs 
demand subjects and (sometimes) objects, prepositions demand nouns, adjectives demand nouns, 
adverbs demand verbs, and so on––writing sentences is a generative act, the writer searching for 





Because I believe this, most of my teaching addresses how students work with sources and how 
that work happens at the sentence level.  This pedagogical concern runs through the Interchapters, 
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from the student placing Porchia and Minaj together, to reading Frost via a blogger from Yahoo, 
to working with Queneau, to reading Freire, to bringing science to bear upon Jamie’s poetry.  
When the student gives another person space to speak within her own writing, engagement and 
reconciliation become possible.  The conventions of working with sources foster it.  Grammar 
encourages it.   
The following comes from a student writing in response to Raymond Queneau’s 
Exercises in Style.  The Exercises retell the same story of a scuffle on a Paris bus 99 ways in 99 
different styles, ranging from “Litotes” to “Animism” to “Homeoptotes” to “Awkward” to 
“Olfactory.”  (See Interchapter, “The Sentence, Performed,” for more on Queneau).  In her essay, 
the student sets the direct, outspoken pedagogy of Klinkenborg against the roundabout, subtle 
claims on style made in Queneau’s Exercises.  Her project attempts to reconcile two competing 
pedagogies through placing them together.  Here, midway through her paper, the student 
considers what the point of Queneau’s retellings might be: 
 Barbara Wright, the translator of Exercises in Style, states: 
And the point about the original story having no point, is one of the points 
of the book.  So much knowledge and comment on life is put into this 
pointless story.  It’s also important that it should be the same story all the 
time.  Anybody can––and automatically does––describe things in different 
ways.  (Wright “Preface” 15, emphasis Wright’s)   
This take on Queneau gives me mixed feelings, because I both agree and disagree 
with what she says.  I do agree that everybody describes things differently, as 
evidenced by the narrators of “Nobel” and “Cockney.”  I also agree that the point 
of such a pointless story is that it has no point.  The banality of the original story 
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gives way to change.  Yet, when I read each exercise, I noticed subtle changes and 
additions because I was not paying attention to the story itself; I was paying 
attention to the language in which it was written.  This is why I disagree with 
Wright when she says that it is important that the story remain the same very time.  
I would revise her statement to say that the importance lies in where the story 
changes.  These changes in the story are where it is most evident that Queneau is 
manipulating language.  
There are two critical moves in the paragraph, that is, moves a critic would make to engage 
Wright and Queneau.  First, the student introduces Wright’s words: “Barbara Wright, the 
translator of Exercises in Style, states:”  The colon is the most important piece of punctuation in 
the paragraph because it––as one of the conventions of quoting––invites a text-based 
engagement.  The colon signals that the student is about to step back and invite Wright to speak 
within her essay.  Wright then takes the stage.  Her words are set off by convention as well, the 
indentation signaling these are someone else’s words and not the student’s.  Here the student and 
Wright stand apart from each other; the formatting of the page delineates who speaks and when.  
(A comma and a pair of quotation marks accomplish the same for shorter quotations.)  In the 
sentences that follow, the student engages Wright.  The student identifies her ambivalence 
toward her––“I both agree and disagree with what she says”––and then the student specifies what 
she agrees with: that “everybody describes things differently” and that “the point of such a 
pointless story is that it has no point.”  With those two phrases––phrases that echo Wright’s 
prose––the student glosses Wright’s reading of Queneau and appropriates Wright’s words into 
her own.   
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The second critical moment of the paragraph comes with the student’s “Yet, when I read 
each exercise.”  Through that “Yet,” the student locates herself in relation to Wright.  “Yet” 
demands a balancing claim, one in tension with what preceded.  The student could have stopped 
at this point––and many do (and did)––having offered Wright’s reading of Queneau followed by 
her own combative argumentation.  But saying no more than “I agree” or “I disagree” 
accomplishes little more than drawing a line in the sand.  The student knows this, so she engages 
Wright further, continuing with “I would revise.”  The success of the paragraph rests in the verb 
“revise.”  It marks the moment the student begins creating something new with Wright and 
Queneau.  “Revise” demands an object, and given the student’s discussion of her unease with 
Wright, “revise” sets readers up to expect Wright to appear once again.  She does, now as the 
object of the sentence, Wright’s ideas grist for the student, the student using the words of others 
to create a revised reading of Queneau, a reading not possible had the student not engaged 
Wright.  
 Many students will not quote unless I ask.  When I do, they often drop the passage into 
their paper with no additional commentary or analysis.  When I push for analysis, students will 
either agree or disagree with the passage they quote.  When I introduce them to “Yes, but,” “No, 
but,” “Yes, and,” “No, and,” and other moves that foster critical engagement with a text, students 
respond with something akin to the passage I presented above.  In this progression, students 
move away from solipsism toward engaging the words of others.  It is an engagement made 
possible through the sentence, through a grammar that demands subjects and objects be placed in 
relation to each other.  It is an engagement the conventions of quoting encourage, the comma 
prefacing a quotation giving space for the writer to pause, the quotation marks setting off the 
words of another, the space following the quotation inviting the writer to elaborate.  This is a 
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composition, placing together someone else’s words with the writer’s.  By wrestling with other 
ideas, striving to reconcile them with her own, attempting to find a way to hold competing claims 
together within a paper, the writer composes a sentence while enacting a syntactic, textual, 
grammar-based reconciliation.   
This act of reconciliation becomes the more complicated––and beneficial––when 
additional voices are added to the discussion, the writer’s syntax now straining to hold together 
the poly-vocal discussion.  Consider the following sentence, from the student writing on Wright 
and Queneau.  I present it so as to highlight its multiple layers: 
 This is why  
  I disagree with Wright when 
   she says that 
    it is important that 
     the story remain the same every time. 
I see two ways to read this sentence.  Beginning on the right, “This” points back to the student’s 
interaction with Wright, moving next to a restatement of her position in relation to Wright (level 
2) and then clarifying that disagreement: the student doesn’t always disagree with Wright, only 
“when / she says that” (level 3).  Next, the student paraphrases Wright’s reading of Queneau 
(levels 4-5).  An alternative reading of this sentence would begin with “the story remain the same 
every time” and add layers to it as a left-branching sentence.  Each addition lengthens the 
sentence while revising its meaning.  Levels 4 and 5 stand alone as a sentence.  Add another 
layer, and levels 3, 4, and 5 become a sentence.  Add another layer, and levels 2, 3, 4 and 5 
become a sentence.  Add the final opening phrase, and all five levels become a sentence.  
Whether read from the right or from the left, this sentence places the student, Wright, and 
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Queneau in relation to each other.  Levels 4 and 5 paraphrase Wright on Queneau; level 3 invites 
Wright to speak and nuances the student’s uneasy relationship with Wright; level 2 is where the 
student stakes a position in relation to Wright, a position that is clarified in levels 3, 4, and 5; and 
level 1 sets the sentence in relation to the discourse preceding and following, locating the 
sentence within the larger composition.  
Sentences, then, are intrinsically responsive in (at least) two ways.  First, grammar 
enables words to act upon words held in relation by syntax, the pieces of a sentence responding 
to each other within the relationships fostered by grammar and convention.  Second, through the 
placement of a sentence within a larger piece of discourse, each individual sentence transforms 
ideas from the known into the new by way of the transformative abilities of a predicate acting 
upon a subject, the new part of any sentence a direct response to the known.  Without an already-
known subject, the predicate would have nothing to do, nothing to transform, nothing to be set in 




I teach the sentence out of this belief that it manifests the moves society as a whole needs to 
make, moves of bringing ideas together and composing something new.  The sentence is an 
inventive space, its grammar pushing writers toward completing a phrase, connecting a 
dependent clause with an independent one, using a conjunction to coordinate or subordinate 
ideas, using an absolute or a parenthetical aside or any number of syntactic moves to nuance 
meaning.  Through these acts of composition, through placing together ideas, students might 
learn patterns of thought and deed that can carry into their lives outside the writing classroom.   
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 It is for these reasons that I also teach the sentence through revision.  Working toward a 
grammar of engagement and reconciliation, the writer must refine her ideas, recognizing that 
with each rewritten sentence, those syntactic relationships change.  Klinkenborg advises that 
writers continually ask, “Why is the sentence this way and not another way?” (34).  If the 
sentence is a set of relationships held together by grammar, and if those relationships are 
representative of the relationships the student holds in the world outside and informing the 
written page, Klinkenborg’s question becomes a space to imagine other possibilities for those 
relationships.  And if the student is to ever rewrite those relations, the student must rewrite her 
sentences, for in the act of revision, the writer not only revises sentences but also––and more 
importantly––she revises her relationship to those sentences and the stakeholders implicated in 
their composition.  Herein is the cultural, political, social, rhetorical, and pedagogical potential of 
the writing classroom: we can revise sentences, and in that revision, we can work toward 
reconciliation, either within our sentences or within our communities.  
My standard assignment is for students to write an essay in response to a reading, and 
then, in revision, bring a second source to bear upon the discussion, at least half of the revised 
essay new material, the student now reconciling her view, the first source, and the second source, 
composing the three.  The revision asks for the engagement and reconciliation that attention to 
the sentence makes possible.  I also give weekly Sentence Exercises, short assignments asking 
students to experiment with language through revising sentences.  I have them write a 100-word 
sentence, rewrite the prose of others, cut a paragraph from 300 words to 150 to 75 to 30, 
combine sentences, write 15 versions of the same sentence, imitate the prose of others, break a 
100-word sentence into short sentences, display a paragraph of their own as Klinkenborg does 
and write about what they notice in their newly formatted prose.  None of these exercises has a 
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Correct Answer, but each asks that the student engage the work of the sentence and play within 
that space through rewriting sentences.  The goal in these exercises is not to become Stylish or 
write Clear prose but that students come to see the ways sentences can be manipulated and what 
those manipulations do to meaning.  In each exercise, I ask students why the sentence is written 
as it is, what it says and what it doesn’t say and what it might say, how it could have been written 
differently, and what the consequences of such a rewrite would be.  These are questions of 
revision, questions that ask the student to think through how subjects interact with objects 




Last year, in response to her Sentence Exercises and my insistence on revision, a student wrote a 
paper defining revision.  Drawing on Klinkenborg’s claim that “Composing a sentence always 
involves revision / Unless you write down the words of a sentence exactly as they pop into your 
head.  / And why would you do that?” (86), she arrives at the following: 
This is revision, the act of composing a sentence.  This is composition, the act of 
revising a sentence.  Just because it isn’t written down on paper doesn’t mean it 
can’t be revised.  And just because you revised the sentence in your head doesn’t 
mean it can’t be revised again when it’s written on paper. 
Just as the first student I quoted used Wright to write her own reading of Queneau, here, this 
student builds upon Klinkenborg to come to her own understanding of revision.  Klinkenborg 
argues revision and composition are entwined.  The student goes one step further, demonstrating 
that relationship through her syntax.  She utilizes a chiasm to do so.  Chiasms are a rhetorical 
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figure of speech wherein what happens at the beginning mirrors what happens at the end, 
following an ABC…C’B’A’ pattern.1  Consider the student’s definition of revision a second time, 
presented so as to show forth the chiastic structure of each sentence:  
A     This is revision,  
     B     the act of composing a sentence.   
     B’    This is composition,  
A’    the act of revising a sentence.   
 
C     Just because it isn’t written down on paper  
     D     doesn’t mean it can’t be revised.   
     D’    And just because you revised the sentence in your head  
C’    doesn’t mean it can’t be revised again when it’s written on paper. 
In the first sentence, the A-level concerns revision; the B-level concerns composition.  In the 
second sentence, the C-level concerns composition, the student repeating variations of “written 
on paper”; the D-level concerns revision.  This student places composition and revision against 
each other, the chiasm holding the two in tension, the repetition of each inflecting the meaning of 
the other.  As the student repeats her key terms of revision and composition, their definitions 
muddy, each now depending––syntactically and theoretically––upon the other for its meaning.  
The recursive chiasm brings this interdependence to the fore.  Her chiasm demonstrates how 
meaning is created through syntax and how a word is meaningless until it is set into a 
grammatical relationship with other words.  And through her chiasm, the student builds upon 
Klinkenborg, the student’s own writing setting herself in relation to his work.  Just as the words 
                                                
1 I’ve written elsewhere on chiasms.  See “Of Chiasms and Composition, or, The Whale, Part II” 
and “Of Tombs and Wombs, or, The Whale, Part III.”  
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she works to define come to carry signification when they are set against each other, so too 
Klinkenborg’s claims come to carry signification when they are set against the student’s own 
work with them.   
 In these sentences, the student is able to say something about revision that she could not 
have said prior to reading Klinkenborg, prior to practicing regular revision of her writing.  Her 
ideas are the synthesis of Klinkenborg, my teaching, and her own ideas.  Through this bringing 
together, her writing shows a limitation of the phrasing “They say / I say.”  Perhaps it is the 
presence of the /, or perhaps it is the opposition between “They” and “I,” but the phrasing “They 
say / I say” suggests that at a certain point, “They” step back and “I” speak.  However, it is more 
often the case (as this student’s writing shows) that “They” still speak when “I” speak, for what 
“I” say is necessarily and unavoidably said in response to and influenced by “They,” grammar 




Though I teach revision, though I teach a sentence that necessarily––by the demands of 
grammar––sets ideas in relation, engaging them and working toward reconciliation, and though I 
push students to resist the pressures of canned discourse, habit persists.  Students return, again 
and again, to Habit, to Themewriting, to Volunteer Sentences.  From the student trying to make 
sense of her relation to Queneau and Wright, the student who even revised Wright’s reading of 
Queneau––a moment holding so much potential for her now nuanced reading of Queneau––this, 
the paragraph following that moment of rewriting Wright’s prose:  
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As deduced from the above passage, I disagree with Wright on a particular 
interpretation of Queneau.  This does not mean that one of us is wrong; in fact, 
both claims could be made and backed up with reasoning from the text.  However, 
both are still different interpretations of a text.  Queneau is ambiguous, and to say 
that there is an ultimate truth to the text and not accept any other reasoning would 
be ludicrous.  
The commonplaces abound.  “As deduced from the above passage”: Reading is no longer a 
matter of engaging ideas––as it was when the student wrestled with Wright’s reading of 
Queneau––but a matter of deduction, my job reading this paper one of merely following an 
argument, deducing its conclusions.  Because reading is only a matter of deduction, the reader 
can only agree or disagree; accordingly, the student restates her disagreement with Wright and 
chooses not to explore the implications of her revision of Wright’s claims.  And because any 
claim can be “backed up with reasoning from the text,” the text is no longer material from which 
to create something new, no longer something to wrestle with, but instead a place to cherry pick 
quotations to support a claim.  The student then resorts to perhaps the largest commonplace of 
the whole paragraph: because every reading can be “backed up,” no one can have an 
authoritative reading of Queneau (or, for that matter, any text).  
 What bothers me most about this paragraph is that it comes on the heels of one holding so 
much promise.  The student had quoted from Wright, used “yet” to situate herself against Wright, 
and rewrote Wright’s claim, all these moves modeling the engagement that makes possible 
reconciliation of disparate ideas.  But following that, the student retreats to the stock responses of 
the writing classroom: that reading is a matter of deduction alone, that a text is only good for 
backing up claims, that everyone is entitled to their own opinion, and that no opinion is better 
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than any other.  It is a moment not unlike when Coles’s students, stymied by a new writing 
assignment, revert back to Themewriting.  The student has made progress with Wright, but does 
not seem to know what to do next, and she reverts back to sentences that are comfortable, easy, 
prepared, convenient.  These are sentences written out of Habit; they are Themetalk; they are 
Volunteer Sentences.  I do not think this student labored over these sentences.  The paragraph is 
too easy, its ideas too pat, its language too common, its phrasings too familiar.  The student has 
been written by these sentences, and the sentences undo the work of the previous paragraph.  
After a moment of triumph, she returns to the rhetoric of cant.   
 This student’s paper on Queneau exemplifies the success all writers can have––moments 
when we rewrite our own sentences with the sentences of others in order to make something 
new––amid the weight of Habit, of the Theme, of Volunteer Sentences.  It exemplifies, too, that 
such successes are never easy, never themselves the product of a habituated style, but instead 
something the writer revises toward as she works against the discourse that comes so easily.  
 I could respond to this student by pointing out the stock responses of her paragraph.  I 
could ask her why she abandoned the provocative rewriting of Wright in favor of commonplaces.  
I could circle the sentence where she revises Wright and ask that the student begin a new draft 
with that sentence as its starting point.  But this paper was her final paper of the term––further 
revision is not possible––which means something must be different within the course itself so as 
to teach the student to read her own work with an eye toward its Performance, toward the 
Displays of the shared values of a community it shows forth and hopefully challenges, toward 
how it Locates her in relation to the figures she writes about.  That something is what I’ve 
offered in this dissertation, a project exploring how we might work with the delivered sentence.  
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What, then, do I hope readers take from this project?  As for the day-to-day work of the 
classroom, a lesson on the sentence?  A revision assignment that attends to the delivery of 
written prose?  Perhaps part of the syllabus calendar devoted to delivery and style?  Maybe even 
an entire course devoted to reading and writing and re-writing sentences?  For our scholarship, a 
refined understanding of the relationship between delivery and style, or, for our teaching, a 
renewed vigor for stylistics and sentence-level pedagogies that recognizes the work of the 
sentence as intellectual and rigorous?   
If anything, I hope for this: a revision of how we––readers and writers, teachers and 
students––read, write, teach, and study the sentence.  The sentence is a consequential site of 
instruction with great pedagogical possibility, long neglected and misunderstood and under-
theorized.  Delivery is one means to deliver––that is, recoup––the sentence.  The sentence has 
the potential not only to reshape college-level writing courses through teaching the care, 
attention, and discernment needed when placing ideas in relation to each other––composing––but 
so too the sentence has the potential to reshape how we interact with those ideas, each revision of 
the sentence revising the writer’s position in relation to the individuals, ideas, ideologies, and 
institutions written about.  Many times in my teaching and in this project I turn to Klinkenborg’s 
claim that “Your job as a writer is making sentences” (13).  I return to it once more, and I rewrite 
it.  Our job as writers and readers, as teachers and students, is revising sentences.  And if we can 
revise our sentences, we can not only deliver the sentence from the pedagogical doldrums, but 
more importantly, we can write in ways meaningful, consequential, generative, and 
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